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Foreword 
On 29 June 2012, the euro area’s heads of state and government 
decided to create a European banking union. European banking 
supervision, established within the European Central Bank is one of 
the essential elements, the others being European bank resolution 
and European deposit insurance (Pisani-Ferry et al, 2012). European 
banking supervision became fully operational on 4 November 2014. 
Eighteen months on from its creation, the time has come for an initial 
assessment. This Blueprint provides the first in-depth review.
Looking back at the first eighteen months, I would identify three 
major debates around banking supervision. The first concerns 
non-performing loans in Europe’s banking system. The ECB’s asset 
quality review and stress tests prior to the establishment of European 
banking supervision uncovered large amounts of non-performing 
exposures in Europe’s banks. Those loans were a major concern for 
banks’ profitability and their ability to fund new profitable investments 
(Acharya and Steffen, 2014a). In particular, medium-sized banks were 
identified as a concern (Mody and Wolff, 2015). More recently, the 
debate has crystallised around non-performing loans in Italian banks 
and the question has arisen of why this issue was only raised in early 
2016. A recurring question in policy circles was therefore whether or 
not European banking supervision was forceful enough in addressing 
the problem and whether its strategy for addressing it was appropriate. 
The editors of this volume conclude that European banking supervi-
sion is tough and broadly fair – but they also acknowledge that Europe 
is still far from addressing all its banking problems. The chapter on 
Italy provides a detailed analysis, but it might still be too early to reach 
XII | BRUEGEL BLUEPRINT
a final conclusion.
The second big policy discussion evolved around the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism’s handling of the Greek situation in 2015. In 
particular, based on the ECB’s handling of Greek banks, concern was 
voiced that banking supervision within the ECB was not sufficiently 
independent from monetary policy decisions. The chapter on Greece 
in this volume provides a nuanced description of the unfolding of 
the stand-off between creditors and Greece and the difficult role that 
European banking supervision had to play. The fast-deteriorating 
economic situation in Greece during the stand-off certainly left a gap 
in the balance sheets of Greek banks. But the size of the gap depended 
on what the final resolution of the conflict would look like – it was hard 
to assess it in real time. In my view, any European supervisor would 
have had a very difficult time taking decisions on Greek banks in such 
a situation that would have precluded their access to funding. Rather 
than manifesting a conflict of interest with monetary policy, the polit-
ical stand-off in an incomplete and fragile monetary union made this 
supervisory decision difficult.
The third policy debate is more generally about the further insti-
tutional development of banking union. One important aspect is the 
separation of banking supervision from monetary policy. There are 
many good arguments for and against the central bank being in charge 
of banking supervision. It is fundamental that supervisory decisions 
should not be unduly influenced by monetary decisions and vice 
versa. In the euro area, it was only possible to establish European 
banking supervision so quickly because of the institutional and legal 
infrastructure of the ECB. Another aspect is how a centralised supervi-
sor operates in a union, in which the resolution framework is not fully 
integrated and deposit insurance is still national. Can it and should 
it end ring-fencing of capital and deposits? What degree of inde-
pendence does it have to take decisions that ultimately could imply 
fiscal costs at national level? How should sovereign debt be treated? 
European banking supervision in a fragile monetary union with an 
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incomplete banking union will remain a special and daunting task. 
The overall tone in this Blueprint is one of appreciation for how well 
the ECB has met this challenge. But we cannot content ourselves with 
the present situation and I would call on the European political system 
to finish the work started in June 2012.
The Blueprint provides an excellent review of the first 18 months of 
European banking supervision. It reviews the overall situation and the 
situation in a number of euro-area countries. In doing so, it provides 
important insights into the start of a new policy regime that involves 
profound change for the European banking landscape. Certainly 
one of the most important common themes is just how profound the 
regime shift from national supervision to European supervision is. The 
greater distance between European banking supervision and banks 
comes out strongly in all the chapters – and the greater independence 
is often highlighted, as is the fear of ‘one-size-does-not-fit-all’. The 
volume does not attempt to evaluate all the specific decisions of bank-
ing supervision. Arguably, such an evaluation is hard to do because 
it critically depends on assessing the information available to bank-
ing supervisors and forming a view of a counterfactual. The volume 
is therefore a critical review of the overall situation and outlines the 
emerging new European banking landscape under uniform European 
banking supervision.
The volume was edited by Bruegel scholars Dirk Schoenmaker and 
Nicolas Véron and I want to express my gratitude for their hard and 
successful work. Country chapters were mostly written by non-Bruegel 
scholars from nine countries who could offer deep insights into their 
respective countries. The scholars involved also acted as a group and 
discussed their findings. Let me thank them for their timely and insight-
ful contributions, and for the collective work that makes for an insight-
ful reading of the emergence of a new European banking landscape.
Guntram Wolff, Director of Bruegel
Brussels, June 2016

1 Introduction and executive 
summary
Dirk Schoenmaker and Nicolas Véron
European banking supervision (also known as the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism, or SSM1) is, in many ways, the cornerstone of Europe’s 
banking union, itself arguably the most ambitious European struc-
tural reform project of the past ten years (Véron, 2015; Schoenmaker, 
2015a). The first firm policy announcement to initiate banking union 
was made on 29 June 2012. It was, in the words of European Central 
Bank President Mario Draghi that same day, “the game-changer we 
need” to trigger the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) 
programme and end the most disorderly phase of the euro-area 
crisis (Van Rompuy, 2014). On 15 October 2013, the enactment of 
the SSM Regulation (Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013), unan-
imously adopted by all EU member states including those outside of 
the euro area, for the first time enshrined the vision of banking union 
in EU legislation, followed by the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) 
Regulation ((EU) No 806/2014) on 15 July 2014.
European banking supervision was a logical first step for banking 
union because key stakeholders, not least the German government2, 
1      We follow the ECB’s recent practice of generally referring to the new bank su-
pervisory policy framework in the euro area as ‘European banking supervision’, 
and to its own supervisory arm as ‘ECB banking supervision’: see ECB (2016a), 
page 4, footnote 1. 
2      On the German finance minister’s key role in introducing European banking  
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saw a neutral and central point of oversight of all banks in the system 
as a prerequisite for any further steps that might involve financial 
risk-sharing. It may thus have been inevitable that the second big 
policy announcement of 29 June 2012, on the possibility of direct 
recapitalisation of banks by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), 
was made conditional on the first, and framed as only possible “when 
an effective single supervisory mechanism is established”3. While the 
prospects for ESM direct recapitalisation were later shrunk to the 
point of near-meaninglessness, and the emphasis shifted to bail-in 
rules to minimise the public cost of future banking crises, it remains 
appropriate to see effective European banking supervision as the 
key to unlocking other advances towards a more complete banking 
union, including in the context of current debates about the European 
Commission’s proposal for a European Deposit Insurance Scheme 
(EDIS)4. In Mario Draghi’s words, European banking supervision “was 
an essential precondition for the other pillars of banking union” (ECB, 
2016a, foreword).
It matters greatly, therefore, to what extent the new European 
banking supervisory system can be considered ‘effective’. Some 
18 months after its official start on 4 November 2014, now is the right 
time for an early assessment – not of the legal framework, on which 
there is already a burgeoning literature (eg Busch and Ferrarini, 2015), 
but rather of how it works in practice. To achieve this, we observe the 
SSM’s early development here, not only from the European (namely, 
euro-area5) perspective, but also closer to the ground at the level of 
supervision into the euro-area crisis management discussion, see Peter Spiegel 
and Alex Barker, ‘Banking union falls short of EU goal’, Financial Times, 20 De-
cember 2013.
3      Euro Area Summit Statement, Brussels, 29 June 2012. 
4      European Commission press release, ‘A stronger Banking Union: New measures 
to reinforce deposit protection and further reduce banking risks’, Strasbourg, 
24 November 2015. 
5      The ‘banking union area’ may go beyond the euro area if other EU member states 
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individual member states. This two-level perspective is justified by the 
fact that banking supervision used to be almost entirely national until 
2014, and national idiosyncrasies will continue to shape the system 
for a long time, both in terms of banking models and structures and 
in terms of perceptions and politics – not to mention enduring dif-
ferences in bank and corporate insolvency laws, tax, accounting and 
other key aspects of the banking policy framework.
Much of this Blueprint is descriptive. The dawn of European 
banking supervision has shed a new light on the euro-area banking 
sector and created a new environment with its own conventions (eg 
the distinction between significant and less significant institutions), its 
own jargon (of which there is no shortage) and its own politics. Instead 
of benchmarking themselves only against national competitors, banks 
in the euro area are increasingly compared to peers across the area’s 
countries. Our European overview and country chapters examine 
Europe’s highly diverse banking landscape in this new light.
For reasons of practicality, we have selected nine euro-area coun-
tries which together represent more than 95 percent of the euro area’s 
total banking assets: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. This selection is somewhat arbi-
trary – one obvious shortcoming is that it includes none of the thirteen 
EU member states that joined the European Union in 2004 and after, 
of which seven are now in the euro area. The selection is tilted towards 
larger countries, or more specifically those with the largest banking 
sectors. Among the smaller countries, we have given priority to Greece 
and Portugal given their ongoing transition out of situations of severe 
banking-sector fragility. For each of these, we have selected an author 
who is both well-informed and suitably independent. While we made 
join it under the procedure known as close cooperation. No country, however, 
has so far taken this step. The Danish central bank has publicly recommended it 
for Denmark: see Danmarks Nationalbank, ‘Participation in the Banking Union 
is in the interest of Denmark’, 10 December 2014. 
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suggestions of themes to the nine country-chapter authors, they have 
been left free to focus on the issues they deemed important in their 
respective national contexts6. Their chapters, and our own overview 
section, are based not only on publicly available information but also 
on many conversations with a broad range of stakeholders includ-
ing national and European policymakers, bankers and other market 
participants.
Summarised findings
We find the new European banking supervision system to be broadly 
effective and, in line with the claim often made by its leading officials, 
tough and fair. These are remarkable achievements given the complexity 
of the transition from the previous regime. That said, we also identify 
significant areas for future improvement. ECB banking supervision still 
lacks transparency, and there is evidence that the supervisors still have 
much to learn about the banks they oversee in order to better accom-
plish their mission. Mistakes have been made along the way. Perhaps 
most importantly, European banking supervision has not yet achieved 
the objective of creating a level playing field for banking in the euro area 
and decisively breaking the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns.
• European banking supervision is effective. Supervision of 
cross-border banking groups in the euro area is conducted in a 
joined-up manner that contrasts with the previous fragmented, 
country-by-country practice. The key mechanism is the operation of 
Joint Supervisory Teams (JSTs), which for each supervised banking 
group enable information sharing between the ECB and relevant na-
tional supervisors while providing a clear line of command and de-
cision-making. The size of JSTs (up to several dozen examiners) also 
allows for specialisation on topics such as  capital and governance.
6      A coordination workshop planned for 23-24 March 2016 in Brussels had to be 
cancelled because of the attacks of 22 March; the meeting was held via conference 
call instead. 
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• European banking supervision is tough, at least when it comes 
to significant (larger) banks. It is generally more intrusive than 
previous national regimes, with supplementary questions during 
investigations and more on-site visits. The ECB is less vulnerable 
to regulatory capture and political intervention. An early quantita-
tive indication is that the ECB has not shied away from increasing 
capital requirements by imposing higher capital add-ons under its 
Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP). Fewer changes 
have been introduced so far for the supervision of less significant 
banks, which still varies significantly in different countries but ap-
pears generally less demanding than that of significant banks.
• European banking supervision appears to be broadly fair, at 
least for significant banks. Among these, we have not found com-
pelling evidence of country- or institution-specific distortions or 
special treatment by the ECB, for example in the determination of 
SREP scores. The situation is more complex when it comes to less 
significant banks that remain subject to national supervision, in-
cluding those tied together in what EU legislation calls Institutional 
Protection Schemes.
• European banking supervision makes mistakes. There have 
been cases of overlapping and redundant data requests. The ECB’s 
communication on maximum distributable amounts was ill-pre-
pared and contributed to volatility on bank equity markets in early 
2016. The Supervisory Board appears to act as a bottleneck in some 
procedures and does not optimise its use of delegation for day-to-
day decisions. 
• European banking supervision is insufficiently transparent. 
The ECB’s Supervisory Board and SREP process are seen as a black 
box by numerous stakeholders. Banks complain about the opacity 
of the determination of SREP scores, which are based on multiple 
6 | BRUEGEL BLUEPRINT
factors. European banking supervision still provides pitifully little 
public information about all supervised banks, in stark contrast to 
US counterparts. 
• European banking supervision has not yet broken the bank-sov-
ereign vicious circle and created a genuine single banking 
market in the euro area. Many lingering obstacles to a level 
playing field are outside European banking supervision’s re-
mit, including deposit insurance, macro-prudential decisions                       
(beyond banking) and many other important policy instruments 
that remain at national level. But even within its present scope of 
responsibility, European banking supervision maintains practices 
that contribute to cross-border fragmentation, such as the imposi-
tion of entity-level (as opposed to group-level) capital and liquidity 
requirements, or geographical ring-fencing, and the omission of 
geographical risk diversification inside the euro area in stress test 
scenarios. It has not yet put an end to the high home bias towards 
domestic sovereign debt in many banks’ bond portfolios. Nor have 
many cross-border acquisitions been approved by ECB banking                
supervision so far. 
Overall, we are impressed by the achievements of European bank-
ing supervision during its first 18 months. However, what remains to 
be done to achieve the vision of European banking union is daunting. 
Much of the work ahead is beyond the remit of European banking 
supervisors’ authority, but materially depends on their ability to 
establish credibility and trust. Almost four years after the inception 
of banking union in late June 2012, these are still very early days in a 
momentous transition. On the basis of the assessment presented in 
this Blueprint, we find grounds for cautious optimism.
2 European overview
Dirk Schoenmaker and Nicolas Véron
The new European banking supervisory framework
Advocacy in favour of a shift of banking policy to the European level 
long predates the euro-area crisis7. It was this crisis, however, and spe-
cifically what is now widely known as the bank-sovereign vicious circle, 
that forced euro-area leaders to jointly decide to initiate banking union 
in late June 2012 (Véron, 2011; Pisani-Ferry et al, 2012). This inevitably 
entails considerable risk-sharing, if only implicit, because systemic 
banking crises can happen and governments cannot leave them unad-
dressed. To contain moral hazard, a precondition for this risk sharing 
is the organisation of banking supervision at the euro-area level.
The European Commission’s proposal for the SSM Regulation was 
published on 12 September 2012, less than three months after the 
initial political impetus of late June. It was adopted in Council on 13 
December 2012 and, after some stalling in the European Parliament 
and a trilogue process, finally enacted on 15 October 2013. ECB bank-
ing supervision started shortly afterwards, with intense recruitment 
activity throughout 2014 and simultaneous work on the comprehen-
sive assessment of 130 euro-area based banking groups, involving 
an asset quality review (AQR) and a stress test. The results of this 
7      Academics and policymakers have long argued that the increasing intensity 
of cross-border banking would require a form of European banking supervi-
sion and/or resolution. See, for example, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (1992), 
Schoenmaker (1997), Padoa-Schioppa (1999), Vives (2001), Decressin et al 
(2007), Véron (2007) and Goodhart and Schoenmaker (2009).
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assessment were published on 26 October 2014 (ECB, 2014a), days 
before the ECB assumed its supervisory authority on 4 November.
The 2014 comprehensive assessment resulted in downward adjust-
ments of the reviewed banks’ assets of €48 billion, or 2.2 percent of 
their assets at the time. The stock of their non-performing exposures 
(NPE) was increased by €136 billion, as NPE definitions were harmo-
nised. The assessment identified capital shortfalls for 25 banks as of its 
cut-off date of end-2013, totalling €25 billion8. In absolute terms, Italy 
with €9.7 billion and Greece with €8.7 billion had the greatest capital 
shortfalls. As a percentage of risk-weighted assets, the countries with 
the greatest capital shortages were Cyprus (6 percent), Greece (4 per-
cent) and Portugal and Italy (1 percent each).
Under the SSM Regulation, the ECB is the single licensing author-
ity for all banks in the euro area; it also has sole authority to approve 
changes of ownership and new management9. The ECB enforces 
supervisory laws and regulations that are substantially harmonised 
at the EU level, and known as such as the ‘single rulebook’. The 
single rulebook, among other things, lays down capital and liquidity 
requirements for banks. Relevant EU legislation includes the Capital 
Requirements Regulation (CRR, (EU) No 575/2013) and four succes-
sive Capital Requirements Directives (CRD), the last enacted in 2013 
(2013/36/EU). The European Banking Authority (EBA), created in 
early 2011 with its seat in London, prepares many of the lower-level 
delegated and implementing acts (broadly equivalent to what are 
called regulations in the United States), which require the European 
Commission’s eventual approval. The EBA also maintains a single 
supervisory handbook to ensure consistency across the EU.
8      Twelve of these 25 banks had addressed the shortfall during the first nine months 
of 2014. The other 13 were asked to rapidly present recapitalisation plans for the 
shortfall to be addressed in the course of 2015. 
9      On this, the euro-area framework is more centralised than in the United States, 
where many banks and credit unions are licensed by state authorities even 
though they are supervised by federal agencies. 
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The ECB directly supervises 129 banking groups, broadly speaking 
the largest in the euro area. They are labelled significant institutions 
(SIs)10. The euro area’s more than 3,000 other banks (or less significant 
institutions, LSIs) are supervised by national competent authorities 
(NCAs), which are the national supervisors in the respective coun-
tries11. The ECB does not conduct parallel supervision of the LSIs, but 
exercises oversight of the NCAs to ensure supervisory consistency, and 
gives them supervisory support. Figure 1 illustrates the framework.
Figure 1: European banking supervision 
ECB banking supervision
Signicant institutions
(currently 129)
Less signicant institutions
(currently 3167)
National competent
authorities
Supervision
Oversight
Supervision
Key decisions: 
license, 
change of 
ownership, 
t-and-proper test
Source: Bruegel based on ECB (2016a). 
10    Under the SSM Regulation, all banks with consolidated assets over €30 billion are 
automatically designated as SIs, and other banks may also be designated if they 
meet other criteria. The list of supervised institutions, including designation of 
all SIs and LSIs, is regularly updated by ECB banking supervision and published 
on its website. Unless otherwise indicated, all numbers in this Blueprint are 
based on the list as of 1 January 2016. 
11   As of April 2016, for 12 of the 19 euro-area countries (Belgium, Cyprus, France, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia 
and Spain), the NCA is the national central bank (NCB). For the other seven 
(Austria, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Luxembourg and Malta), the NCA is 
an independent supervisory authority, such as BaFin in Germany, but the NCB 
also participates in the relevant JSTs. In the latter cases, the exact division of 
labour between the NCA and NCB varies for different countries. 
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Operationally, the key unit for European banking supervision is the 
Joint Supervisory Team (JST), one for each of the 129 SIs. JSTs combine 
ECB banking supervisory staff with staff from the NCAs. Each JST is 
led by a coordinator from the ECB12, always a national from outside 
the supervised bank’s home country, in line with standing practice 
of surveillance by international organisations like the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). Each JST also includes a sub-coordinator from 
the NCA of the bank’s home country, and if the bank has major oper-
ations in other euro-area countries, additional sub-coordinators from 
the relevant NCAs. JSTs of the largest banks can have as many as 70 to 
80 members, of which up to a dozen are ECB banking supervisory staff 
and the rest are from the participating NCAs.
The key decision-making body is the ECB’s Supervisory Board, which 
includes a chair (currently Danièle Nouy), a vice-chair who is also a 
member of the ECB’s executive board (currently Sabine Lautenschläger), 
four ECB representatives (currently Ignazio Angeloni, Luc Coene, Julie 
Dickson and Sirkka Hämäläinen), and representatives from all partici-
pating member states13. Apart from the Supervisory Board’s secretariat, 
ECB banking supervisory staff work in four directorates-general for 
micro supervision (DGMS). DGMS I supervises the system’s largest 
banking groups, currently numbering 30. DGMS II supervises all other 
SIs. DGMS III, the smallest of the four directorate-general in terms of 
headcount, oversees the supervision of LSIs by the NCAs. DGMS IV is in 
charge of horizontal functions, such as policy and common methodo- 
logies (eg for the SREP process), inspections and thematic reviews, for 
example on risk governance, horizontal analysis of internal models and 
IT and cybersecurity risks. There were 250 inspections in 2015 (of which 
12    By contrast with, for example, the Federal Reserve system, in which each bank’s 
supervisory team is led by one of the 12 regional Federal Reserve Banks, all JST 
coordinators are located at the ECB in Frankfurt. 
13    For those member states where the NCA is separate from the NCB, there are two 
representatives (from the NCA and NCB respectively), but they collectively have 
only one vote. 
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42 targeted the seven largest banking groups), involving mostly NCA 
staff but also the ECB’s centralised on-site inspections division with 
several dozen staff in DGMS IV (ECB, 2016a, section 2.4.3). Overall, the 
expenditure for ECB banking supervision in 2015, not counting super-
visory expenditures at the NCAs, was €277 million (ECB, 2016a, sec-
tion 5.1). This amount will grow in the next few years as the ECB is still 
recruiting new staff (ECB, 2016a, section 1).
Data requests are aligned with standards, which the EBA began to 
define well before the start of European supervision. The main stand-
ards for harmonised reporting by banks are COREP (common reporting 
for regulatory metrics, such as Pillar-1 capital14) and FINREP (financial 
reporting data, such as annual financial statements). While the NCAs 
are first in line for the collection of supervisory data and quality control, 
the ECB has established further quality controls to ensure consistent 
data quality standards across all supervised banks, and is gradually 
building up integrated information systems. The supervisory bank-
ing data system (SUBA in ECB lingo) allows for communication and 
data-sharing between the ECB and NCAs (ECB, 2016a, section 1.6).
The euro-area banking system
As of early 2016, the ECB directly supervises 129 SIs, listed and sum-
marily described in Table 6 at the end of this chapter. Of these, 96 are 
designated as significant because they have more than €30 billion in 
assets; the other 33 are designated under other criteria set by the SSM 
Regulation (among the largest three banks in a country; assets above 
20 percent of a country’s GDP; significant cross-border operations; 
or banks with assets over €30 billion in the previous three years). The 
14   The Basel capital accord (currently Basel III) defines Pillar-1 capital requirements 
as a minimum ratio of regulatory capital (eg common equity Tier1 or CET1 cap-
ital) over risk-weighted assets. Pillar-2 is based on supervisory review involving 
a greater degree of supervisory judgment, and may entail additional capital re-
quirements (‘Pillar-2 add-ons’). Pillar-3 is a framework for mandatory disclosure 
of regulatory information and risks, currently undergoing review by the Basel 
Committee because it has generally disappointed in the past. 
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breakdown of these banks and the 3,167 LSIs is shown in Table 1. 
Table 1: Institutions subject to European banking supervision (end-2015)
Size Number 
of banks
Assets 
(billions)
% of all euro 
area banks’ 
assets
CET1          
ratio in %
Leverage 
ratio 
in %
G-SIBs 
(> €800bn assets)
8 € 10,866 39.2 12.3 4.5
E-SIBs 
(> €150bn)
22 € 7,253 26.1 14.0 5.1
Other EA SIs           
(€3-150bn)
70 € 3,999 14.4 16.6 5.6
Significant subs/
branches 
(€3-302bn)
29 € 940 3.4 n.a. n.a.
LSIs 
(all < €30bn)
3,167 € 4,689 16.9 n.a. n.a.
All euro-area 
banks
3,296 € 27,747 100.0 n.a. n.a. 
Source: Bruegel based on SNL data and ECB (2016a). Notes: The CET1 ratio and lev-
erage ratio are calculated as an average weighted by total assets. The leverage ratio is 
defined as the ratio of Tier 1 Capital and total leverage exposure.
Table 2: Comparing the major banking systems, end-2015 
Banking 
system
Total 
assets 
(billions)
Domestic 
assets 
(billions)
Activity 
abroad 
(%)
CR-5 
Ratio 
(%)
Assets/
GDP 
(largest, %)
Assets/
GDP         
(top 3, %)
Assets/
GDP      
(top 5, %)
China € 28,226 € 26,999 4.3 40.4 30.1 76.9 113.6
Euro 
area
€ 27,747 € 22,757 18.0 24.6 18.8 50.1 73.3
U.S. € 14,296 € 13,044 8.8 40.4 10.7 28.7 38.3
Source: Bruegel based on SNL data and China Banking Regulatory Commission 
(CBRC) for China, ECB (2016a) for the euro area, and Federal Reserve for the Unit-
ed States. Notes: The total assets comprise consolidated assets of domestic banking 
groups and domestic assets of subsidiaries and branches of foreign banks. To calculate 
the size of the respective banking systems (labelled as domestic assets), the foreign 
assets of the domestic banks are deducted. The concentration ratio of the largest five 
banks (CR-5) is based on their domestic assets as a percentage of total domestic assets.
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The SIs dominate the landscape, with 83 percent of the system’s 
total assets; LSIs are more important in some member states (espe-
cially Austria, Germany and Italy), but unfortunately the ECB does not 
(yet) provide a split of LSI assets by country. The eight largest SIs are 
designated by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) as ‘global systemi-
cally important banks’ (G-SIBs)15. We use the label ‘European systemi-
cally important banks’ (E-SIBs) for the next 22 SIs with more than €150 
billion in assets16. Together, the euro area’s G-SIBs and E-SIBs repre-
sent almost two-thirds of the area’s total assets. 
Table 2 compares the euro area with the banking systems of 
China and the United States. Following rapid recent growth, China 
has become the world’s largest banking system with €28.2 trillion in 
total assets at end-2015. The European banking union follows closely 
with €27.7 trillion, and the United States is about half that size with 
€14.3 trillion. Table 2 also shows that euro-area banks are much more 
internationally active (outside the euro area) than their US or Chinese 
counterparts (see Table 3 for more detail). It further indicates that the 
concentration ratio for the largest five banks (CR-5 ratio) is only 24.6 
percent in the euro area, while for both the Chinese and US banking 
market it is 40.4 percent. Europe’s banking union thus starts signif-
icantly less concentrated than its international counterparts, even 
though its banks have a heavier weight than those in the US when 
measured against euro-area GDP17. A crucial question is whether the 
euro area will witness the same merger-and-acquisition dynamics as 
15   By decreasing order of total assets (Table 6): BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole, 
Deutsche Bank, Santander, Société Générale, BPCE, UniCredit and ING. 
16   The ECB does not explicitly disclose the split of SIs by supervision between 
DGMS I and DGMS II, but we presume that the 30 banks supervised by DGMS I 
are the eight G-SIBs and 22 E-SIBs. The E-SIB labelling is our judgment and does 
not appear in ECB communication. 
17   The gap between Europe and the US is partly, but far from entirely, related to 
differences in accounting standards, which make the US banks appear compara-
tively smaller when measured by total assets. Accounting differences presumably 
have less of an impact between Europe and China. 
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the US experienced after the lifting of restrictions on interstate banking 
by the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 
1994 (Stiroh and Strahan, 2003; Schoenmaker, 2015b).
Zooming in on the G-SIBs and E-SIBs, Table 3 shows their bank-
ing union market shares and cross-border footprints. The banking 
union market share is defined as a banking group’s assets in the euro 
area divided by total domestic assets in the banking euro area (as 
shown in Table 2). While the euro area has very large banks with up 
to almost €2 trillion in assets, their banking union market share does 
not exceed 7 percent (Crédit Agricole). By contrast, large US banks, 
such as JP Morgan Chase and Bank of America, have 13 percent and 
11 percent respectively of the US banking market18. This highlights the 
comparative fragmentation of the euro-area market when seen from a 
European perspective19.
Table 3 also provides the geographical segmentation of bank assets 
by home country, other euro-area countries, non-euro EU countries 
and non-EU countries. On (weighted) average, G-SIBs and E-SIBs 
conduct 58 percent of their business in their home countries, and 16 
percent in other banking union countries. As a consequence, the euro 
area, which may be viewed as their new ‘home’ base, represents 74 
percent of their total assets. The SSM is thus significantly better able to 
conduct supervision of these large banks at a consolidated level than 
individual country authorities were in the pre-banking union era.
Table 3 shows some major differences in the banks’ internationali-
sation patterns. Three of them have a global reach with around 30 per-
cent or more of their assets outside the EU: Deutsche Bank, Santander 
18   US federal law prevents any bank from gaining more than 10 percent of national 
deposits in the United States through acquisition. So, JP Morgan Chase and Bank 
of America can only organically grow in the US. Lucas (2014) ranks the top five 
US banks by assets.
19    Compared to asset numbers, market shares are less affected by differences in 
accounting standards. Of course, the market landscape is very different when 
considered from a national perspective inside the euro area, as illustrated in 
several of this Blueprint’s country chapters. 
15 | EUROPEAN BANKING SUPERVISION: THE FIRST EIGHTEEN MONTHS
and BBVA. Next, several banks can be considered pan-European, with 
more than 30 percent of their assets in other European countries: BNP 
Paribas, UniCredit, ING, Commerzbank, KBC, Banco Sabadell and 
Erste. The remaining banks retain a strong domestic focus, with over 70 
percent of their assets in their respective home countries20.
Turning to the overall group of SIs, there is an important distinc-
tion between 100 banking groups headquartered in the euro area, or 
euro-area banking groups, and 29 subsidiaries and branches of other 
groups21. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the 100 euro-area banking 
groups by home country. France is a clear first in this ranking, with an 
aggregate €7.4 trillion in assets, followed by Germany (€4.4 trillion), 
Spain (€3.4 trillion), Italy (€2.4 trillion) and the Netherlands (€2.2 
trillion). The other countries are all well under €1.0 trillion. While the 
German and French banking systems are more or less equal in size 
(around €8 trillion)22, this chart illustrates a major difference between 
the two largest banking union countries: France has a centralised 
banking system with a few relatively large banks, some with substan-
tial international assets. By contrast, German banks are typically small 
and local (and thus categorised as LSIs), and even the larger German 
banks, with the exceptions of Deutsche and Commerzbank, tend to 
have a domestic focus. A similar contrast underlies the respective posi-
tions of Spain versus Italy, or the Netherlands versus Belgium.
If we look at cities instead of countries, Paris is by far the biggest 
banking centre with 11 of the 100 euro-area banking groups repre-
senting €7.4 trillion in assets, followed by Frankfurt (six groups, €2.9 
trillion), Madrid (eight groups, €2.6 trillion), the Dutch Randstad (six 
groups, €2.2 trillion) and Milan (five groups, €1.8 trillion). Table 6 pro-
vides the details.
20    Dexia is left aside in this enumeration, because it is in a process of unwinding. 
21    As Table 1 shows, the vast majority of SI assets belong to the 100 euro-area bank-
ing groups. 
22    Source: Aggregate MFI balance sheets at the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse.
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Table 3: Global and European systemically important banks (G- and E-SIBs), 
end-2015
Banking union Rest of world
Banking groups 
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1 BNP Paribas (FR) €1,994 5.3 25 36 11 28
2 Crédit Agricole (FR) €1,699 6.7 81 8 2 8
3 Deutsche Bank (DE) €1,629 3.2 26 19 9 46
4 Santander (ES) €1,340 2.3 28 11 31 29
5 Société Générale (FR) €1,334 4.7 72 8 10 11
6 BPCE (FR) €1,167 4.8 91 2 1 6
7 UniCredit (IT) €860 2.8 40 35 22 3
8 ING (NL) €842 2.7 36 38 9 17
9 BBVA (ES) €750 1.6 39 10 4 47
10 Crédit Mutuel (FR) €707 3.0 89 8 1 3
11 Intesa Sanpaolo (IT) €676 2.7 85 5 6 5
12 Rabobank (NL) €670 2.3 74 5 2 20
13 Commerzbank (DE) €533 1.7 52 19 16 13
14 DZ Bank (DE) €408 1.6 82 7 5 5
15 ABN AMRO (NL) €390 1.5 73 12 3 11
16 CaixaBank (ES) €344 1.4 86 8 3 4
17 KBC Group (BE) €252 0.8 52 21 22 5
18 LBBW. (DE) €234 0.9 76 10 7 8
19 Dexia (BE) €230 0.6 1 59 16 23
20 La Banque Postale (FR) €219 1.0 99 1 0 0
21 BayernLB (DE) €216 0.8 77 10 6 7
22 Banco Sabadell (ES) €209 0.8 63 21 8 7
23 Bankia (ES) €207 0.9 86 10 4 1
24 Erste Group (AT) €200 0.6 44 18 36 1
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25 NORD/LB (DE) €181 0.7 85 8 3 4
26 Belfius (BE) €177 0.7 70 20 8 2
27 Helaba (DE) €172 0.7 86 5 3 6
28 Monte Paschi Siena (IT) €169 0.7 95 3 1 1
29 Banco Popular (ES) €159 0.7 92 6 0 2
30 BNG Bank (NL) €150 0.6 88 8 3 0
Total G-/E-SIBs €18,119 58.7 58 16 9 17
Source: Bruegel based on SNL Financial, annual reports and ECB SDW. Notes: The 
market share in the banking union is defined as the share of total assets in the banking 
union of the respective banking group over total banking assets in the banking union. 
The geographical breakdown refers to the share of assets in the home market, the 
banking union, the rest of Europe and the rest of the world over the total assets of the 
respective banking group. The home and banking union shares add up to the total 
banking union share. The bottom line is calculated as average weighted by assets. The 
data is for end 2015, except for Crédit Mutuel, which is end 2014.
Next, Table 4 ranks the banking groups according to their gov-
ernance. We distinguish three main categories: commercial banks, 
cooperative-governed banks, and government-owned banks (see the 
notes to Table 6 for definitions). Remarkably, and in sharp contrast to 
both the United States and the United Kingdom, commercial banking 
groups with dispersed ownership are barely more than half of total 
assets (€11.9 trillion, or 54 percent of the total), making up only 30 
out of 100 banking groups. Cooperative groups are almost as numer-
ous (27 out of 100) and total €6.3 trillion in assets, or 28 percent of 
the total. There are no fewer than 32 government-controlled banking 
groups, including some owned by local governments, banks national-
ised during the crisis, and policy banks; they represent €3.6 trillion in 
assets, or 16 percent of the total. The remaining banks (2 percent of the 
total) are privately-controlled commercial banks. 
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Figure 2: Significant euro-area banking groups, total assets by country (€ bn)
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Source: Bruegel based on SNL Financial for the 100 euro-area-headquartered SIs. Note 
that all SIs in Estonia, Lithuania and Slovakia are branches or subsidiaries of groups 
headquartered elsewhere (see Table 6). 
Table 4: Governance of euro-area banking groups (end-2015)
Governance Number of 
banks
Total assets 
(€ billions)
CET1 ratio 
in %
Leverage ratio 
in %
Commercial 41  € 12,258 12.4 4.9
- Dispersed ownership 30  € 11,892 12.4 4.8
- Privately held 11  € 366 13.7 7.3
Cooperative 27  € 6,269 13.6 5.2
Government 32  € 3,591 17.9 4.9
- Public sector banks 22  € 2,279 19.2 4.9
- Nationalised 10  € 1,312 15.7 4.8
Total 100  € 22,118 13.6 5.0
Source: Bruegel based on SNL data and ECB (2016a). Notes: The CET1 ratio and lever-
age ratio are calculated as an average weighted by total assets.
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While the government-controlled banks appear to be better capi-
talised with an average CET1 ratio of 18 percent compared to around 
13 percent for commercial and cooperative banks, the average leverage 
ratio hovers around 5 percent for all three categories. This illustrates 
the zero/low risk-weights for sovereign and semi-sovereign exposures 
as input to the risk-weighted CET1 ratio calculations, combined with 
the fact that government-owned banks often hold a lot of sovereign 
and semi-sovereign assets. The unweighted leverage ratio corrects for 
these low risk weights.
Only 41 of the 100 euro-area banking groups are publicly listed at 
the parent-entity level, representing €15 trillion, or 68 percent of total 
assets of these 100 groups. This has implications in terms of transpar-
ency, since disclosure requirements are more stringent and better 
enforced for listed groups than for unlisted ones. The branches and 
subsidiaries of non-euro area banks are comparatively more ‘com-
mercial’, with 22 out of 29 banks, representing €798 billion out of €940 
billion in assets (85 percent), being part of commercial banking groups 
with dispersed ownership.
Finally, 18 of these 29 branches and subsidiaries (representing 
€744 billion in assets, or 77 percent of total assets of the 29 branches 
and subsidiaries) are held by EU-based groups, including by far the 
two largest, Nordea Finland and HSBC France. The largest euro-area 
bank with a non-EU parent is Abanca (formerly Novacaixagalicia, sold 
by the Spanish Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring to Venezuela’s 
Banesco), which comes a distant third with €47 billion in assets. In 
other terms, non-EU foreign penetration in the euro-area banking 
system is very low. One reason for this is that large American and other 
non-EU banks tend to concentrate their EU operations in London 
and use their EU internal market ‘passport’ from there (Goodhart and 
Schoenmaker, 2016). There is essentially no US presence in European 
retail banking, in marked contrast to US retail banking where several 
euro-area groups (in particular BBVA, BNP Paribas and Santander) 
have significant regional positions.
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Figure 3: Non-performing loans (% of total gross loans)
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Source: Bruegel based on IMF Financial Soundness Indicators database. Note: ‘Core’ 
refers to a simple average of Austria, Belgium, France and the Netherlands (Germany is 
omitted for lack of data availability).
The euro-area banking system is not only heterogeneous in terms 
of bank size, governance, and ownership; it is also characterised by 
significant variations in bank strength. The strength of the banking sec-
tors in different countries also varies notably. Figure 3 illustrates this 
heterogeneity by comparing non-performing loan (NPL) rates in sev-
eral member states. This picture has to be taken with a grain of caution, 
because it is based on national NPL definitions that are not necessarily 
harmonised, and an increase in reported NPLs is itself an ambiguous 
signal: it might signify a deterioration in the quality of loans, but might 
also result from better measurement and curbs on practices variously 
referred to as loan forbearance, ‘evergreening’ or ‘extend-and-pretend’ 
(Advisory Scientific Committee, 2012). Nevertheless, Figure 3 pro-
vides support for the view that Greece, Italy and Portugal, in particu-
lar, are still far from having brought their banking systems back to 
soundness, while Ireland and Spain are, after major restructuring and 
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recapitalisation of their banking systems, more advanced on the path 
towards recovery23.
Assessing European banking supervision
Our assessment is based on three criteria. The first is effectiveness: is 
European banking supervision able to fulfil its mandate? The second is 
toughness: is the supervision rigorous enough to ensure the stability of 
the banking system? The third is fairness: is it consistent across super-
vised banks and countries? Where relevant, we use quantitative indica-
tors to underpin the assessment. Our aim is to assess the performance 
of the overall system of European banking supervision, including the 
ECB and all NCAs24. At times, it is nevertheless helpful to differentiate 
between the performance of the ECB, which is ultimately in charge, 
and those of the NCAs. This split is unsurprisingly even more apparent 
in the subsequent country-specific chapters of this Blueprint.
Effectiveness
In the short period from the June 2012 political decision to embrace 
banking union to the effective start of European banking supervision 
in November 2014, the ECB and NCAs managed a generally smooth 
transition from the previous national frameworks. The size of the task 
is illustrated by the ECB hiring by the end of 2014 approximately 900 
staff for banking supervision and related shared support services25. The 
reliance on existing ECB infrastructure, including human-resources 
support, information systems and facilities, was crucial in realising 
23   The picture looks fairly similar if one uses aggregate NPL ratios based on the 
sample of supervised banks in Table 6, which is based on SNL Financial, instead 
of national data collected by the IMF.
24   In line with many others, our collective reference to ‘the NCAs’ also encompasses 
national central banks that play a role in their respective countries alongside the 
NCA, eg the Deutsche Bundesbank or Austrian National Bank. 
25    See ECB (2016a, page 15). Around three-quarters of the new staff came from the 
NCAs.
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this. Our assessment is that the ECB has successfully mobilised its own 
resources and those of the NCAs to set-up an effective supervisory 
organisation, on time as mandated by EU law26.
The following country-specific chapters, combined with our own 
observations across the euro area, lead us to the view that the JSTs 
work much better than the previous supervisory colleges for cross-bor-
der banks, because there is a clear line of command and deci-
sion-making. Next, both home and host NCAs in the euro area are fully 
engaged in the same supervisory effort. Information-sharing between 
home and host supervisors in the pre-banking-union era was lim-
ited by many factors that became particularly acute in times of stress, 
notwithstanding the memoranda of understanding. One consequence 
was that host supervisors tended to err on the side of caution and add 
local requirements that were unnecessary and suboptimal from a con-
solidated prudential perspective. By contrast, the ECB and the NCAs 
now use connected databases with a common data format, and the 
legislative framework guarantees the adequate pooling of supervisory 
information. The larger size of the JST for a euro-area-headquartered 
banking group, compared to the previous separate teams in individ-
ual countries, also allows for specialisation within the team on topics 
like solvency, liquidity, asset quality and governance. In sum, the JST 
framework enables European banking supervision to form a consoli-
dated view at the euro-area level. European banking supervision also 
greatly facilitates international supervisory cooperation. As Tables 
2 and 3 illustrate, many euro-area banks have significant activities 
outside the area as well as in several euro-area countries. The ECB, as 
their single home supervisor, makes coordination easier in European 
and global supervisory colleges with peers in the UK, United States 
and other jurisdictions. The ECB also participates as host in the super-
visory colleges of at least some of the 16 banks that hold significant 
26    The SSM Regulation gave the ECB discretion to extend the deadline of 4 Novem-
ber 2014, but the ECB did not use that option. 
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branches and/or subsidiaries in the euro area27.
The JST framework can also, inevitably in our view, generate ten-
sions. While the head (coordinator) of the team, who is always from 
ECB staff, is ultimately in charge, the sub-coordinators from the NCAs 
have dual reporting lines, to the JST coordinator at the ECB and to 
their local manager. This may lead to conflicts of interests or loyalties, 
for example if the ECB advocates a tougher stance than the NCA lead-
ership. Another case is ring-fencing (see below), over which the ECB 
may take a softer stance on additional capital requirements at the local 
entity (as opposed to group) level than the respective NCAs.
Based on interviews with supervisors and supervised entities, we 
find that the internal culture of ECB banking supervision has coa-
lesced rapidly and is stronger than might be expected of such a young 
institution. The hard deadlines and operational complexity of the 
comprehensive assessment appears to have acted as a ‘crucible’ in this 
respect, forging a sense of shared experience and common belonging 
among the initial cadre of ECB supervisory staff. There is little doubt 
that the hosting of the central supervisory function by the ECB, with 
its organisational strength and independence (buttressed by a single 
working language), has helped enormously in this outcome, as has the 
overall quality of the new recruits. The country chapters illustrate that 
most (though not all) member states accept that stronger supervision 
is needed compared to the pre-banking union situation. The ECB is 
paying attention to the challenge of strengthening the common feeling 
of belonging among its supervisory staff, as illustrated by its repeated 
references to the ‘SSM team spirit’ and ‘SSM community’ (ECB, 2016a).
The effectiveness of European banking supervision is still ham-
pered by a lopsided legal and regulatory policy framework. Even 
assuming completion of the ongoing effort to minimise so-called 
27    As documented in Table 6, these are: five Scandinavian banks (Danske, DNB, 
Nordea, SEB, Swedbank); three UK banks (Barclays, HSBC, RBS); three US banks 
(Bank of New York Mellon, JP Morgan, State Street); and Banesco (Venezuela), 
RBC (Canada), Sberbank and VTB (Russia), and UBS (Switzerland). 
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options and national discretions, the vision of a single rulebook is 
far from fulfilled. One area in which this is particularly evident is the 
accounting and auditing framework, which is a significant compo-
nent of the banking supervisory infrastructure even though it also 
serves other purposes. Listed banks in the euro area, as in the rest 
of the European Union, must use International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) for their consolidated financial statements28. For 
unlisted banks, however, IFRS is mandatory under national law in 
Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, Estonia, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia, but not in Austria, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands or Spain (Pacter, 
2015). Small banks in Austria and Germany, in particular, vigorously 
oppose the prospect of having to use IFRS in the future, as docu-
mented in our respective country chapters. In this, the euro area is an 
outlier from international practice, since most non-EU jurisdictions 
which have required IFRS for listed companies also require them for 
banks irrespective of size or listed status, and the United States simi-
larly imposes US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles on all fed-
erally supervised banks (Pacter, 2015). Similarly, in auditing, national 
legal regimes vary considerably, as does audit quality, and attempts 
at EU harmonisation have not progressed far. Whether this heteroge-
neity in accounting and auditing is compatible with the effectiveness 
of European banking supervision on a steady-state basis will surely be 
further debated in the years to come.
There is a longstanding debate on the possible conflicts between 
monetary policy and prudential supervision when conducted in 
the same institution (eg Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 1995; Whelan, 
2012), and the ECB is no exception. To address this challenge, the SSM 
Regulation creates a functional separation between the Supervisory 
Board and the Governing Council (even though the former remains 
28    With the exception of a limited change introduced by the European Commission 
when adopting the IAS 39 standard on financial instruments accounting in late 
2004, known as the IAS 39 carve-out. 
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subordinate to the latter); at a more practical level, the ECB has chosen 
to keep the separate arms in separate buildings. Our observation is 
that, notwithstanding the intrinsic tension between loose monetary 
policy and strict banking supervision, the Supervisory Board’s super-
visory stance so far has not been distorted or softened by the ECB’s 
monetary policy objectives, as we discuss in the next subsection.
Toughness
As is evident from this Blueprint’s country-specific chapters, European 
banking supervision is more intrusive than most of the national 
regimes it replaced, with more questions from the supervisors and 
more effort to verify the banks’ answers. The country chapters also 
suggest that there is less capture of the supervisors by the banks than 
before November 2014. It has become more difficult to address super-
visory matters through informal negotiation or political intervention 
with the supervisor’s top leadership. The supervisory coordinator 
is now at a distance in Frankfurt, and from a different nationality. 
Supervision has thus not only literally but also figuratively become 
more distant from the banks in the euro area. Moreover, the independ-
ence of ECB banking supervision, enshrined in the SSM Regulation29, 
appears to be stronger than supervisory independence at the national 
level, where it is easier to change the relevant financial services leg-
islation. This is arguably particularly meaningful for the many gov-
ernment-controlled banks in the banking union. The corresponding 
tensions have been alluded to in several official speeches and inter-
views30, but so far we are not aware of them erupting directly into the 
public space, with the exception of Italy31.
29    Article 19 of the SSM Regulation. The SSM Regulation, being based on Article 
127(6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, can only be mod-
ified by unanimity among member states. 
30    For example Danièle Nouy, interviewed in Handelsblatt, 1 April 2015 (English 
translation on the ECB website); Dombret (2015). 
31   See for example Patrick Henry (2015) ‘Bank of Italy Letter Slams ‘Arbitrary’ ECB 
26 | BRUEGEL BLUEPRINT
The toughness of a supervisor is ultimately revealed by her or 
his actions. For European banking supervision, the most prominent 
among these so far include the 2014 comprehensive assessment, the 
201432 and 2015 SREP decisions, and ad-hoc assessments made in 
particular in the context of the Greek crisis of summer 2015. In our 
view, this experience demonstrates the fact that the new supervisory 
regime is tougher than most (perhaps all) of the national regimes it 
replaced. In stark contrast to the 2010 and 2011 rounds of European 
stress tests, which were coordinated respectively by the Committee of 
European Banking Supervisors and by its successor the EBA, but for 
which the main inputs came from the NCAs, the 2014 comprehensive 
assessment has not been followed by embarrassing failures of banks 
that were given a clean bill of health a few months earlier33. It has 
also been perceived as overly demanding in several member states, 
as this Blueprint’s chapter on Italy illustrates. The decisions made by 
European banking supervision on Greek banks during the spring and 
summer of 2015 were vindicated by subsequent developments, as ana-
lysed in the chapter on Greece. The criticism – not least from Germany 
– that was directed at the ECB for being too sanguine on the solvency 
of Greek banks was shown with hindsight to be excessive.
As for the 2015 SREP process, it represented the first round of 
capital requirements (applicable from 1 January 2016) that was fully 
prepared under the new European regime. These requirements are a 
combination of a CET1 capital requirement of 8 percent (as used in the 
October 2014 comprehensive assessment, and thus higher than the
Over Capital Demands’, Bloomberg, 21 September 2015. 
32   The 2014 SREP decisions were communicated to supervised banks in early 2015. 
They were largely based on the 2014 comprehensive assessment, which is why we 
don’t analyse them in any depth here. 
33   In 2010, for example, Allied Irish Banks passed the stress test in July but needed a 
rescue as part of the Irish assistance programme later that year. In 2011, Bankia 
in Spain and Dexia in Belgium and France passed the July stress test but experi-
enced massive problems a few months later. 
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Figure 4: Pillar-2 capital requirements (end-2015 SREP decisions, in %)
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Source: Bruegel based on annual reports. Note: does not include three E-SIBs that have 
not disclosed SREP requirements: Crédit Mutuel Group, Bayerische Landesbank and 
BNG Bank; they are unlisted and thus subject to less demanding disclosure require-
ments.
Pillar-1 minimum resulting from the application of the CRR) and of a 
Pillar-2 add-on. The latter is based on a qualitative and quantitative 
assessment of a bank’s business model, internal governance and risk 
management, and risks to capital and liquidity. Based on EBA guide-
lines (European Banking Authority, 2014), the ECB has developed a 
common methodology and a common database to ensure a consist-
ent process of determining the eventual SREP decision. Even so, the 
latter remains a judgement call of the supervisor. Figure 4 shows that 
the resulting Pillar-2 capital requirements range from 8.625 percent 
to 10.75 percent for the 27 G- and E-SIBs that have disclosed them. 
The average score for these is 9.6 percent, both on a weighted and 
unweighted average basis. The average requirement for the full SI 
population is around 9.9 percent for 2015, which is an increase of 30 
basis points compared to the average for 2014 (ECB, 2016e). These 
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figures reveal that the ECB has not shied away from setting core capital 
requirements at a high level.
This should be seen in the context of gradual strengthening of euro-
area banks’ capital ratios over the last few years, driven both by market 
pressure and by new regulations and predating the establishment of 
banking union. Figure 5 shows this trend for the 100 euro-area banking 
groups supervised by the ECB34. 
A bank’s governance is important for determining its risk appetite, 
risk management and internal controls. Commercial, cooperative and 
government-owned banks all face specific governance challenges. 
Commercial banks could have too strong a focus on return on equity, 
neglecting the interests of depositors and financial stability. While 
cooperative banks in principle have incentives to put clients’ inter-
ests first, their internal decision-making can be too decentralised and 
fuzzy, or captured by special-interest groups, as illustrated by cases 
such as Banca Popolare di Vicenza35. For some large cooperative 
banking groups, ECB banking supervision has acted to strengthen and 
streamline their governance (see eg the case of Rabobank in the chap-
ter on the Netherlands). Finally, government-controlled banks could 
be too responsive to politics, losing sight of the need for efficiency and 
cost-effectiveness. Now that capital requirements have been raised to 
a reasonably high level, the focus of European banking supervision 
appears indeed to be shifting towards ‘softer’ matters of governance, 
34    Note that for Figures 5 and 7 we used balanced samples within each variable, ie 
we exclude banks for which at least one data point is missing (after imputing) 
during the time period. This is why 2015 values in Figure 5 slightly differ from 
those in Tables 1, 3, and 4. We impute missing values by using a simple average 
if data is missing in between two values in a series of three consecutive years. If 
an average cannot be taken – ie if more than one data point is missing in between 
available observations or data point missing at beginning (end) of available 
time series – the previous (former) value is taken. Otherwise, the missing value 
remains.
35   Valentina Za, ‘Blind faith turns to disbelief in Italian banking’s heartland’, Reuters, 
26 April 2016.
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risk management and risk appetite (ECB, 2016a).
Figure 5: CET1 capital ratio and leverage ratio for the significant euro-area 
banking groups (in %)
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Source: Bruegel based on SNL Financial. Note: CET1 capital ratios and leverage ratios 
are aggregated by computing an average of banks’ ratios weighted by total assets, for 
the 100 euro-area-based SIs. See also footnote 34.
This overview does not include supervisory decisions on LSIs, 
which are still made by NCAs under ECB oversight. The vast majority 
of the euro-area LSIs are in only three countries: Austria, Germany and 
Italy. In Austria and Germany, they are typically covered by institu-
tional protection schemes (IPS), which are arrangements under which 
small banks may provide each other with financial assistance within a 
network (eg the German or Austrian savings banks, or Sparkassen)36. 
From the relevant country chapters of this Blueprint, the perception 
36   Lautenschlaeger (2016) calculates that half of all banks in the euro area (SIs and 
LSIs), and four-fifths of those in Germany, are IPS members.
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that emerges is that LSI supervision by NCAs is typically laxer than 
the supervision of SIs by the ECB. This discrepancy could be a source 
of future supervisory failures, as illustrated by the chapters on Greece 
(the case of Attica Bank) and Italy. In early 2016, the ECB conducted 
a consultation on IPS that might be followed by new supervisory ini-
tiatives in this area, an issue which is developed at more length in the 
chapters on Austria and Germany.
Overall, there is no doubt that European banking supervision 
is generally tougher than the national supervisory regimes it has 
replaced in all countries reviewed in this Blueprint. Whether that 
makes it tough enough is of course a different question. At this point 
we are inclined to think that it does, but a better-informed assessment 
will be provided by the observation of future developments in the 
euro-area banking system.
Fairness and consistency 
We have not found evidence of a country- or institution-specific 
pattern in the SREP process that would suggest favouritism, discrimi-
nation or other forms of undue distortion. In fact, the question might 
aptly be raised whether there is sufficient dispersion in the SREP 
requirements shown in Figure 4, given the differences in the quality of 
the banks in general and the problems at some banks in particular. Our 
impression is that European banking supervision has initially erred on 
the side of not enough differentiation, precisely to avoid being accused 
of displaying an inherent bias.
One additional layer of complexity for European banking supervi-
sion is that NCAs retain a separate competence on the application of 
macro-prudential buffers, comprising systemic and countercyclical 
buffers. The systemic risk buffer is an additional capital charge for 
systemically important banks to address the ‘too-big-to-fail’ issue. The 
Financial Stability Board has started this process with the suggestion 
of additional loss-absorbing requirements for G-SIBs. In addition, the 
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CRD IV (Article 131) empowers NCAs to designate other systemically 
important institutions (or O-SIIs, also known in Basel parlance as 
domestic systemically important banks) and apply to them a capital 
surcharge of up to 2 percent. Finally, the CRD IV (Article 133) also 
allows NCAs to set systemic risk buffers of at least 1 percent. The 
last column of Table 5 calculates the domestic systemic buffer as 
the higher of the latter two buffer requirements, which are set by the 
NCAs. Figure 6 shows the same numbers as a map, illustrating the 
differences in toughness among NCAs.
Most northern member states generally apply higher systemic 
buffers of up to 2 or 3 percent, while southern member states (except 
Cyprus and Malta) apply low systemic buffers of up to 1 percent. 
Remarkable cases are Italy and Latvia, which have set the systemic 
buffer for other systemically important institutions at 0 percent, 
with only a G-SIB surcharge of 1 percent for UniCredit following the 
Financial Stability Board’s guidance.
While national authorities have the primary responsibility for such 
macro-prudential requirements (Article 5.1 of the SSM Regulation), 
the ECB has the ability to set more stringent requirements (Article 5.2). 
So far, it appears that the ECB has chosen to not use this option, per-
haps to avoid opening a new front in its already complex relationship 
with national central banks and other NCAs. Nevertheless, it appears 
desirable that systemic buffer requirements should be harmonised 
across the banking union area at some stage. Meanwhile, the variation 
of macro-prudential stances in different countries is bound to generate 
perceptions of unjustified differential treatment.
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Table 5: Application of systemic risk buffers across banking union countries 
(fully loaded)
Country G-SIB buffer O-SII buffer Systemic risk 
buffer
Domestic 
systemic buffer
Austria n.a. 1.0%-2.0% 1.0%-2.0% 2%
Belgium n.a. 0.75%-1.5% none 1.5%
Cyprus n.a. 0.5%-2.0% none 2%
Estonia n.a. 2.0% 1.0% 2%
Finland n.a. 0.5%-2.0% none 2%
France 1.0%-2.0% 0.25%-1.5% none 1.5%
Germany 2.0% 0.5%-1.5% none 1.5%
Greece n.a. 1.0% none 1%
Ireland n.a. 1.5% none 1.5%
Italy 1.0% 0.0% none 0%
Latvia n.a. 0.0% none 0%
Lithuania n.a. 0.5%-2.0% none 2%
Luxemburg n.a. 0.5%-1.0% none 1%
Malta n.a. 0.5%-2.0% none 2%
Netherlands 1.0% 1.0%-2.0% 3.0% 3%
Portugal n.a. 0.25%-1.0% none 1%
Slovakia n.a. 1.5%-2.0% 1.0% 3%
Slovenia n.a. 0.25%-1.0% none 1%
Spain 1.0% 0.0%-1.0% none 1%
Source: Bruegel based on ECB (2016c), ESRB (2016) and ESRB National Policy data-
base. Notes: G-SIB buffer is the global systemically important bank buffer set by the 
FSB and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision; the O-SII buffer is the other 
systemically important institution buffer set by the NCA based on the CRD IV; the 
systemic risk buffer is set by the NCA based on the CRD IV. The domestic systemic 
buffer is the higher of the latter two buffer requirements, except for Slovakia that sums 
its O-SII and systemic risk buffers. The maximum of the domestic systemic buffer is 
shown in the last column.
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Figure 6: Domestic systemic buffer requirements across the banking union 
(fully loaded)
0 -1 % 1 -2 % 2 -3 %
Source: Bruegel based on ECB (2016c), ESRB (2016) and ESRB National Policy data-
base; see Table 5.
As emphasised in the previous subsection, a potentially more 
serious asymmetry is the lingering one between LSIs and SIs, whereby 
LSIs are subject to a national supervisory stance even though the 
ECB’s oversight (and specifically its DGMS III) could bring a degree 
of convergence over the medium term. In particular, national net-
works of local banks bound together in an IPS, such as the German or 
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Austrian Sparkassen, are not fundamentally different from groups of 
mutuals that co-own a consolidating central entity (such as the large 
French cooperative groups, the Netherlands’ Rabobank or Finland’s 
OP group), and in principle should compete on equal terms including 
in terms of the supervisory regime. This will certainly remain a widely 
debated issue over the next few years. More generally, a consistent 
SREP methodology for LSIs across euro-area member states remains 
a somewhat distant objective. The ECB acknowledges that risk assess-
ment systems that underpin SREP scoring, in particular, are far from 
harmonised (ECB, 2016a, section 2.4.5). There is still work to be done 
within European banking supervision to ensure consistency, even for 
significant institutions.
Overall, we find no evidence of blatant unfairness in the current 
European banking supervisory regime for significant institutions, but 
more observation will be needed to conclude that it is genuinely fair.
Areas for improvement
European banking supervision has experienced many teething prob-
lems, and there remains much scope for improvement. Examples 
of problems are overlapping and redundant data requests, which 
have generated considerable frustration among supervised banks, 
as illustrated by many of this Blueprint’s country chapters. Further 
coordination is needed with the gradual implementation of the ECB’s 
AnaCredit project, a detailed euro-area-wide bank loan dataset which 
predates banking union but has become even more important in the 
context of European banking supervision. Another, perhaps more 
serious, unfortunate episode was the sequence of communication 
about what has come to be known in European banking jargon as 
maximum distributable amounts (MDA), also discussed in the chapter 
about France. In summary, ECB banking supervision took a long time 
to reach the conclusion that MDAs would be based on Pillar-2 cap-
ital requirements, and that these requirements should therefore be 
disclosed publicly by the supervised banks (in contrast to most prior 
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and international practice). The combination of this decision with 
high Pillar-2 capital add-ons (see above) is likely to have contributed 
to European bank stock market volatility at the beginning of 2016. 
The later revision of the stance (with the introduction of a distinction 
between Pillar-2 requirements and additional Pillar-2 ‘guidance’, which 
hints at a possible softer future approach) gave an impression of insuf-
ficient preparedness, even though we have no objection against the 
new stance on substance37.
There appears to be scope for streamlining the internal deci-
sion-making procedures, data requests and related reporting for-
mats. Decision-making processes in the Supervisory Board appear 
overly burdensome. There were no fewer than 38 Supervisory Board 
meetings in 2015, of which 22 were in Frankfurt and 16 by videocon-
ference (ECB, 2016a), many of which lasted more than one full day. 
In addition, many authorisation procedures (on which 921 decisions 
covering more than 2,000 individual procedures were taken in 2015) 
need approval by the ECB’s Governing Council, adding further delays. 
The existence of a long backlog of fit-and-proper authorisations is 
acknowledged by the ECB (ECB, 2016a, section 3.1.2) and, there 
appears to have been significant adverse operational consequences in 
some banks. While some of this burden is inherent in the governance 
framework set by the SSM Regulation38, our assessment is that the 
operation of the Supervisory Board should be revised, and more deci-
sions delegated from the Supervisory Board to ECB banking supervi-
sion staff. This in turn requires constructive engagement from at least a 
critical number of the NCAs.
Transparency, or the lack thereof, is another area that calls for 
significant improvement in the near future. To its credit, the ECB 
37   See Boris Groendahl and Jeanna Smialek, ‘ECB’s Nouy Says Legal Change Is 
Needed to Provide CoCo Clarity’, Bloomberg, 24 March 2016. 
38   Unless there are changes to the European treaties, there is no way to avoid the 
constraint that many of the Supervisory Board’s decisions only take effect after 
formal approval by the Governing Council. 
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has provided a lot of public information on the implementation of 
European banking supervision since late 2013, with regular and 
detailed reports on the build-up of its own banking supervisory 
capacity, the execution of the 2014 and 2015 comprehensive assess-
ments and initial rounds of SREP decisions, and related issues of 
governance and operations. NCAs also generally produce increasingly 
detailed activity reports. Where European banking supervision falls 
short, however, is on transparency about the banks themselves. As we 
have observed, only a minority of SIs, let alone LSIs, are publicly listed 
and thus subject to the corresponding demanding disclosure obli-
gations under EU legislation39. In principle, banks also need to make 
disclosures under the so-called Pillar 3 of the Basel framework, as 
transposed into EU and national legislation by the successive Capital 
Requirements Directives and the CRR, but the quality and comparabil-
ity of such Pillar-3 disclosures leave considerable scope for improve-
ment40. In practice, therefore, supervisors have an irreplaceable role in 
collecting, aggregating and disseminating quantitative and qualitative 
data about banks. In the United States, very rich data on all federally 
supervised banks is publicly available through the Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC), an umbrella organisation of 
all federal supervisory agencies41. By contrast, in the euro area, bank-
level information is generally not disclosed by national supervisors. 
The ECB’s regularly updated list of supervised entities only gives highly 
imprecise indications of consolidated balance sheet size, and only 
for SIs. The EBA’s regular transparency exercises provide much richer 
39   Even though the enforcement of these obligations by securities market regulatory 
authorities is of variable effectiveness across member states. 
40   The Basel Committee’s Pillar-3 framework is currently undergoing revision, and 
significant new proposals were published for consultation by the Basel Commit-
tee in March 2016. 
41   These include the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National Credit Union 
Administration and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. 
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information, but are insufficiently institutionalised and don’t even 
cover all SIs. Overall, the euro area’s level of supervisory transparency 
is pitifully low42.
As for institutional transparency and accountability, an interinsti-
tutional arrangement between the European Parliament and the ECB 
specifies the modalities of democratic accountability and oversight of the 
ECB’s supervisory tasks, covering elements such as submitting reports, 
attending hearings, responding to parliamentary questions and provid-
ing access to confidential information43. One area for improvement is the 
European Court of Auditors’ mandate for the audit of the operational effi-
ciency of the ECB’s management. This does not seem to encompass pol-
icies and decisions related to its supervisory tasks (Contact Committee, 
2015). Public auditing of supervisory effectiveness is an accepted practice 
in countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia, Denmark, 
Sweden, France and Germany (Contact Committee, 2015).
The fact that European banking supervision remains a work in 
progress is starkly illustrated by the mixed market judgment on (listed) 
euro-area banks. Figure 7 shows wide fluctuations in price-to-book 
(P/B) ratios in selected countries covered in this Blueprint (grouped in 
two charts for better readability). While all suggest lacklustre valua-
tions, with P/B ratios generally less than 100 percent, some countries 
(Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain) are better regarded by 
the markets than France, Italy and Portugal, let alone Germany and 
Greece44. In general, the banks’ P/B ratio in the United States is 1.4 
42   See Gandrud and Hallerberg (2014) and Gandrud, Hallerberg and Véron (2016) 
for a more in-depth analysis of supervisory transparency in the European Union. 
43   The ECB’s written responses to questions from MEPs are published on its                      
website and occasionally provide useful information about European banking 
supervision. 
44   The low average P/B ratio observed for German listed banks cannot be solely 
attributed to market concerns about Deutsche Bank (which has a high weight 
in the calculation because of its large size). The German ratio without Deutsche 
Bank is equally low. Most German banks, however, are unlisted and thus not 
included in this calculation. 
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times higher than in the EU (IMF, 2016). This market indicator suggests 
deeper problems. The euro area remains significantly ‘overbanked’, 
with an insufficiently efficient banking sector and insufficiently devel-
oped capital markets (Véron and Wolff, 2015; Langfield and Pagano, 
2016)45. European banking supervision still has to deal with significant 
excess capacity in European banking, and must encourage further 
consolidation, restructuring and renewal of the European banking 
sector over the coming years.
Finally, the country chapters (eg on France, Germany and Spain) 
highlight concerns about the multiplicity of EU-level agencies, includ-
ing ECB banking supervision, the EBA, the European Commission (not 
least in its state aid control capacity) and the Single Resolution Board 
(SRB) that started work in 2015 and acquired its full resolution author-
ity on 1 January 2016. While some mechanisms exist in the EU legal 
framework to avoid overlapping information requests and diverging 
policy stances, the coordination between these agencies is inherently 
difficult, and appears to be less than optimal in at least some cases. It is 
likely that this challenge will not be solved any time soon, but pro-
active efforts should be made to minimise the resulting frictions and 
dysfunction.
A single banking market?
The aim of Europe’s banking union was to break the bank-sovereign 
vicious circle, by decoupling banks from their respective home coun-
tries. This decoupling should in principle lead to a seamlessly inte-
grated single market for banking services in the entire banking union 
area. Evidently, this remains a distant vision, as mirrored in several of 
our country chapters (see for example the chapter on France).
45   See also Advisory Scientific Committee (2014) and more recently the IMF (2016).
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Figure 7: Price-to-book ratio of the listed SIs (in %)
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Source: Bruegel based on SNL Financial. Notes: P/B ratios are aggregated at the coun-
try level by computing an average of listed banks’ P/B ratios weighted by total assets 
of listed euro-area SIs included in the sample. Crédit Agricole SA was taken as a proxy 
for Crédit Agricole Groupe, as the latter is not listed. 2016 values correspond to 29 April 
2016. Also see footnote 34.
European banking supervision has initiated a major effort to 
reduce the number of options and opportunities for national dis-
cretion in the various country banking regulations (ECB, 2016a and 
2016f). When completed, this project will make supervision easier and 
also contribute to the single market, but it stops well short of address-
ing all national idiosyncrasies.
There is no longer any liquidity supervision of branches within 
the banking union. Moreover, the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) will 
be moved, as of October 2016, to 75 percent at subsidiary level if the 
parent bank’s ratio is 100 percent or more, which allows for some, 
but not unrestrained, circulation of liquidity among a group’s entities 
within the euro area (ECB, 2016f). But there are no apparent plans to 
phase out such subsidiary-level LCR requirements entirely, nor are 
there any clear signs of phasing-out of extra capital requirements at the 
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subsidiary level, imposed both by European banking supervision and, 
in some cases at least, also by NCAs under a national-law mandate 
(such as deposit insurance or resolution authority). There is still ample 
evidence of such geographical ‘ring-fencing’ of capital in national 
subsidiaries46.
Several of this Blueprint’s country chapters also note some ambi-
guity about supervisors’ stances on mergers and acquisitions, espe-
cially those that take place cross-border. While the fact that the ECB 
is not expected to hamper cross-border M&A will foster better market 
integration, it is not clear whether all NCAs are prepared to let their 
‘national champions’ go. The ECB has the final say on approving 
changes of control and acquisitions of/by all supervised banks (SIs and 
LSIs), but the NCAs receive the applications from banks and have a 
role in the preparation of decisions. Also, some aspects of the current 
supervisory approach could create unnecessary obstacles to the emer-
gence of sustainable pan-European banking business models. For 
example, stress tests tend to favour scenarios of correlated downturns 
in all euro-area countries (and beyond), thus negating the stability 
benefits of geographical diversification even though these have been 
amply documented during the recent years of crisis (see in particular 
the chapter on Spain on this).
Many large cross-border banks complain about NCAs’ tendencies 
to keep introducing local requirements, limitations or distortions – at 
their national level, and also occasionally through their collective 
majority of the ECB’s Supervisory Board – thus preventing the vision 
of a single market from being realised. These local requirements apply 
only to cross-border subsidiaries, which are licensed by the host NCA 
and are thus subject to local rules. Cross-border branches fall legally 
under the parent company in the home country and are thus under 
the control of the home NCA. Banks might thus take action by con-
verting subsidiaries into branches to bypass such local distortions, a 
46   For an overview of geographical ring-fencing measures, see Beck et al (2015).
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process that is likely to be much more feasible in the new context of 
European banking supervision. Recent examples of such conversions 
are the conversion of Deutsche Bank’s subsidiary in the Netherlands 
into a branch in February 2016 (Deutsche Bank, 2016), and the 
announcement by Sweden’s Nordea that it would turn its large Nordic 
subsidiaries into branches, including the one in Finland (thus in the 
banking union); this is still subject to regulatory approval47. Both the 
Finnish central bank and national banking supervisor have criticised 
the Nordea plan to convert its Finnish subsidiary into a branch, on the 
grounds that Nordea Bank Finland is systemically important in Finland 
with a market share of about 30 percent (Rosendahl, 2015)48. While 
national supervisors might thus want to block these conversions, the 
ECB might base its decision on the Second Banking Directive (89/646/
EEC), which allows freedom of cross-border establishment through a 
branch or subsidiary, and thus permit such conversions that foster the 
single market. At the time of writing (May 2016), the outcome is not 
clear, and might be an interesting indication of the future direction for 
European banking supervision in this respect.
Barriers to the completion of the single market, of course, are not 
only or even mainly down to supervision. Interestingly, the planned 
merger of Nordea’s Nordic subsidiaries into the Swedish parent as 
branches highlights the problems with national-based deposit insur-
ance in an integrated market, as discussed in the country chapter 
on Belgium. While banks increasingly operate on a European level, 
only the locally incorporated banks, including subsidiaries of for-
eign groups, contribute to the local deposit insurance fund, with 
a fiscal backstop provided by the national government (Gros and 
47    Nordea (2016), ‘Decisions by Nordea’s AGM 2016’, press release, 17 March, avail-
able at http://www.nordea.com/en/press-and-news/news-and-press-releases/
press-releases/2016/03-17-19h20-decisions-by-nordeas-agm-2016.html.
48    As Table 6 shows, Nordea Finland, with €302 billion in assets, is by far the largest 
national entity of any non-euro-area banking group in the banking union area, 
followed by HSBC France (€168 billion) and Abanca (€47 billion) in Spain. 
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Schoenmaker, 2015). Local deposit insurance funds might run into 
problems, as recently witnessed in Iceland and in the 1930s in the 
United States, when many of the state-level deposit guarantee schemes 
went bankrupt because of a lack of geographic diversification and 
size (Golembe, 1960). This is one of many ways through which the 
bank-sovereign nexus still exists, along with domestic home bias in 
banks’ sovereign-bond portfolios, government-owned banks, bank 
and corporate insolvency law, taxation, housing finance, pension 
frameworks, lender-of-last-resort operations and more. The European 
Commission’s European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) proposal 
of November 201549 has triggered a debate on some (but not all) of 
these obstacles, and it is to be expected that this debate will remain 
active for many years.
Even with such obstacles firmly embedded in national legislation 
and politics, there is some evidence of a reversal since mid-2012 of 
bank market fragmentation in the euro area. The dispersion in the 
cost of borrowing from banks for non-financial corporations and 
households across the euro area, which increased substantially in 
2011-12, had shrunk markedly by 2015 and early 2016 (ECB, 2016b). 
Nevertheless, cross-border credit provided by local affiliates of foreign 
banks stagnated in 2015. The share of total assets and total loans of 
non-domestic affiliates remained at low levels of around 14 percent 
(ECB, 2016b).
Our overall assessment is that banking union is only half-fin-
ished as an overarching policy framework (Posen and Véron, 2014). 
European banking supervision is by far its most integrated component, 
the SRM being significantly less centralised. The continued absence 
of EDIS and of a common backstop for the Single Resolution Fund 
(SRF), which was decided on in principle by the European Council in 
late 2013 but not implemented, are key aspects of this incompleteness, 
49    The EDIS proposal is available at http://ec.europa.eu/finance/general-policy/
banking-union/european-deposit-insurance-scheme/index_en.htm.
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as is the lack of harmonisation of national bank insolvency regimes, 
which implies that the Single Resolution Mechanism is ‘single’ in 
name only.
Future outlook
European banking supervision, with its start in 2014, was the first step 
towards the banking union. The SRM started in January 2016, and it is 
still too soon to convincingly assess its effectiveness as long as there 
is no actual case of resolution. The European Commission’s proposal 
for EDIS was published in November 2015, but its adoption is far from 
certain, as with other necessary and still missing components of a 
complete banking union, as we have discussed.
The banking union needs to be completed to ensure the strength 
and stability of the euro-area banking system (see for example Hellwig, 
2014). A swift handling of the banking fragility that Italy is experiencing 
at the time of writing is a prerequisite (Véron, 2016). At the European 
level and in the short term, we support a balanced policy package 
including EDIS, effective limits on banks’ exposures to each sovereign 
including their home country, bank insolvency law harmonisation 
and reform of the Capital Requirements Regulation (eg prohibition 
of deferred tax credits as capital, and fuller compliance with Basel 
III)50. Collectively, euro-area banks will benefit from more demand-
ing supervisory standards, and might thus in future reverse their 
recent relative decline compared to their more stringently supervised 
US rivals on the European and international market for investment 
banking services (Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 2016). Simultaneously, 
risk sharing through adequate European arrangements is needed to 
eliminate economically damaging geographical ring-fencing and make 
the euro area resilient to future shocks.
50   See, for example, ECB (2016b).
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Table 6: List of significant institutions (1 January 2016)
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8 G-SIBs (assets>€800bn)
BNP Paribas FR Paris Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
1,994 11.05 4.00
Crédit Agricole FR Paris Cooperative Listed 
(controlled by 
mutuals)
1,699 13.52 5.70
Deutsche Bank DE Frankfurt Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
1,629 13.19 3.50
Banco 
Santander
ES Madrid 
(Santander)
Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
1,340 12.55 4.73
Société 
Générale
FR Paris Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
1,334 11.42 4.00
BPCE FR Paris Cooperative Unlisted 
(owned by 
mutuals)
1,167 13.02 5.00
UniCredit IT Milan Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
860 10.59 4.63
ING NL Randstad / 
Amsterdam
Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
842 12.94 4.40
22 E-SIBs (assets>€150bn)
BBVA ES Madrid 
(Bilbao)
Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
750 12.10 5.98
Crédit Mutuel FR Paris Cooperative Unlisted 
(owned by 
mutuals)
707 15.32 6.40
Intesa San-
paolo
IT Milan Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
676 12.98 6.80
Rabobank NL Randstad / 
Utrecht
Cooperative Unlisted 
(owned by 
mutuals)
670 13.49 3.90
Commerzbank DE Frankfurt Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
533 13.77 4.50
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DZ Bank DE Frankfurt Cooperative Unlisted 
(owned by 
mutuals)
408 13.85 4.00
ABN AMRO NL Randstad / 
Amsterdam
Government Listed                  
(nationalised)
390 15.53 3.80
CaixaBank ES Barcelona Cooperative Listed 
(controlled by 
foundation)
344 12.90 5.20
KBC BE Antwerp Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
252 15.16 6.27
LBBW DE Stuttgart Government Unlisted           
(local                 
government)
234 16.36 4.70
Dexia BE Brussels Government Unlisted                 
(in resolution)
230 15.91 4.37
La Banque 
Postale
FR Paris Government Unlisted 
(French post 
office)
219 13.20 5.20
BayernLB DE Munich Government Unlisted           
(local                 
government)
216 15.14 4.70
Banco 
Sabadell
ES Sabadell Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
209 11.50 4.81
Bankia ES Madrid 
(Valencia)
Government Listed                   
(nationalised)
207 13.89 5.00
Erste Group AT Vienna Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
200 12.35 5.70
NORD/LB DE Hanover Government Unlisted           
(local                 
government)
181 13.07 4.38
Belfius BE Brussels Government Unlisted               
(nationalised)
177 15.90 4.90
Landesbank 
Helaba
DE Frankfurt Government Unlisted           
(local                 
government)
172 13.79 4.55
Monte dei Pas-
chi di Siena
IT Siena Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
169 12.01 5.22
Banco Popular ES Madrid Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
159 13.11 6.07
BNG Bank NL Randstad / 
The Hague
Government Unlisted              
(policy bank)
150 23.35 2.80
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70 other euro-area SIs 
NRW.BANK DE Düsseldorf 
(Münster)
Government Unlisted           
(local                 
government)
141 42.58 11.00
Raiffeisen 
Zentralbank 
AT Vienna Cooperative Unlisted 
(owned by 
mutuals)
138 10.58 4.50
Bank of Ireland IE Dublin Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
131 13.30 5.70
OP Financial 
Group
FI Helsinki Cooperative Unlisted 
(owned by 
mutuals)
125 19.55 7.20
VW Financial 
Services
DE Braun-
schweig
Commercial Unlisted 
(Volkswagen)
121 11.97 11.10
Banco 
Popolare 
IT Verona Cooperative Listed   
(Popolare)
121 13.15 4.70
UBI Banca IT Milan (Ber-
gamo)
Cooperative Listed   
(Popolare)
117 12.08 5.81
National Bank 
of Greece
GR Athens Commercial Listed                
(dispersed)
111 14.52 8.21
HSH 
Nordbank
DE Hamburg 
(Kiel)
Government Unlisted           
(local                 
government)
110 9.17 5.02
DekaBank DE Frankfurt Government Unlisted 
(owned 
by Savings 
Banks)
108 13.51 4.20
Allied Irish 
Banks
IE Dublin Government Listed                  
(nationalised)
103 15.86 7.90
Caixa Geral de 
Depósitos
PT Lisbon Government Unlisted 
(govern-
ment-owned)
101 10.80 6.10
Rentenbank DE Frankfurt Government Unlisted               
(policy bank)
93 20.19
Nederlandse 
Waterschaps-
bank
NL Randstad / 
The Hague
Government Unlisted                
(policy bank)
91 64.07 2.00
WGZ Bank DE Düsseldorf Cooperative Unlisted 
(owned by 
mutual)
90 14.57 3.34
Piraeus Bank GR Athens Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
88 17.49 10.90
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Erwerbsg-
esellschaft 
der S-Finanz-
gruppe
DE Neuhard-
en-berg
Government Unlisted 
(owned by 
Sparkassen)
87 12.83
SFIL FR Paris Government Unlisted              
(policy bank)
84 24.74 1.88
Millennium 
BCP
PT Lisbon Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
75 13.33 5.60
Eurobank 
Ergasias
GR Athens Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
74 17.03 9.07
L-Bank DE Karlsruhe Government Unlisted 
(local policy 
bank)
73 16.38 4.13
Mediobanca IT Milan Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
71 11.98 12.02
Alpha Bank GR Athens Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
69 16.65 12.30
PBB Deutsche 
Pfandbrief-
bank
DE Munich Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
67 18.90 3.90
SNS Bank NL Randstad / 
Utrecht
Government Unlisted               
(nationalised)
63 25.33 4.80
Banca popo-
lare dell’Emilia 
Romagna
IT Modena Cooperative Listed   
(Popolare)
61 11.24 6.90
Unicaja ES Malaga Cooperative Unlisted 
(foundations)
60 12.84 5.06
Ibercaja ES Zaragoza Cooperative Unlisted 
(foundations)
59 11.95 5.16
Bankinter ES Madrid Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
59 11.77 5.42
Kutxabank ES Bilbao Cooperative Unlisted 
(foundations)
58 14.61 7.71
Novo Banco PT Lisbon Government Unlisted              
(nationalised)
58 13.47
Aareal Bank DE Wiesbaden Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
52 13.75 4.90
Banca Popo-
lare di Milano 
IT Milan Cooperative Listed   
(Popolare)
50 11.53 7.67
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Iccrea Holding IT Rome Cooperative Unlisted 
(owned by 
mutuals)
50 11.45 3.00
HASPA DE Hamburg Government Unlisted           
(local                 
government)
46 13.11 7.65
BpiFrance FR Paris Government Unlisted              
(policy bank)
45 9.60
Banque 
et Caisse 
d’Epargne de 
l’Etat
LU Luxem-
bourg
Government Unlisted  
(government)
43 17.84 5.48
AXA Bank BE Brussels Commercial Unlisted  
(AXA Group)
43 16.51 3.22
CRH FR Paris Cooperative Unlisted 
(JV of large 
French banks)
43 11.68 1.33
Liberbank ES Madrid Cooperative Listed                   
(cooperative)
42 13.66 5.49
Banco Mare 
Nostrum
ES Madrid Government Unlisted              
(nationalised)
41 11.12 5.06
Banco BPI PT Lisbon Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
41 10.86 6.40
Grupo Cooper-
ativo Cajamar
ES Madrid Cooperative Unlisted 
(owned by 
mutuals)
40 11.30 6.00
Banca Popo-
lare di Vicenza
IT Vicenza Commercial Unlisted           
(Atlante fund)
40 6.65 4.4
Argenta BE Antwerp Commercial Unlisted 
(private)
39 19.90 4.80
Münchener  
Hypotheken-
bank
DE Munich Cooperative Unlisted 
(mutual)
38 17.30
Credito 
Emiliano
IT Reggio 
Emilia
Commercial Listed               
(dispersed)
37 13.52 5.22
Raiffeisen-
landesbank 
Oberösterreich
AT Linz Cooperative Unlisted 
(mutual)
37 13.83
RCI Banque FR Paris Commercial Unlisted 
(Renault)
37 15.64 8.40
apoBank DE Düsseldorf Cooperative Unlisted 
(mutual)
36 22.00 5.10
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Agence 
Française de 
Développe-
ment
FR Paris Government Unlisted           
(policy bank)
36 8.70
Banca Popo-
lare di Sondrio
IT Sondrio Cooperative Listed   
(Popolare)
36 10.49 6.22
Promonto-
ria Sacher / 
BAWAG
AT Vienna Commercial Unlisted 
(private)
36 13.80 6.20
Kuntarahoitus FI Helsinki Government Unlisted              
(policy bank)
34 41.49 3.15
Veneto Banca IT Montebel-
luna
Cooperative Unlisted 
(Popolare)
33 7.23 5.20
Precision 
Capital
LU Luxem-
bourg
Commercial Unlisted 
(private)
33 14.72 4.36
Banca Carige IT Genoa Commercial Listed                
(dispersed)
30 12.19 7.74
Permanent 
TSB 
IE Dublin Government Unlisted              
(nationalised)
29 17.08 6.00
Raiffeisen-
landesbank 
Niederösterre-
ich-Wien
AT Vienna Cooperative Unlisted 
(mutual)
28 13.75
Bank of Cyprus CY Nicosia Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
23 13.97 11.32
Cooperative 
Central Bank
CY Nicosia Government Unlisted               
(nationalised)
14 15.61 8.80
Nova Ljubljan-
ska Banka
SI Ljubljana Government Unlisted 
(govern-
ment-owned)
12 16.20 9.11
Volksbank 
Wien
AT Vienna Cooperative Unlisted 
(mutual)
10 12.47
Bank of Val-
letta
MT Valletta Commercial Listed                  
(dispersed)
10 11.26 5.00
Hellenic Bank CY Nicosia Commercial Listed                    
(dispersed)
7 14.75 8.60
Banque De-
groof
BE Brussels Commercial Unlisted 
(private)
6 15.08
ABLV Bank LV Riga Commercial Unlisted 
(private)
5 10.64 4.06
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Nova Kreditna 
banka Maribor
SI Maribor Commercial Unlisted 
(private)
4 25.13 13.04
Abanka SI Ljubljana Government Unlisted 
(govern-
ment-owned)
4 23.03 10.64
Mediterranean 
Bank
MT Valletta Commercial Unlisted 
(private)
3 11.28 5.90
29 branches & subsidiaries
Nordea Fin-
land
FI 
(SE)
Helsinki Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
302
HSBC France FR 
(UK)
Paris Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
168
ABANCA 
(Banesco)
ES 
(VE)
Betanzos Commercial Listed               
(private)
47
State Street 
Europe 
DE 
(US)
Munich Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
36
Bank of New 
York Mellon
BE 
(US)
Brussels Commercial Listed            
(dispersed)
35
Ulster Bank 
(RBS)
IE 
(UK)
Dublin Government Listed (na-
tionalised)
31
Danske Bank 
Finland
FI 
(DK)
Helsinki Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
30
State Street 
Luxembourg
LU 
(US)
Luxem-
bourg
Commercial Listed                         
(dispersed)
30
Barclays plc, 
French branch
FR 
(UK)
Paris Commercial Listed                      
(dispersed)
30
Barclays plc, 
Italian branch
IT 
(UK)
Rome Commercial Listed                
(dispersed)
28
SEB Germany DE 
(SE)
Frankfurt Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
22
RBS Nether-
lands / RFS 
Holdings
NL 
(UK)
Amsterdam Government Listed                 
(nationalised)
16
RBC Investor 
Services
LU 
(UK)
Luxem-
bourg
Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
15
Slovenska Spo-
ritelna (Erste)
SK 
(AT)
Bratislava Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
14
Sberbank 
Europe
AT 
(SE)
Vienna Government Listed              
(govern-
ment-owned)
13
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VUB Banka 
(Intesa San-
paolo)
SK 
(IT)
Bratislava Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
13
JP Morgan 
Luxembourg
LU 
(US)
Luxem-
bourg
Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
12
Tatra Banka 
(Raiffeisen)
SK 
(AT)
Bratislava Cooperative Listed               
(mutual)
11
Swedbank 
Estonia
EE 
(SE)
Tallinn Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
10
VTB Austria AT 
(RU)
Vienna Government Listed                       
(govern-
ment-owned)
10
UBS Luxem-
bourg
LU 
(CH)
Luxem-
bourg
Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
10
RCB Bank 
(VTB)
CY 
(RU)
Limassol Government Listed 
(govern-
ment-owned)
8
HSBC Malta MT 
(UK)
Valletta Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
7
SEB Lithuania LT 
(SE)
Vilnius Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
7
Swedbank 
Lithuania
LT 
(SE)
Vilnius Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
7
Swedbank 
Latvia
LV 
(SE)
Riga Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
5
SEB Estonia EE 
(SE)
Tallinn Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
5
DNB Lithuania LT 
(NO)
Vilnius Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
4
SEB Latvia LV 
(SE)
Riga Commercial Listed                 
(dispersed)
4
Total 129 significant institutions 23,058
Source: Bruegel based on ECB List of Supervised Entities as of 1 January 2016; online 
sources and company reports (headquarters, governance, ownership); SNL Financial 
(assets, CET1 and leverage ratios).
Notes: bank names are based on the banks’ own branding and common usage, and 
may differ from the names of parent legal entities as listed by the ECB (eg L-Bank refers 
to Landeskreditbank Baden-Württenberg-Förderbank). Country codes are based on 
the ECB list; for branches and subsidiaries, the home country of the parent bank is 
indicated in parentheses (we use standard two-letter ISO codes, eg CH for Switzerland 
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and IE for Ireland). Headquarters refers to the operational head office; where relevant, 
the separate place of incorporation is indicated (eg Bilbao for BBVA).
‘Governance’ includes three categories: (1) ‘Government’ governance applies to all 
banks owned or controlled by government at the national or local level, and also to 
those jointly controlled by a group of such banks (such as DekaBank in Germany). (2) 
‘Cooperative’ governance applies to a range of non-commercial models, which are not 
government-controlled. These include cooperative banks in a narrow sense and their 
central/national bodies (eg Crédit Agricole, Crédit Mutuel, DZ Bank, Rabobank), banks 
controlled by non-profit foundations (eg successors of Spain’s savings banks), a joint 
venture majority-owned by cooperative banks (France’s CRH), and Italy’s ‘popular 
banks’ (see below). (3) ‘Commercial’ governance applies to all other banks, which are 
organised on a joint-stock basis. Euro-area branches or subsidiaries of other banking 
groups are classified according to the governance of their parent group.
‘Public listing (ownership)’ indicates whether the bank is listed or not at parent-entity 
level, and gives an indication of ownership structure. ‘Dispersed’ ownership, in this 
context, only means that no shareholder holds an absolute majority, but it should be 
kept in mind that this category covers a wide variety of situations, which may in some 
cases involve de-facto control by minority shareholders, acting on their own or as 
part of shareholders’ agreements. Among the banks under government control, we 
distinguish between ‘nationalised’ banks (which were in the private sector before the 
start of the crisis in 2007), ‘policy banks’ (which have a specific public-interest mission, 
such as financing local government in the case of the Netherland’s BNG Bank, Fin-
land’s Kuntarhoitus or France’s SFIL), and other (such as Germany’s Landesbanken). 
‘Popolare’ refers to the specific case of Italian popular banks, which currently follow a 
one-person-one-vote principle (as opposed to one-share-one-vote) even when public-
ly listed. This information is updated as of May 2016.
All financial metrics are as of end-2015, except Crédit Mutuel, HSH Nordbank,                   
Erwerbsgesellschaft der S-Finanzgruppe, Iccrea Holding, HASPA, AXA Bank, Precision 
Capital, Banque Degroof,  Sberbank Europe, VTB Austria, Bank of New York Mellon, 
RCB Bank (VTB), UBS Luxembourg, JP Morgan Luxembourg, all of which are as of 
end-2014, and State Street Luxembourg, as of end-2013. In addition, the leverage ratio 
is as of end-2014 for Dexia, NRW.BANK, WGZ Bank. We made estimates for Barclays’ 
branches in Italy and France, based on the Barclays plc annual report, since these 
branches are not specifically included in the SNL database. 
3 Austria
Thomas Gehrig
Austrian banking groups are characterised by different degrees of com-
plexity in their organisational structure. ‘One-tiered’ banks are stand-
alone joint-stock banks, such as Bank Austria (controlled by UniCredit 
since 2005)51, savings and loan institutions, local mortage banks (Hypo 
Landesbanken) and special-purpose banks. There are two ‘two-tiered’ 
groups, the savings banks (Erste Group Bank, Zweite Sparkasse and 
46 other Sparkassen) and cooperative banks (41 Volksbanken and 
Apothekerbank Sparda Banken), within which individual entities are 
financially linked through central coordinating banks on a second tier 
(respectively Erste Bank der Österreichischen Sparkassen AG, and 
Volksbank Wien). The Raiffeisen group is ‘three-tiered’, with 473 inde-
pendent local Raiffeisen (cooperative) banks, eight regional Raiffeisen 
Landesbanken, and a central entity, Raiffeisen Zentralbank (RZB).
The group ownership structures of the Erste and Raiffeisen groups 
are Austrian particularities deserving further comment. Erste Bank 
AG is the group central entity and manages the foreign subsidiar-
ies and capital market activities. It evolved as a subsidiary of the 
Sparkassenverband (Savings Banks Association), which remains the 
main shareholder via the Erste Foundation, jointly owned by the 
‘tier-1’ Sparkassen. Similarly, Raiffeisen Zentralbank AG (RZB) is 
the ‘tier-3’ centre of the Raiffeisen group, conducting international 
51   Bank Austria used to be part of the national savings banks system (Sparkassen-
verband), but left it in 2004.
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business (through its listed subsidiary Raiffeisen Bank International) 
and most of the group’s capital market activities. About 88 percent 
of its share capital is owned by a joint entity of the eight ‘tier-2’ 
Raiffeisen Landesbanken, the rest being held by a handful of external 
shareholders.
The two- and three-tiered groups are structured as institutional 
protection schemes (IPS), which imply mutual risk sharing, though 
without mutual or centralised control. In addition to the manda-
tory deposit insurance system administered by the Österreichische 
Raiffeisen-Einlagensicherung eGen (ÖRE), the Raiffeisen group has a 
longstanding mutual insurance scheme, the Solidaritätsgemeinschaft 
der Raiffeisen Bankengruppe, and also, since 2000, an institu-
tional protection scheme (Raiffeisen Kundengarantiegemeinschaft 
Österreich) which has been joined so far by about 85 percent of 
Raiffeisen banks. Similarly, the Volksbanken are members of an 
IPS named Österreichische Genossenschaftsverband (Schultze 
Delitzsch). The IPS that covers the Sparkassen and Erste Bank is the 
Haftungsverbund der Sparkassen.
The Austrian national supervisory authority is the FMA 
(Finanzmarktaufsicht), an independent federal agency. The national 
central bank (OeNB, for Österreischiche Nationalbank) provides 
consulting and information services to the FMA but does not control 
it, in a relationship similar to that between Bundesbank and BaFin in 
Germany.
According to FMA’s 2015 notification to the ESRB (ESRB, 2015), the 
Austrian banking sector can be characterised as large in relation to the 
Austrian economy, and as highly exposed to emerging markets (mostly 
EU member states in central and eastern Europe, and Russia, Turkey and 
Ukraine). Austrian banks are also insufficiently prepared for the reduc-
tion/removal of the implicit government guarantee and under-capital-
ised in relation to their European peers. The Austrian banking sector’s 
very specific ownership structure (with a high share of non-joint-stock 
companies) renders re-capitalisation difficult in times of crisis.
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Figure 8: Gross loans to central and eastern European countries by Austrian 
banks (end-Q1 2014, € billions)
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Source: Bruegel and Raiffeisen Bank International (2015). Notes: For Bank Austria the 
following applies to net loans: Turkey: pro-forma (41 percent stake at-equity since 
2013); Slovakian unit merged into the Czech unit in 2013; Fitch assumption for Ukrani-
an unit (booked as available-for-sale since 2013).
While generating higher returns on equity relative to lending in the 
euro area, the banks’ CEE exposure results in asset quality problems as 
indicated by a relatively high proportion of non-performing loans. The 
Austrian subsidiaries of Sberbank and VTB have achieved substan-
tially lower NPL ratios and loan impairments52.
Exposure to central and eastern European (CEE) countries
A specific feature of the Austrian banking market is its substantial CEE 
exposure mainly through the three largest banks: Bank Austria, Erste 
52    See Gehrig (1998) for an explanation of domestic advantage in cross-border 
lending because of the presence of local information. In his model cross-border 
banks face an adverse selection problem highlighted by higher NPL ratios, loan 
impairments and provisioning.
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Bank and Raiffeisen International (see Figure 8). Together these banks 
comprise the largest group of cross-border banks in the CEE area. 
Erste Bank and Raiffeisen International together account for about 
20 percent of total CEE lending from the 15 countries that formed the 
European Union before the 2004 enlargement, while Bank Austria 
together with Intesa Sanpaolo account for about another 17 percent.
Overall the CEE markets still appear underbanked53. For example, 
collateralisation in the CEE area in 2014 typically is still below 20 per-
cent of GDP, compared to the euro-area average, which grew from 30 
to 40 percent of GDP between 2002 and 2014. Some euro-area coun-
tries have collateralisation levels of up to 40-50 percent of GDP. This 
suggests the existence of further unexploited banking opportunities in 
the CEE area.
Despite improvements on the asset side, Austrian banks started to 
reduce their CEE exposures in 2014. Partly this was a reaction to the 
SSM and the resulting increasingly conservative supervisory envi-
ronment in their home countries, Austria and Italy54. In particular, 
Erste Group CEO Andreas Treichl has repeatedly complained about 
unfair treatment of CEE engagement and supervisory bias in the ECB’s 
comprehensive assessment55, in the face of which the ECB felt com-
pelled to justify its asset quality review and stress testing procedures56. 
53   ‘Underbanked’ is understood here in terms of services provided, not as a meas-
ure of banks per customer. In the latter sense, the euro area is largely viewed as 
overbanked.
54   Among the SIs supervised by the ECB since 2014, only Santander and KBC in-
creased their CEE exposure in 2014 markedly, despite growing NPL ratios.
55    See for example Bloomberg, ‘ECB stress tests biased’, 25 April 2014, or Reuters, 6 
June 2014. On Austrian TV (ORF, ZiB2) Mr Treichl said on 26 October 2014: “In 
Brussels and Frankfurt they haven’t yet engaged intensely enough with this region, 
and especially they haven’t grasped how strong the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Poland have become” (author’s translation from German), implying a serious lack 
of expertise on, or knowledge of, regional CEE fundamentals at the ECB and the 
European Commission.
56    Bloomberg, ‘ECB defends stress test from Erste’s criticism of design’, 24 May 2014.
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Austrian banks continued to reduce the CEE exposures in 2015.
Comprehensive assessment and stress tests
The 2014 comprehensive assessment was criticised by the Austrian 
banking industry and Austrian regulators. There was a widespread 
sense that the ECB was modifying the fair-value accounting of 
impaired assets according to its own excessively restrictive interpre-
tations or preferences, and, as widely claimed, in contradiction to 
Austrian accounting standards, and even IFRS57. In late 2014, ECB 
officials had to defend themselves repeatedly in the Austrian public 
debate against the charge of unduly interfering in the banks’ account-
ing practices. The details of the definition of non-performing loans, or 
merely impaired loans, and their implementation was a key issue in 
that debate, because it significantly affected CEE exposures58. In aggre-
gate, the large Austrian banks had to adjust their required Tier 1 capital 
by less than 1 percentage point because of the differential accounting 
treatments (0.65 percent in case of RZB).
A common feature of SSM supervision became evident in those 
early days. In attempts to implement equal standards and to be fair in 
this respect to all euro-area countries, standards would converge to the 
57   For example, Raiffeisen CEO Walther Rothensteiner insisted of the legality of the 
accounting procedures chosen by his bank, versus the ECB’s insistence on reclas-
sifying loans for asset quality review purposes (Salzburger Nachrichten, October 
2014). In their discussion on the innate tensions in the treatment of NPLs and 
impaired assets in different accounting regimes, Bholat et al (2016) and Roaf 
(2014) also highlight the particularly conservative ECB approach. They also imply 
that the standards agreed in the ‘Vienna Initiative’ with respect to problematic 
exposures in CEE and south-eastern Europe were significantly laxer than the 
recent ECB policies.
58   While it appears to be closer to the Austrian perspective that renegotiating loans 
is a characteristic feature of doing business within the CEE area and not neces-
sarily an indication of bad performance, the ECB – in their attempt to implement 
equal treatment throughout the euro area – as a matter of principle prefers to 
treat any such renegotiations as indicators of non-performance (relative to the 
initially agreed contractual terms). Accordingly, the discretionary choices were 
treated more conservatively by the ECB during the asset quality review. 
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toughest, most conservative levels. Already within these first months 
of negotiations, Austrian members felt they were being deprived of 
opportunities to attract good business for the sake of fending off risky 
business. These views have been reiterated regularly in more recent 
disagreements between Austrian stakeholders and the ECB.
The stress test results themselves did not come as a surprise, and 
Austria banks performed according to expectations. Only ÖVAG 
(Österreichische Volksbank AG, by then the central entity of the 
Volksbank system) failed the stress test. But this problem was already 
being taken care of at the time, and in June 2015 the Volksbank system 
was reorganised into eight regional groups with Volksbank Wien taking 
the lead function. The bad assets were transferred into a part-govern-
ment owned bad bank, Immigon Portfolioabbaugesellschaft AG.
Significant institutions (SIs)
In June 2015, the Financial Market Stability Board (FMSB), a newly 
established institution at the FMA to implement macroprudential 
regulation, decided that banks with significant CEE exposures (namely 
Erste Group, Raiffeisen and Bank Austria) would be subject to an 
extra 3 percent systemic risk capital buffer. This requirement will be 
phased-in by mid-2017. It is worth noting that these systemic risk 
buffers were added despite the fact that the systemic risk exposures of 
the Austrian SIs were declining, according to various measurements 
of systemic risk such as SRISK (see Gehrig and Iannino, 2016). While 
the CEE lending business has been largely profitable (especially in the 
Czech Republic, Russia and Turkey), and significant risk premia had 
been earned, considerable losses, non-performing loans and tail risks 
also remain on the books (Romania, Ukraine).
Because of their extensive cross-border activities, two Russian 
subsidiaries were determined to be significant by the ECB in 2015: 
Sberbank Europe AG and VTB Bank (Austria) AG. These two, and 
seven other banks in other euro-area countries, were subjected in 2015 
to a comprehensive assessment that complemented the one carried 
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out in 2014. While both banks passed the asset quality review, they 
failed to meet the 5.5 percent CET1 ratio under the adverse stress test 
scenario (reaching levels of 4.1 and 4.2 percent respectively). Both 
banks were able to make up the shortfall through capital injection by 
their respective parents before the conclusion of the stress tests.
Less significant institutions (LSIs)
The FMA maintains responsibility for supervising about 550 less 
significant institutions in Austria. The FMA argues that this arrange-
ment provides sufficient flexibility to account for local and regional 
specificities.
The largest group of less significant banks comprises most local 
Raiffeisen banks, which are organised in the form of cooperatives. 
These institutions are formally independent. As cooperatives, how-
ever, they guarantee each other’s obligations, and therefore share each 
other’s risks. Despite their less significant status, these banks are very 
concerned about the possible current intention of the ECB to merge 
them into larger, possibly systemically important players. There is con-
siderable mistrust in the industry about the FMA’s ability to effectively 
protect them against such schemes. The FMA is seen as executing 
Frankfurt’s orders and implementing the instructions of the ECB.
Perception and debate
In the first 18 months of European banking supervision, the public 
debate about banking in Austria has been dominated by the reso-
lution of the Carinthian bank Hypo Alpe Adria (and the related bad 
bank HETA) and that of ÖVAG (see below). The restructuring of Bank 
Austria, with the transfer of its CEE exposure to the Italian head 
office of Unicredit Group in Milan, announced in October 2015, also 
attracted much publicity.
Within the financial community, there are strong rumours about 
the ECB’s possible intention to restructure the Raiffeisen banks and 
Volksbanken, and their possible inclusion in the common European 
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deposit insurance scheme. Banks feel their traditional lending activi-
ties are being held back by excessively intrusive regulation, and also by 
an excessively accommodating monetary policy59. The financial sector 
is disappointed with the FMA, which does not seem to defend national 
interests against Frankfurt’s dominance, and is seen as giving in pre-
maturely to questionable requests from the ECB.
There is also a widespread feeling among the the Raiffeisen banks 
and Volksbanken that both the ECB’s monetary policy and its super-
vision unnecessarily constrain profitable traditional and hitherto 
resilient business models. This comes on top of an Austrian bank levy 
introduced in 2011 in order to recoup some of the cost to taxpayers of 
the banking sector bailouts of previous years. This bank levy was intro-
duced as a permanent rather than a temporary measure. The ECB’s 
additional efforts at harmonisation of options and national discretions 
(ONDs) and its ‘strengthening’ of supervision standards and attempts 
to create a level-playing field, might reduce (traditional) lending while 
effectively making it less risky. Accordingly, many observers, especially 
within the LSIs, sense a strong connection between what they argue is 
excessively conservative supervision, and low growth and lacklustre 
economic activity. According to this view, all these developments seri-
ously undermine the competitiveness of the Austrian banking sector, 
both internationally and at home.
Deposit insurance
The 2015 Austrian law transposing the EU Deposit Guarantee Scheme 
Directive of 201460 leaves the basic depositor protection unchanged 
at the level of €100,000, and in special cases even at €500,000. 
Contributions according to the new law will have to be fully funded by 
the banking sector. In the previous regime, contributions were shared 
59   Laura  Noonan (2014) ‘Interview – Erste chief sees bank regulation as biggest 
constraint on lending’, Reuters, 6 June.
60    Bundesgesetzblatt 159/2015: Einlagensicherungs- und  Anlegerentschädigungs-
gesetz. 
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equally between the banking sector and the government at a guaran-
tee level of €50,000 each. Accordingly, explicit partial former funding of 
deposit insurance by the taxpayer has been transferred to the banking 
sector in the wake of the creation of the banking union61.
Cooperation between the FMA and the ECB
The relationship between the FMA and the ECB is portrayed as coop-
erative in both institutions’ public communications. ECB Supervisory 
Board chair Danièle Nouy and vice chair Sabine Lautenschläger have 
been repeatedly invited to present their views at FMA annual confer-
ences, which receive widespread attention from the financial commu-
nity. The annual conferences meetings in 2014 and 2015 focussed on 
demonstrating complete supervisory harmony. Even so, Nouy did not 
shy away from emphasising that the ECB would have the final say in 
case of a stalemate.
Hans-Jörg Schelling, Austria’s finance minister since September 
2014, has strongly supported the SSM in public speeches. In his 
address to the 2014 FMA annual conference (Schelling, 2014), he 
clearly invited the cooperation of the financial sector. At the same time 
he emphasised the need to evaluate the SSM in due course, in particu-
lar its roles to improve financing for small and innovative firms and to 
increase the resilience of the banking sector.
Among regulators, however, the sense of harmony with Frankfurt 
has increasingly been replaced by an attitude of fatalistic cooperation. 
Conflicts with the ECB ‘higher-ups’ are carefully avoided. The feeling is 
that, whenever Frankfurt-based JST members turn a deaf ear to issues 
voiced by FMA members, the latter will not insist on making their 
points. ECB supervisory staff members are viewed by more and more 
of their FMA counterparts as dominant and insisting on their self-at-
tributed expertise, including on local Austrian matters.
61    Article 25 (3) of the new law allows for additional discretionary government guar-
antees on a case-by-case basis.
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The cooperative banking sector (Raiffeisen banks and 
Volksbanken) largely regards the FMA attitude as one of appeasement 
that too easily surrenders the interests of the cooperative banks and of 
LSIs more generally. In particular, attempts by the ECB to transform 
cooperative banks into systemically important institutions via forced 
mergers are a major source of concern. The argument is that the ECB 
has effective control. The FMA is viewed as having been degraded to 
a local subsidiary of the ECB, effectively forced to cooperate in imple-
menting the orders from Frankfurt.
Resolution of systemic banks: HETA and ÖVAG
While the Austrian banking market is heavily over-banked, structural 
reform is slow. Because of its connections to political parties, the exit 
of the failed Hypo Alpe Adria (HAA), however, has attracted public 
attention.
HAA’s banking license was withdrawn in October 2014 and the 
remaining assets were managed by HETA under FMA supervision. An 
independent commission headed by former high-court judge Irmgard 
Griss, in a report (Griss, 2014) that was widely considered as unusually 
frank and detailed, attributed HAA’s problems to its close political rela-
tionships and supervisory failure, including by the OeNB and the FMA. 
The report, commissioned in May 2014 and delivered in December 
2014, deeply dented the reputation of the Austrian supervisors. The 
impact of this report is seen by some industry observers as one of the 
reasons for the eagerness of the FMA and OeNB to cooperate with the 
ECB in SSM matters, as an attempt to restore their public reputations.
Less dramatic was the exit of ÖVAG, which, as mentioned, failed 
the 2014 stress test. Its banking licence was relinquished in July 2015. 
ÖVAG had got into trouble with bad investments in derivatives and 
stocks, prior to and during the subprime crisis. In this case too, it 
appears that Austrian supervisors were slow to close the failed bank, 
adding to the costs ultimately borne by the taxpayer.
One important result of the restructuring of HAA and ÖVAG has 
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been an increasing willingness to use bail-in instruments. Austrian poli-
cymakers are increasingly prepared to implement forms of burden-shar-
ing that include bail-in instruments, even at the cost of legal risk62. 
Overall assessment and prospects
The introduction of the SSM has clearly changed the supervisory cul-
ture in Austria. It is too early for a definitive assessment, however. The 
publication of the Griss report on Hypo Alpe Adria, which uncovered 
massive supervisory failures by both the OeNB and FMA, dominated 
2015. After the denting of their reputations, both supervisors have tried 
to restore their good names and public confidence by cooperating 
closely with the ECB and by avoiding any public conflict with it.
Given Austrian banks’ substantial CEE exposures and relatively 
low capital levels, Austrian supervisors are not likely to support local 
interests to the extent expected by domestic banks. The signs are that 
there will be massive sector concentration, and reduced horizontal or 
geographical diversity in the Austrian banking industry. Banks appear 
to be gradually continuing to reduce their role as major financiers of 
smaller and medium sized, and especially, of innovative and risky 
companies. A widely discussed report on SMEs by the Ministry of 
Science, Research and Economics, showed that the value of newly 
granted loans per SME applicant dropped by about 20 percent from 
€7,120 in 2009 to €5,930 in 2014 (BMWFW, 2015, Fig. 59), despite 
significantly enhanced public support in line with to the European 
Small Business Act of 2008. Moreover, while funding conditions have 
improved in the euro area since 2011, the spread between lending 
rates for small business and the ECB rate (or 6-month Euribor) has 
widened from less than 150 to more than 200 basis points (BMWFW, 
2015, Fig. 54)63.
62    In May 2016, after several failed attempts, the Austrian Federal Finance Ministry 
reached a settlement with HETA creditors in order to avoid lengthy and costly 
legal proceedings.
63    This increase in spreads for SMEs cannot be explained by refinancing costs. 
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Many Austrian observers see the real test of SSM’s success as its 
ability to attract the under-banked non-euro CEE countries to opt into 
banking union through the close cooperation procedure and, thus, to 
maintain if not increase the competitiveness of euro-area based banks 
in eastern Europe64. Currently there is no sign of this, causing concern 
among Austrian banks and economic players that they will lose com-
petitiveness in eastern Europe and neighbouring countries because of 
the SSM.
Overall, it seems that banking union has already contributed 
positively to speed up the resolution of failed banks in Austria. In 
this regard, the SRM in particular will help to restructure European 
banking markets and to enable market forces to determine the viability 
of banking business models. While concerns about the (increasingly) 
intrusive character of the SSM might admittedly reflect self-serving 
interests of the banking industry, it remains debatable how conserva-
tive and standardised European banking supervision ultimately should 
be. If supervision is too tight, it might be successful in almost eradicat-
ing the problem of failing banks, but it might also impede the ability 
of the banking system to fund (small) risky and innovative ventures. 
Recent evidence from the United States (Götz et al, 2016) suggests 
that geographical diversification can be an important substitute for 
(excessively active) supervision. In Europe, significant diversification 
benefits could, for example, be gained by hedging risks between over-
banked core countries and underbanked CEE countries. In this sense 
it would seem appropriate that future SSM policies should be put in 
place with a view to future growth and development, and not only 
Increasing risk premia are also an unlikely explanation, given improved govern-
ment guarantees as a consequence of the implementation of the European Small 
Business Act. Given the high intensity of competition throughout this period, the 
apparent explanations for the spread increase are heightened regulatory costs 
and reduced competitiveness.
64    See the panel contribution of Erste CEO A. Treichl at the 42nd Economics Con-
ference of the OeNB in 2014 (Oesterreichische Nationalbank, 2014).
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calibrated on what was the most serious crisis in decades. After all, 
the raison d’être of banks as delegated monitors of risk requires them 
to acquire social information, especially about risky entrepreneurial 
ventures.
4 Belgium
André Sapir
The Belgian banking landscape
Belgium is special among the nine countries described in this 
Blueprint. It is the only one for which the importance of foreign banks, 
via branches or subsidiaries, was greater (in terms of assets) than that 
of domestic credit institutions at the start of European banking super-
vision65. According to the ECB (2015a), banking groups headquar-
tered outside Belgium accounted for 65.6 percent of banking assets 
in Belgium in 2014. This is far more than in the other eight countries, 
where the share of foreign banks averaged only 12 percent in 2014 
and ranged between 2.5 percent (Greece) and 24.7 percent (Austria). 
Belgium is also the country with the greatest share of bank assets held 
by subsidiaries (43.1 percent of total) and by branches (22.5 percent) of 
foreign banks.
The reasons for the large share of foreign banks in Belgium include 
the financial crisis of 2007-08, which resulted in the demise of Fortis 
(the largest bank in Belgium) and its acquisition by BNP Paribas. 
Another important reason is the large pool of surplus savings in 
Belgium. According to the High Level Expert Group on the Future of 
the Belgian Financial Sector (HLEG, 2016), the net financing of the 
resident banking sector by Belgian households (ie surplus savings) 
65   This feature, however, is shared by several other SSM countries which are not 
included in the project, such as the Baltic countries, Finland and Luxembourg. 
Portugal is also likely to join the group shortly. 
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amounted to 46 percent of GDP, roughly €180 billion, in 2015. A sig-
nificant part of these surplus savings is channelled abroad by foreign 
banking groups, mostly in the context of intra-group operations. The 
total of net intra-group interbank claims of resident banks in 2015 was 
estimated at about €90 billion, a large part of which was channelled by 
branches or subsidiaries of foreign banks.
Immediately before the creation of the SSM, the National Bank of 
Belgium (NBB) was the supervisory authority for all Belgium-based 
banks, ie all domestic credit institutions and subsidiaries of foreign 
credit institutions. Belgian branches of foreign credit institutions were 
supervised only by their home supervisory authorities. With the crea-
tion of the SSM, the NBB retains supervisory responsibility for the less 
significant institutions (LSIs).
Table 7 at the end of this chapter shows the top 20 Belgium-based 
banking groups, which account for 99 percent of all banks (exclud-
ing foreign branches) in terms of assets, and the situation in terms of 
supervision following this shift66. Seven different cases can be distin-
guished, four for significant and three for less significant institutions:
• Significant institutions:
1. Domestic credit institutions: KBC, Dexia, Belfius, Argenta, De-
groof Petercam;
2. Subsidiaries of foreign credit institutions from non-SSM coun-
tries: Bank of New York Mellon;
3. Subsidiaries of foreign non-credit institutions: AXA Bank (sub-
sidiary of French insurer AXA);
4. Subsidiaries of foreign significant institutions from SSM coun-
tries: BNP Paribas Fortis, ING Belgium, bpost bank (another 
subsidiary of BNP Paribas), Santander, BKCP and Beobank 
(both fully-owned by Crédit Mutuel Nord Europe, itself a mem-
66   Data reported in Table 7 is consolidated, and might include therefore non-bank-
ing (mainly insurance) activities, and non-euro-area banking activities that fall 
outside SSM responsibility. 
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ber of France’s Crédit Mutuel cooperative group);
• Less significant institutions:
5. Domestic credit institutions: Crelan, Finaxis, VDK, CPH;
6. Subsidiaries of foreign institutions from non-SSM countries: 
Euroclear (owned by Euroclear UK);
7. Subsidiaries of foreign non-credit institutions: Nagelmakers 
(owned by Chinese insurer Anbang).
Among the top 20 Belgium-based banks, there are therefore: 13 that 
are, or belong to, significant institutions, seven considered as Belgian 
(cases 1-3) and six from another SSM country (case 4)67; six less 
significant institutions, all considered Belgian (cases 5-7); and  BHF 
Kleinwort Benson, which currently has no SSM-supervised banking 
activity in Belgium68.
Assessing the working of the SSM from a Belgian perspective
All SIs operating in Belgium are directly supervised by the ECB, with 
participation of the NBB in their Joint Supervisory Teams (JST). All 
Belgian LSIs remain directly supervised by the NBB, as before the cre-
ation of the SSM. Branches of SSM-headquartered foreign banks are 
now supervised by the ECB if the parent group is a SI, or remain super-
vised by the relevant national supervisor if the parent group is a LSI.
This assessment of the working of the SSM can therefore focus 
primarily on the SIs operating in Belgium, for which the creation of 
the SSM has shifted supervisory responsibility to the ECB. This means 
focusing on the 13 banks listed above as being, or belonging to, signifi-
cant institutions.
The seven Belgian-headquartered SIs (cases 1-3 above) were all 
subjected to SSM comprehensive assessments in 2014 (Argenta, AXA, 
67   Outside the top 20, there are seven subsidiaries of foreign significant institutions.
68   Outside the top 20, there are dozens of less significant institutions, mainly 
Belgian domestic credit institutions but also some subsidiaries of foreign credit 
institutions.
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Belfius, BNY Mellon, Dexia and KBC) or 2015 (Degroof, in anticipation 
of its merger with Petercam) to help ensure that they were adequately 
capitalised and could withstand possible financial shocks. The result 
of the 2014 comprehensive assessment indicated a capital shortfall for 
two of the Belgian banks: AXA Bank (€200 million shortfall) and Dexia 
(€339 million shortfall). AXA Bank has since been fully recapitalised by 
its parent group. Regarding Dexia, the Belgian authorities had argued 
that it should be excluded from the comprehensive assessment alto-
gether, since it has been in orderly resolution since December 201269. 
The ECB Supervisory Board rejected this on the grounds that Dexia is 
a significant institution with full access to ECB liquidity. Nonetheless, 
the ECB stated after the comprehensive assessment that, in view of the 
orderly resolution plan for Dexia, which benefits from a Belgian federal 
state guarantee, there was no need to proceed with capital raising.
As far as significant non-Belgian institutions with important activ-
ities in Belgium (ie those listed under case 4 above) are concerned, 
none of the parent groups was identified by the SSM as having a capital 
shortfall. The sole significant foreign institution operating in Belgium 
found to have a capital shortfall was Monte dei Paschi di Siena, the 
Belgian subsidiary of which is rather small with €1.2 billion in assets at 
the end of 2014.
How have relevant Belgian stakeholders, in particular bankers and 
supervisors, reacted to the creation of the SSM? All of them seem to 
strongly support the creation of the banking union and of European 
banking supervision as a matter of principle. This is because they 
regard the banking union as an important step forward in reinforcing 
the economic governance and financial stability of the euro area, but 
also because the Belgian banking sector is so interconnected with the 
rest of the euro area. Given the cross-border dimension of the Belgian 
banking industry, extending bank supervision beyond domestic 
69   Since December 2012, Dexia has been majority-owned by the Belgian state 
(50.02 percent), with the balance held by the French state (44.40 percent) and 
other shareholders (5.58 percent). Source: Dexia website.
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borders is generally viewed as crucial to align responsibilities and 
ensure coherent and harmonised implementation of supervisory and 
regulatory practices (HLEG, 2016).
This does not mean, however, that Belgian stakeholders directly 
involved in supervision (bankers or supervisors) have no criticisms 
of the actual working of European banking supervision during its first 
year of operation. A comment often heard among Belgian stakehold-
ers is that JSTs are very centralised, with little room for manoeuvre left 
for the NBB’s sub-coordinators. In other words, responsibility for the 
supervision of significant institutions seems to have really shifted, as 
intended, from the NBB to the ECB. Belgian bankers seem to miss the 
cosy relationship they enjoyed with their Belgian supervisor. There is 
a strong feeling that informality has been replaced by anonymity and 
that this carries a cost: less dialogue leading to less nuanced, more 
bureaucratic and more ‘one-size-fits-all’ supervisory decisions.
There is also a feeling among some Belgian bankers that the small 
size of Belgium translates into less influence over decisions taken in 
Frankfurt, compared to banks from larger countries. Here the situation 
obviously differs according to whether or not the Belgian bank is a 
subsidiary of a foreign bank headquartered in a large country (as is the 
case for the six banks in case 4). For subsidiaries of foreign banks from 
large countries, European banking supervision might actually give 
a stronger voice to the concerns of Belgian bankers via their parent 
companies.
What is less clear at this stage is how what is described by some as 
the ECB’s more bureaucratic and less subtle approach, compared to 
the pre-SSM regime and the allegedly more strategic NBB approach, 
translates into actual supervisory decisions. The only example so 
far seems to concern the ‘fit and proper’ requirement for new bank 
administrators and board members, which requires approval by the 
ECB for both SIs and LSIs. However the complaint here seems to be 
more in terms of the length of the process than its results.
Another issue, which is likely to have far more systemic 
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implications for the Belgian banking landscape than the replacement 
of supposedly ‘friendly’ NBB supervisors by ‘faceless ECB bureaucrats’, 
concerns so-called ‘gold-plating’ and ‘ring-fencing’ practices and their 
implication for subsidiaries of foreign banks operating in Belgium, in 
particular BNP Paribas Fortis and ING Belgium, two of the big four 
banks in Belgium (which also includes KBC and Belfius)70. Gold-
plating refers to national regulatory and/or supervisory requirements 
that go over and above EU or other international standards, whereas 
ring-fencing refers to actions by national authorities aimed at retain-
ing capital or liquidity within national borders by limiting intra-group 
transfers. These two practices are justified by national authorities on 
grounds of financial stability.
Subsidiaries of foreign banks have been fighting gold-plating and 
ring-fencing practices in Belgium71. By shifting power from national 
authorities to the ECB, the creation of the SSM is bound to enhance 
the centralisation of capital and liquidity within cross-border groups, 
thereby weakening gold-plating and ring-fencing possibilities in 
countries like Belgium. While this development is generally regarded 
as both inevitable and even potentially welfare-enhancing by Belgian 
authorities, there are also worries that it could generate some risks for 
Belgium given its persistent surplus savings. The risks concern mainly 
national taxpayers because of the incomplete nature of the banking 
union, and in particular the absence of a common deposit insurance 
scheme.
The expectation of the relevant stakeholders (bankers and public 
authorities) in Belgium is that the creation of a full banking union 
will take time and that, during the interim period, some gold-plating 
and ring-fencing will continue. The question then is what will be the 
strategy of foreign banks that operate in Belgium via subsidiaries. 
70   Dexia is not included in this group since it has ceased operating activity. Belfius 
is the new name of what used to be the Belgian operations of the Dexia group, 
which were separated from the Dexia parent entity in 2011.  
71   Of course, Belgium is far from the only euro-area country with such practices.
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One option could be the transformation of (or more simply the shift 
of activity from) subsidiaries into (to) branches, which would also 
address the complaint of banks in Belgium that seem to be subject 
since the financial crisis to higher taxes than in other EU countries72. 
From a Belgian perspective, this option would have the advantage 
of reducing the risks for the national deposit insurance scheme and 
therefore for domestic taxpayers, but it would also have two disadvan-
tages. First, it would reduce the amount of taxes paid by banks to the 
Belgian government. Second, it would risk reducing strategic activities 
and knowledge centres in Belgium, which are important in the case of 
BNP Paribas and ING.
Before the creation of the SSM, the transformation of subsidiaries 
into branches for one of the big four would probably have been pre-
vented by the NBB and the national political authorities. Today, it is 
less clear that they could interfere. An interesting parallel is with the 
situation in Finland, a country where the share of foreign banks is about 
the same as in Belgium, but is almost entirely accounted for by subsid-
iaries73. Nordea (headquartered in Sweden) and Danske Bank (head-
quartered in Denmark), the two groups whose Finnish subsidiaries 
are, respectively, the first and third-largest banks in the country, have 
long considered converting their Finnish subsidiaries into branches, 
raising some concern from the host-country authorities. In March 2016, 
Nordea’s Annual General Meeting voted to convert its subsidiary banks 
in Denmark, Finland and Norway to branches of the Swedish parent 
company, subject to approval by the relevant authorities. 
The situation with respect to the possible transformation of their 
Belgian subsidiaries into branches would be different for BNP Paribas 
72    HLEG (2016) reports that, although no information is available on the corporate 
taxes effectively paid by banks across countries, bank charges and levies seem to 
be somewhat higher in Belgium than in most other EU countries.
73    According to the ECB (2015a), foreign banks accounted for 67.2 percent of 
banking assets in Finland in 2014, with 61.5 percent held by subsidiaries and 5.7 
percent by branches. 
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compared to ING. The reason is that the Belgian state holds a partic-
ipation of ten percent in the capital of BNP Paribas, the parent com-
pany of BNP Paribas Fortis, which it would likely try to use to discour-
age the transformation.
On the subject of state ownership, it should also be noted that the 
Belgian state fully owns Belfius, the country’s third-largest bank, which 
emerged in 2011 from the dismantling of the Dexia group. In this case, 
European banking supervision has created a change in paradigm by 
greatly reducing the possibility for the Belgian state to intervene in the 
supervisory oversight.
Finally, two comments on branches. First, in case BNP Paribas 
and/or ING decided to transform their Belgian subsidiaries into 
branches, it is clear that the NBB would remain involved in their JSTs 
since the new cross-border branches would be significant. Second, 
in most current cases, cross-border branches operating in Belgium 
are not significant, and therefore the NBB is not directly involved in 
their supervision, despite the creation of the SSM. This does not mean, 
however, that the SSM has not changed anything in this respect. The 
NBB, like its counterparts in other SSM countries, can now take to the 
ECB any problem it might have with the behaviour of a bank operating 
as a branch within Belgium’s borders or offering cross-border services 
there, even if that bank is classified as less significant and therefore not 
directly supervised by the ECB. For instance, there are rumours that, 
in 2015, the NBB raised with the ECB the issue of Nemea, a Maltese 
online bank that was offering unusually high interest on bank deposits 
and advertised in Belgium74. According to the Belgian press, where 
the issue was much discussed in 2015, Nemea is jointly owned by two 
Finnish bankers who were involved in Kaupthing, an Icelandic bank 
that went bankrupt in 2008. It is unclear, however, whether the alleged 
intervention by the NBB was successful in changing the behaviour of 
74    Being a purely online bank, Nemea does not have a physical presence in Belgium 
and does not therefore operate in the country via what would be considered 
stricto sensu as a branch. 
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Nemea, which still offered in April 2016 interest of 3.5 percent on five-
year deposit accounts, by far the highest rate advertised in Belgium at 
that point.
Conclusion
The first year of operation of the SSM has been rather uneventful as far 
as the Belgian banking sector is concerned. However the sector has 
two features that will probably raise interesting issues for European 
banking supervision in the future. One is the high share of foreign 
banks operating in Belgium through subsidiaries and branches. The 
other is the full or partial ownership by the Belgian state of two of the 
big four banks.
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Table 7: Top 20 Belgium-based banking groups (latest date available)
Rank Company 
name
Total 
assets 
 (€bn)
End period 
for balance 
sheet data
Group’s 
home 
country
SI or LSI 
(SSM 
home 
country)
Belgian 
state 
share 
(percent)
1 BNP Paribas 
Fortis
275.2 30/06/2015 FR SI (FR) 10.00*
2 KBC Group 252.4 31/12/2015 BE SI (BE) 0.00
3 Dexia 230.3 31/12/2015 BE SI (BE) 50.02
4 Belfius 179.6 30/06/2015 BE SI (BE) 100.00
5 ING Belgium 151.8 31/12/2014 NL SI (NL) 0.00
6 AXA Bank 
Europe
42.6 31/12/2014 FR SI (BE) 0.00
7 Argenta 37.7 31/12/2014 BE SI (BE) 0.00
8 Bank of New 
York Mellon 
34.8 31/12/2014 US SI (BE) 0.00
9 Euroclear 25.9 31/12/2014 UK LSI (BE) 0.00
10 Crelan 23.3 31/12/2014 BE LSI (BE) 0.00
11 bpost 9.5 31/12/2014 FR SI (FR) 10.00*
12 BHF Kleinwort 
Benson 
9.4 30/09/2015 BE - 0.00
13 Santander 
Benelux 
8.6 31/12/2014 ES SI (ES) 0.00
14 Nagelmackers 6.9 31/12/2014 China LSI (BE) 0.00
15 Degroof 
Petercam
5.6 30/09/2014 BE SI (BE) 0.00
16 Finaxis 5.0 31/12/2014 BE LSI (BE) 0.00
17 BKCP 3.9 31/12/2014 FR SI (FR) 0.00
18 VDK 3.4 31/12/2014 BE LSI (BE) 0.00
19 Beobank 2.6 31/12/2014 FR SI (FR) 0.00
20 CPH 2.3 31/12/2014 BE LSI (BE) 0.00
Source: columns 2-4: SNL database.
Note: *Belgian state ownership of the parent group, BNP Paribas.
5 France
Philippe Tibi
The French banking landscape
For historical reasons (Jacobinism, nationalisation waves in 1946 and 
1981), the French banking system is highly concentrated. Seven parent 
banks own the near-totality of retail banking networks: Banque Postale 
(state-owned), BNP Paribas, BPCE (formed in 2009 through the merger 
of the Banques Populaires and Caisses d’Epargne cooperative groups), 
Crédit Agricole, Crédit Mutuel, HSBC France, and Société Générale. 
Apart from Banque Postale, which specialises in retail services, they 
are all universal banks with significant operations in retail, commercial 
and investment banking, and life insurance and asset management75.
HSBC is the only foreign bank in this group, following its 1999 take-
over of Crédit Commercial de France. The presence of other foreign 
banks is almost negligible. The largest of them, the French branch of 
Barclays, has less than €50 billion in assets according to the ECB’s list 
of supervised institutions, in in the context of €8.5 trillion, or about 
four times French GDP, for all French banks76.
BNP Paribas and Société Générale developed an acquisitive strat-
egy outside France, with the ambition to build leadership positions 
in selected countries, primarily but not only within the euro area. The 
75    Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations, a large state-controlled financial institution, 
is not a bank. 
76    https://acpr.banque-france.fr/fileadmin/user_upload/acp/publications/rap-
ports-annuels/20151007_Rapport_chiffre_2014_Banque.pdf.
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same is true to a lesser extent of Crédit Agricole and Crédit Mutuel. 
France is the home country of half of the top ten significant institu-
tions (SIs) in the euro area. Among the six euro-area banking groups 
with assets in excess of €1 trillion, four are French (the others being 
Deutsche Bank and Santander). A related feature is that LSIs collec-
tively make up a smaller share of the French banking system than 
in other large euro-area countries, especially Germany and Italy. In 
another contrast to other large countries, all French SIs are headquar-
tered in a single metropolitan area, namely Paris. 
The French national supervisory authority is the Autorité de 
Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution (ACPR), a semi-autonomous 
institution within the central bank (Banque de France). ACPR results 
from the 2010 assumption by the banking supervisor (formerly known 
as Commission Bancaire) of further prudential authority over insurers, 
nonbank credit institutions and investment firms, to which resolution 
authority was added in 2013. 
Overall assessment
The implementation of the SSM has been positive for the French 
banking system. It has clarified its relationship with its various regula-
tors and opened a welcome path towards a single European banking 
market and cross-border consolidation. It has also brought a more 
international perspective to supervision, and has been instrumental in 
recent governance transformations of France’s mutual banks.
Looking back at the rationale for European supervision, however, 
it is very problematic that the SSM so far has not changed the market 
assessment and rating of the European (including French) banks, 
as measured for example by price-to-book-value ratio. The sector 
remains fragile, almost ten years after the beginning of the subprime 
crisis. Reasons for this may include stringent capital rules inconsistent 
with banks earning their cost of capital; unpredictable rules, or rules in 
the making, which justify a very large risk premium; a lack of credibil-
ity of stress tests and/or of the quality of banks’ balance sheets; banks 
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paying only lip service to the new regulatory requirements; anaemic 
growth in the euro area; and the risk of another situation like Greece, 
including in a larger country. All of these factors, with the exception 
of economic growth, are at least partly within the remit of European 
banking supervision. More work has to be done to persuade market 
participants and the public about the quality of the reforms and the 
endgame of banking union, both in terms of market outcomes and of 
the architecture of the various agencies. 
Furthermore, it is vital to demonstrate that European banking 
supervision will not be unduly influenced by political factors. But it 
is also increasingly difficult to understand the ECB’s dual strategy: 
encourage banks to take risks in order to finance the economy, while 
simultaneously adding new layers of capital to mitigate risks. It is very 
difficult for the ECB to please three constituencies at the same time: 
the economy, public opinion and the shareholders and bondholders 
who finance banks. European banking supervision’s future success will 
partly depend on its ability to steer the right macro-prudential policy 
course, a concept that has very limited substance and effectiveness at 
the moment.
Another trade-off must be managed. The post-crisis European par-
adigm is that markets should increase their share of the financing of 
the economy, at the expense of more constrained banks (capital mar-
kets union). This can only be true if markets are liquid. The under-rec-
ognised reality is however that bond markets are very illiquid at the 
moment, even for government bonds, because banks have massively 
reduced the capital they allocate to market-making activities (AMAFI, 
2015) in order to improve their CET1 ratios. Banking regulations also 
affect market structures. 
Many French stakeholders are concerned that the SSM and ECB 
may be losing sight of their fundamental mission: ensuring a pro-
ductive financing set-up in the euro area, with the most efficient and 
secure supervisory arrangements. This is seen in France as entailing 
quality of judgement and strategic handling of trade-offs, and also 
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having a clear view of the endgame, formulated and managed by a 
strong leadership. French institutions worry that existing trends might 
not play in this direction. In addition, they worry that the original quid 
pro quo – loss of sovereignty against a level playing field – might be lost 
on the way. 
France and the SSM concept 
Banking union is the child of the euro-area sovereign debt crisis and 
the idea that more federalism was necessary to restore the healthy 
functioning of the European financing system, beyond the objective 
of breaking the bank-sovereign vicious circle. The concept has been 
strongly supported in France, for three main reasons:
• First, it required strong political traction, which only Germany and 
France were able to exert. Banking union was seen as an opportu-
nity to leverage French ideas at the European level. 
• Second, French banks are among the largest and the most inter-
nationalised in Europe. As a consequence, they supported plans 
to level the playing field and establish a unified banking system in 
Europe. They would be significant beneficiaries of a radical simpli-
fication of the competitive and regulatory landscapes.
• Third, European banks were penalised by low valuations, as illus-
trated by price-to-book ratios. Proper supervision was seen as an 
efficient tool to reduce uncertainty and risk premiums, and to en-
hance balance sheet credibility, in particular in a market environ-
ment influenced by scepticism on the part of American investors.
European banking supervision is the first pillar of the banking 
union, complemented by the more recent SRM and the still-to-come 
European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS). It has a clear mission to 
ensure the safety and soundness of banks, and to contribute to the 
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financial integration of the euro area. As such, it is unanimously wel-
come by those in the French financial community, be they regulators 
or banks. 
It is agreed in France that these objectives make sharing a signif-
icant amount of financial sovereignty worthwhile. This ‘sacrifice’ is 
viewed as material. Unlike several other euro-area countries, almost all 
French banks are SIs and thus directly supervised by the ECB. Unlike 
in some other countries, the transfer of sovereignty is not seen as jus-
tified by past supervisory failures: French banks fared comparatively 
well during the crisis, and the reputation of French banking supervi-
sion emerged almost unscathed from this sequence. (In France, the 
case of Dexia is not generally seen as a failure of French supervision). 
In short, the French financial elites are now pro-Europe and 
pro-European supervision.
The positives of European banking supervision
The dominant view in France is that the recapitalisation of Greek banks 
by private investors in late 2015 was successful, and was an important 
test for the credibility of European banking supervision. Tougher cap-
ital and liquidity requirements are also seen as a positive in principle, 
because they help to restore trust in the sector. This statement however 
has to be nuanced in practice, given French banks’ frequent criticism 
of overshooting in the form of excessive capital thresholds.
French bankers are generally positive on the quality and effective-
ness of Joint Supervisory Teams (JSTs), which are seen as displaying 
the right blend of regulatory, consulting and banking backgrounds 
and skills. They are appreciative of the fact that teams have been hired, 
trained and assembled within a very short timeframe. Day-to-day 
contacts are easy even though communication with the ECB is much 
more formal than it used to be with APCR, and is more systematically 
based on templates. Banks generally understand that JSTs methodi-
cally request additional data, in comparison to the national framework 
in which regulators had more ex-ante knowledge of their processes 
81 | EUROPEAN BANKING SUPERVISION: THE FIRST EIGHTEEN MONTHS
and people. Coordination with supervisors outside of the euro area 
is perceived as continuing along the same path as before the SSM, in 
both situations: supervision of the non-euro area operations of French 
banking groups, and of the French operations of non-euro area banks. 
The expectation is that the creation of the SSM as a strong pan-Euro-
pean institution will enhance Europe’s global influence, in particular 
within the Basel Committee, which is seen as having been greatly 
influenced by American arguments in recent times. 
The new European supervision is also reckoned to be an agent 
of positive transformation within the French banking sector. It has 
brought a fresh and international view on controls and governance. 
The granularity of banks’ in-house information has been improved. 
Information systems have been upgraded. Governance has been 
enhanced in order to:
• Clarify structures: major changes have taken place in mutual 
banks; 
• Train and empower directors in subsidiaries and branches, and 
ensure the effectiveness of board committees; 
• Qualify and quantify risk in a more systematic way, with a focus on 
business models, guarantees and collateral, and comparisons with 
peer banking groups.  
The SSM’s thematic programmes are viewed as useful in terms 
of generating new ideas and in order to anticipate forthcoming 
inspections. 
All the aforementioned issues are not common to all banks and 
certainly not applicable at every level of each bank, but they provide 
some idea of the positive influence of European banking supervision, 
as seen by the top level of French banks.
French banks’ specific interests
All national financial systems have local idiosyncrasies, reflected in 
the 167 ‘options and national discretions’ (ONDs) identified by the 
82 | BRUEGEL BLUEPRINT
SSM. France is no exception. The financial framework historically was 
designed to optimise the use of scarce capital. In particular:
• French banks are very large, with a significant international foot-
print. The sector is very concentrated, with limited foreign pres-
ence; 
• Banks are truly universal, with investment banking arms very rele-
vant at European or global levels in certain lines of business; 
• Bancassurance is a strong component of the product mix, in a 
country in which life insurance represents a massive 75 percent of 
GDP; 
• Specific rate-regulated (and tax-favoured) savings products 
(‘épargne réglementée’) represent a total around €840 billion77;
• Mutual banks have structures that are more centralised than in 
other countries, and the French believe that this feature should be 
properly taken into account in supervisory risk assessment. 
The SSM’s willingness to eradicate all ONDs has been a cause for 
concern, even though worries are less acute now than at the outset of 
the process. The 2012 ‘Danish compromise’ for the EU implementation 
of Basel III, which acknowledged the inclusion of insurance subsidiar-
ies’ capital into the consolidated group capital ratio and thus supports 
the bancassurance model, has not been reversed by the SSM so far. 
French banks adamantly defend their view that intra-group exposures 
(at national level for mutual banks or at the international level) should 
77  ‘Epargne réglementée’ savings products are collected by banks, but their yield 
is decided by the government. Within this category, Livret A, LDD and LEP 
(€410 billion in total) have a special status: about three-fifths of the inventory 
is ‘centralised’ (ie in mandated custody) at Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations. 
The calculation of CET1 ratios takes all of these savings into account, although 
only part of them is effectively managed and put at risk by the banks. The impact 
is particularly strong for mutual banks, because they used to have a monopoly 
on the distribution of Livret A and still play a major role in this segment. See 
http://www.fbf.fr/fr/files/9NJCEC/Rapport-observatoire-epargne-reglement-
ee-2014-BDF.pdf. 
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not be limited. The unique features of épargne réglementée are seen 
as legitimate and in need of being defended, even though bankers 
also acknowledge that they are difficult to explain in an international 
context.
Shortcomings
Of course, it is not all rosy. Several aspects of European banking super-
vision have been identified by the French financial community as 
needing improvement. 
First there is the risk of bureaucratic drift. Bank workloads to 
comply with SSM requests are extremely heavy, and continue 
to increase. Very detailed demands may arrive at short notice. 
Duplication and contradictions (between the ECB’s DGMS I and 
DGMS IV, and between the ECB and other agencies) are unwelcome 
in this context, all the more because few executives have a full grasp of 
top-level issues, information systems and details. 
The review of models is a much-debated question in terms 
of timing, because it takes place at the same time as the Basel 
Committee’s Fundamental Review of the Trading Book, and because it 
creates uncertainties inside banks and slows the development of new 
businesses.
Bankers recognise that much centralisation of decision-making in 
Frankfurt is unavoidable, but they feel that some of the rules should 
be changed. Delegation should be made possible for lower-level 
decisions, such as the vetting of new directors, and changes at small 
subsidiaries. More generally, the view prevails that the principle of 
proportionality should be better applied by European banking super-
vision. Small subsidiaries are currently subject to the same supervisory 
controls as group-level entities.
Delays in ECB decision-making (eg more than six months to pro-
duce a follow-up letter) are perceived as undermining the effective-
ness of supervision. By contrast, SSM-imposed deadlines for remedi-
ation plans are very short. More fundamentally, bankers expect that 
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substantive feedback should be provided by European banking super-
vision in exchange for the very detailed information they provide. 
They understand that the SSM is young and that its doctrine is still in 
the making, so that its staff might not wish to publicise views that they 
might subsequently have to amend. Even so, the current situation is 
not considered satisfactory.
Another cause for concern is that all SSM initiatives in the first 
year have been seen as opportunities to add new layers of capital in 
a systematic way, with little consideration of previous efforts. This 
perception, however, might be alleviated by Danièle Nouy’s recent 
declarations that capital requirements will not increase beyond their 
current level. 
At a more fundamental level, French stakeholders worry about an 
overly prescriptive European supervisory approach to banking busi-
ness models. They generally welcome harmonisation as a way to create 
a level playing field, as noted before. But they are wary that the ECB 
might promote a normalised banking model, on the basis that it would 
be easier to monitor and control. The argument is that several banking 
models should coexist. For example, European banking supervision 
has to adapt to different ways of considering housing risk (which is 
very much shaped by national legal systems), or the way mutual banks 
manage their base of shareholders. 
A specific episode has been the SSM’s wobbly stance on Pillar-2 
capital requirements and maximum distributable amounts (MDA), 
which is seen by several French stakeholders as having partially con-
tributed to the surge of volatility in bank share prices in early 2016.
Although this bout of volatility was triggered by questions about 
Deutsche Bank’s ability to pay down dividends on its additional Tier 
1 debt (AT1, including contingent convertible instruments known as 
CoCos), an issue linked to the application of country-specific German 
law, investors started to look at the European regulatory framework 
relevant to the situation. They found that the MDA definition was 
not entirely clear, nor the stacking order of various instruments. 
85 | EUROPEAN BANKING SUPERVISION: THE FIRST EIGHTEEN MONTHS
Scandinavian, UK and euro-area banks seemed to operate under 
different regimes in terms of Pillar-2 constraints and disclosure obli-
gations. In particular, the SSM had asked banks not to publish MDA 
information, in order to enhance the quality of its dialogue with banks. 
This situation was perceived as having been particularly detrimental to 
French banks, which manage their MDA buffer tightly.
A common view in France is that a distinction should be made 
between what is required (and published) by the supervisor, and what 
is part of the private dialogue between it and the supervised bank. This 
position seems to have been eventually endorsed by the European 
Commission and the ECB. The SSM’s communication, however, was 
less than clear. In its SREP methodology booklet (published on 19 
February 2016), the ECB stated that AT1 instruments were not taken 
into account in SREP 2015 decisions; but the following week, it added 
that AT1 may be taken into account in SREP 2016. The ECB’s clari-
fications were interpreted by market participants as implying some 
future relaxation of automatic AT1 coupon cancellations and a move 
towards the UK approach to Pillar-2 requirements, currently the most 
advanced and transparent within the EU. This approach entails Pillar-2 
specifications across all capital tiers, and a split of Pillar-2 into a ‘hard’ 
component, before all buffers, and a ‘soft’ component, on top of the 
buffers for, for example, adverse stress test scenarios and initially not 
binding for MDA restrictions78. In the same vein, later in March, the 
Commission asked regulators to differentiate between capital ‘guid-
ance’ they give to individual banks, and enforceable capital require-
ments79. In the light of this episode, it is plain that European banking 
supervision should intensify its dialogue with market participants in 
order to prevent unnecessary differences in perception.
78   BIHC, ‘Commission review raises hopes after EBA bombshell’, March 2016, 
http://bihcapital.com/2016/03/commission-review-raises-hopes-af-
ter-eba-bombshell/.
79   http://washpost.bloomberg.com/Story?docId=1376-O3TZG16TTDSH01-4EM7T-
KL4BD0ENAC4BGPU64T4CL.
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Last but not least, European banking supervision is blamed for 
having failed so far to deliver a genuine single euro-area banking 
market. As previously emphasised, French stakeholders understand 
the promise of banking union to be a loss of sovereignty in exchange 
for a level playing field in Europe, including further expansion of 
acquisitive French banks. They also feel uncomfortable with the fact 
that the SSM’s governance model gives significant influence to coun-
tries where the approach to banking and financial security tends to 
be more parochial and more supportive of geographical ring-fencing 
for domestic political reasons. They believe that European institutions 
should oppose countries reincorporating harmful ONDs, idiosyncratic 
treatment of deferred tax assets or obstacles to cross-border liquidity 
into national legislation. 
Another strong belief in France is that supervision by the SSM 
should not be restricted to the current 129 SIs, and should be extended 
to all LSIs as soon as possible for at least three reasons:
• Smaller banks can be systemically dangerous, as recently demon-
strated by the 2008-11 crises, recent bankruptcies and the non-per-
forming loan situation in Italy; 
• National supervision of LSIs creates barriers to cross-border M&A; 
• Unresolved issues at smaller banks create can damage the reputa-
tion of the whole euro area, in particular in the minds of investors 
in the US and Asia. It should be noted in this respect that all banks 
that failed since the inception of European banking supervision 
(BANIF in Portugal, the four Italian banks resolved in late 2015) 
were LSIs.
The dominant view in France is that the same rules should apply 
to all banks irrespective of size, even if reporting formats may be 
adjusted. Large banks are frustrated with the idea that their competi-
tive positions are more constrained by regulation than those of others. 
This may lead to adverse consequences for the financing of European 
corporates (Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 2016). 
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Prospective issues
Looking ahead, one significant challenge is the multiplicity of partly 
overlapping regulators after the wide-ranging European reforms of 
the past few years. Banks face six different regulators which pursue at 
least partly self-defined objectives: the SSM, SRB, Basel Committee, 
EBA, the European Commission and their local supervisor (ACPR 
in France). Compliance with the prescriptions of these regulators 
requires resources and the parallel management of complex pro-
jects critically based on IT resources (the upgrade of legacy IT sys-
tems being a persistent challenge in many banks) and concentrated 
expertise.
In this respect, bankers are concerned that well-staffed agencies 
might want to start unnecessary projects. They understand that the 
ECB and SRB are independent from each other, but are concerned that 
the SRB develops its own methodology on risks, creating an unwel-
come discontinuity between supervision and resolution. If a resolution 
case fails for whatever reason, fingers will point at the supervisor, and 
the ECB position could be weakened as a consequence. Another con-
cern is that confusion about minimum requirements for eligible lia-
bilities (MREL) under the EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive 
(BRRD) might replicate the difficulties encountered by European 
banking supervision with the definition and publication of Pillar-2 
and MDA, for similar reasons. Hence a stronger dialogue with market 
participants is necessary, on this as on other issues. 
Of course, French bankers and officials also express worries about 
the perceived trade-off between efficient financing of the economy 
and secure risk management. This issue predates European bank-
ing supervision. Basel III requirements have incentivised banks to 
reduce their market-making activities, and bankers argue that this has 
increased market volatility, which is ironic given that EU policymakers 
simultaneously pledge to promote a more disintermediated financial 
system (capital markets union). 
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Regulators and European banking supervisors would ignore this 
worry at their peril. They must understand markets. A widespread 
concern in French banking circles is that the ECB and other European-
level authorities have not developed a broad enough network of 
contacts in order to grasp the reality of markets, despite ongoing efforts 
such as road-show-type meetings with (mostly European) investors.
The SSM could magnify the issue, with its insistence on capital, and 
given the inherent difficulty for investors to understand newly created 
institutions, especially when in a different time zone. The problem 
with markets is that they tend to materialise sell-fulfilling prophecies 
once a trigger point has been reached. Orderly resolution might be 
difficult to execute past this point.
The recent market turbulence highlights the fact that regulators 
cannot act in a political vacuum. In the US, federal regulators have 
become extremely powerful but also answer to a healthy dose of 
scrutiny from Congress. Efforts should be made in Europe to fill this 
vacuum (see also Villeroy de Galhau and Weidmann, 2016). 
The above-mentioned failure of the SSM to trigger a decisive 
improvement in banks’ average valuation (in price-to-book terms) 
should act as a wake-up call, and serve as a reminder to the financial 
policy community that banking union has not yet fulfilled its initial 
promise.
6 Germany
Sascha Steffen
The German banking landscape
Germany hosts the largest number of significant institutions (SI) 
among banking union countries (even though the French SIs are larger 
in aggregate when measured by assets). Germany also has almost half 
of the euro area’s less significant institutions (LSI). The 22 German 
SIs include the euro area’s third-largest banking group, Deutsche 
Bank. The LSIs finance about 70 percent of the country’s small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) (Lautenschläger, 2016). Cooperative 
and savings banks are usually bound to a specific region and cannot 
engage in business activities anywhere else in Germany, under what 
is referred to in German banking circles as the ‘regional principle’ 
(Regionalprinzip). The regional principle is a rule within the savings 
bank sector and ensures that savings banks do not compete with each 
other. While these banks develop ties to the companies and house-
holds in their regions, they also face concentrated risks with regard to 
specific local industries, which might make them vulnerable.
Germany has two large institutional protection schemes (IPS), 
covering 80 percent of the banks and representing about 40 percent 
of total assets of the German banking sector (Lautenschläger, 2016): 
the savings banks sector (Sparkassen), and the cooperative sector 
(Verbundstrukturen, including Volksbanken and Raiffeisenbanken). 
The regional public banks (Landesbanken), most of which are SIs, and 
regional ‘building savings banks’ (Landesbausparkassen), all of which 
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are LSIs, also belong to the public-sector IPS, together with the savings 
banks. The central bodies of the cooperative banking sector (DZ Bank 
and WGZ Bank, which are in the process of merging) are members of 
the cooperatives’ IPS. These protection schemes raise potential issues 
from a financial stability perspective, as detailed later in this chapter.
It is common in Germany to describe the system as based on 
three pillars: (1) the public banks, including all Sparkassen and 
Landesbanken; (2) the cooperative banks; and (3) the commercial 
banks. While the latter do not have a formal IPS, they also rely on 
contingent risk-sharing mechanisms such as the German Banking 
Association’s Deposit Insurance Fund, which can be used to guarantee 
not only deposits but also bank bonds.
The German bank supervisory authority is BaFin (Bundesanstalt 
für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht). BaFin also regulates Germany’s 
insurers and securities markets, and conducts banking supervision in 
cooperation with the national central bank (Deutsche Bundesbank), 
which also has certain supervisory tasks as explained below. 
Germany’s representatives on the ECB’s Supervisory Board are from 
both BaFin and the Bundesbank, whereas only BaFin has voting rights.
Some of the German SIs (eg Hamburger Sparkasse, also known as 
HASPA) have no cross-border business at all, and are SIs only on the 
basis of their balance sheet size. One criticism made by some German 
stakeholders is that size alone should not trigger SI status, and that a 
bank’s business model should also be taken into account so that banks 
like HASPA should be directly supervised by BaFin in cooperation with 
the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
The initial impact of European banking supervision
Banking supervision in Germany has changed under the SSM, for 
both SI and LSI banks. Before the late-2014 transition, banking 
supervision was institution-specific, a tailor-made approach for each 
bank or group of banks. This approach was based on the structure 
of the German banking system, with hundreds of small banks with a 
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region-specific focus. BaFin and the Bundesbank as supervisors have 
accumulated substantial knowledge about the banks and the institu-
tional environment, and used this information in a highly individual-
ised and qualitative approach to the supervision of German banks.
This relationship has changed – partly because the people who are 
responsible for supervision have changed. ECB supervisory staff typ-
ically lack the institution- and region-specific knowledge, and might 
also have a different approach to banking supervision. This obviously 
affects the SIs, eg through the Joint Supervisory Teams (JSTs), but also 
the LSIs which experience direct requests (eg for data) from the ECB 
via BaFin.
Banking supervision under the SSM has become more tem-
plate-driven. Reporting requirements have expanded and supervision 
has therefore become more quantitative in nature. An advantage of 
this approach is comparability of institutions and the possibility to 
benchmark them in order to identify their main strengths and weak-
nesses and to assess their interconnectedness. However, supervision 
that is purely based on numbers can also be problematic. First, num-
bers only make sense if they are put into context, and it will take some 
time for ECB banking supervision to understand the context. Second, 
an institution-specific view is necessary to spot risks that cannot be 
identified based on numbers only. A recent example is Maple Bank, 
which was closed by BaFin in February 2016. This Frankfurt-based 
bank had to set up provisions for tax payments because of illegal share 
purchases around dividend payment dates, which rendered the bank 
insolvent. These types of risks cannot be identified based on quantita-
tive data alone.
Banking supervision has also become more complex. The number 
of supervisors, particularly for SIs, has increased and has become 
more international. The JST for Deutsche Bank, for example, com-
prises almost 70 individuals of at least 12 nationalities. Almost 40 of the 
JST members are German and work for BaFin and the Bundesbank; 
the rest are from countries in which Deutsche Bank has significant 
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branches or are ECB employees. Whereas the number of staff from 
the different national supervisory authorities in this team is by and 
large the same as before the start of European supervision, the ECB 
staff members have been added on top. The team is headed at the ECB 
by a French national. BaFin and Deutsche Bundesbank each have 
appointed a sub-coordinator of the JST.
Banking supervision used to be less formal and more direct, with 
sustained conversations between the banks and their German supervi-
sors. Under the SSM the relationship between bank and supervisor has 
become both more formal and less direct.
Many decisions, such as introducing a new board or supervisory 
board member, which used to be made by BaFin, must now be pre-
pared by the ECB Supervisory Board and adopted by the Governing 
Council. More than 4,000 of these decisions had to be made in 2015 
alone (Europe-wide), and the Governing Council cannot fully delegate 
these decisions on the basis of current law. So far, the possibility of 
delegation has not been used. This, of course, is leading to substantial 
delays in taking some decisions and is also associated with more work 
for the national supervisor, such as filling out templates for the ECB. 
In some cases, the delays amount to several months or even a full year. 
These delays have the potential to cripple the implementation of bank’s 
management decisions (eg the installation of a new board member, 
the transfer of assets from one of the banking group’s legal entities to 
another, or strategic decisions on business projects). That said, in most 
cases the decisions are taken in a timely manner by the ECB.
Another important aspect of complexity is the increasing number 
of relevant capital ratios. There are too many different capital ratios 
and regulatory metrics that investors have to look at. As a result, some 
banks now increasingly focus on regulatory capital instead of eco-
nomic capital, because regulatory capital and ratios are the only ratios 
of interest for investors. The use of regulatory capital ratios might be 
problematic given the inclusion of risk-weighted assets as part of the 
ratio. Risk weights that are out of sync with the actual risk of these 
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assets might create incentives for banks to arbitrage these risk weights, 
leaving them severely undercapitalised (Acharya and Steffen, 2014a 
and 2014b; Korte and Steffen, 2016).
Regulation overall has become more complex. One important issue 
is the interdependence of different regulatory requirements coming 
from different agencies. Currently, different regulators have only partial 
overviews of the applicable regulations, and work largely in isolation 
from each other. An example is the definition of the maximum distrib-
utable amount (MDA)80 by regulators, which involves the European 
Banking Authority (EBA), the European Commission and ECB bank-
ing supervision. The automatism of restrictions on distribution poli-
cies, envisaged by Article 141 of CRD IV, is intended to be a minimum 
common measure applicable to all banks authorised in any EU member 
state. But the implementation of the concrete calculation of the MDA 
differs between the euro area and other EU jurisdictions (eg Denmark 
and the United Kingdom). As a consequence, there is not always a 
level playing field in the European Union, or between the EU and the 
US, with negative consequences in particular for large banking groups 
with global competitors. Moreover, we know relatively little about how 
the regulatory requirements set by microprudential (eg Pillar-2 capital 
requirements) and macroprudential authorities (eg systemic risk buff-
ers) work in combination, and whether and how they balance the policy 
objectives of financial stability and economic growth.
BaFin vs Bundesbank
BaFin was created in 2002 through the merger of separate supervisory 
authorities for banks, insurers and securities firms. The Bundesbank 
80   Pursuant to Article 141 of the CRD IV, on breaching the combined buffer require-
ment (defined by Article 128(6) of CRD IV), banks face distribution restrictions. 
The restrictions have the objective of capital restoration when capital buffers are 
breached, in contrast to the minimum requirements under Pillar-1 and Pillar-2 
capital, which are to be met at all times. The MDA is the payout amount that must 
not to be exceeded in order to restore capital buffers.
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and BaFin share tasks related to banking supervision. While BaFin is 
primarily responsible for issuing administrative acts such as licenses, 
authorisations and fines, the Bundesbank does most of the ongo-
ing supervision of institutions. With the start of European banking 
supervision, the separation of tasks between BaFin und Bundesbank 
remains unchanged, including in relation to their cooperation with the 
ECB’s direct supervision of SIs81.
All 1,600-odd German LSIs are still directly supervised by BaFin 
and the Bundesbank, with the same division of labour as pre-SSM. 
Supervision of SIs
German SIs report delays in approvals of, for example, changes to their 
internal models. They complain that supervisors responded much 
more quickly pre-SSM. The consequence is that banks have to operate 
under greater uncertainty.
More broadly, market participants (including investors and banks) 
complain about the lack of transparency of European banking supervi-
sion. Investors feel they do not have the information they need to value 
bank equity or bank debt. Despite an enormous amount of data col-
lection by the ECB, the information that is released to investors is very 
limited. For example, information remains scarce at best on how much 
bail-inable debt is available within each large institution. Genuine 
market discipline is not possible if the market cannot assess the risks of 
(and price) banks’ liabilities and equity.
Among banks, a widespread complaint is that the supervisory 
review and evaluation process (SREP) is not transparent at all. Banks 
complain of not receiving information about interim SREP scores or 
about what factors contributed to their eventual scores. Also, the ECB 
has some discretion to adjust scores at each step of the SREP process. 
Banks receive a final score between one and four, and a regulatory 
81   German regulation specifies this in Section 7, 1a of the Banking Act (KWG, Kred-
itwesengesetz). 
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capital ratio that they have to meet. Naturally, banks want to know how 
the scores have been calculated and make some effort to reverse engi-
neer the individual SREP scores. While reverse engineering might lead 
to perverse incentives for regulatory arbitrage, more SREP transpar-
ency could help banks mitigate identified weaknesses.
Some banks are concerned that the ECB uses the lack of transpar-
ency of the SREP process and exerts some discretion over how target 
bank capital ratios are set. For example, the ECB might already incor-
porate buffers that are supposed to come into effect only in 2018-19, 
making it more difficult for banks to meet their capital requirements.
The ECB is also competent to decide on the application of the cap-
ital and the liquidity waiver for significant institutions. One aim of the 
ECB’s project on options and national discretions was to ensure a level 
playing field across the euro area that would allow the granting of these 
waivers to the greatest extent possible. The ECB might also raise the 
large exposure limit for cross-border intra-group transactions, in line 
with the German Large Exposure Regulation. In a crisis situation and as 
a residual power, however, the decision to limit the flow of capital and 
liquidity within a banking group across borders remains with the BaFin.
Differences in accounting standards are another important topic 
for the German SIs. Of the 22 SIs in Germany, seven prepare their 
financial statements using German national accounting standards 
(known as HGB for Handelsgesetzbuch, or German commercial 
law) and not IFRS. These institutions are: Deutsche Apotheker-und 
Ärztebank, Erwerbsgesellschaft der S-Finanzgruppe (Landesbank 
Berlin), Hamburger Sparkasse, L-Bank, Münchener Hypothekenbank, 
State Street Europe Holdings and NRW.Bank. Given the amount of 
data that SIs must deliver to the ECB, some of these banks might con-
sider switching to IFRS. But German bankers are concerned that the 
ECB wants all SIs to eventually switch to IFRS; they view this as outside 
the scope of the mandate of European banking supervision.
Bankers are also concerned that they do not have enough time to 
implement the new rules and regulations and to raise capital. This 
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process requires a substantial amount of new resources, in particular 
specialists (IT, lawyers, consultants) who need to be hired. If all banks 
start this process at the same time, there might be a shortage of skilled 
experts in the market.
Raising capital is particularly challenging in a low (or negative) 
interest rate environment. German banks have long suffered from low 
profitability, but low interest rates and resulting declines in net interest 
margins aggravate this problem. SIs worry that they cannot attract suf-
ficient interest from investors who require a high return on equity.
Supervision of LSIs
The ECB plans SREP guidance for LSIs as of 2018, but BaFin decided to 
take the first SREP capital decision in 2016, in line with the EBA SREP 
Guidelines. Capital add-ons will be common practice in the future 
because of the requirements set out in the EBA Guidelines, which 
define a ‘Pillar-1-plus’ approach for the quantification of Pillar-2 risks.
Beyond the SREP minutiae, the major challenge facing the SSM is 
to balance the objective of a single rulebook for the euro area with the 
principle of proportionality. LSIs in Germany are concerned that the 
ECB eventually wants to apply the same rules for SIs and LSIs, which 
might threaten their business models.
As mentioned, most German LSIs are part of one of the two 
German institutional protection schemes. The CRR provides signif-
icant advantages to banks that are in such schemes with respect to 
liquidity requirements, capital requirements and concentration limits.
It should be noted, however, that all German banks have to meet 
the liquidity coverage ratio requirement at the individual bank level. 
While Article 7 of CRR provides for a possible waiver, this is associated 
with strict requirements that are not met by the two German IPSs. 
Importantly, neither the savings nor the cooperative banks are part of a 
holding company that owns a majority of the voting shares and is able 
to actively intervene in the individual savings or cooperative banks.
Banks that are part of an IPS have advantages in terms of capital 
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requirements and limits on their exposures to banks that are part of 
the same IPS (CRR Art. 113, 6 & 7). They do not have to hold capital 
against these exposures (zero risk-weights), and there are no large 
exposure limits (as opposed to, for example, corporate exposures 
which are limited to 25 percent of Tier 1 capital). Advantages in terms 
of zero risk-weights and concentration limits apply to exposures to 
banks within Germany. Exposures to subsidiaries outside of Germany 
are not affected.
IPSs, however, can also carry risks. Savings banks were particularly 
affected because of their investments in Landesbanken during the 
2007-09 financial crisis. These Landesbanken (WestLB, Sachsen LB 
and Bayern LB in particular) took large risks in the US subprime mort-
gage market that eventually spilled over to the savings banks82.
HSH Nordbank is another example, and as a Landesbank, is also 
part of the IPS of the savings banks. It is publicly owned, 95 percent 
jointly by the states of Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein and 5 per-
cent by the Sparkassen- und Giroverband Schleswig-Holstein. HSH 
Nordbank had to be bailed out by the federal government during the 
global financial crisis of 2008-09. In 2008, it reported a group net loss of 
€2.70 billion, along with dramatically higher loan loss provisions. Poor 
asset quality has continued to be an issue – its nonperforming loan 
ratio was 23 percent at the end of September 2015, based on data from 
its annual and quarterly reports. In March 2016, the German govern-
ment and the European Commission came to an agreement on how 
the problem loans should be dealt with. This agreement also stipulates 
that HSH Nordbank has to be privatised by 2018 or to be wound down. 
Because it might prove difficult to find a buyer, the latter is not an 
unlikely scenario, and it is unclear how losses might then be shared. It 
might be that the IPS will have to bear considerable losses in order to 
82   Puri, Rocholl and Steffen (2011) show that affected savings banks reduced 
consumer lending substantially after the Landesbanken incurred these losses. 
Fischer et al (2016) link those losses to the elevated risk taking behaviour of 
Landesbanken associated with the loss of their government guarantee in 2005. 
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avoid the imposition of losses on bondholders.
It is thus critical that IPSs are supervised not only at the individual 
bank level, but also at the combined IPS level, and that the intercon-
nectedness of these banks is taken into account. SIs and LSIs that 
are in the same IPS require additional coordination from all relevant 
supervisors. In early 2016, the ECB conducted a consultation on IPSs 
(ECB, 2016d). The ECB’s consultation document “sets out the ECB’s 
approach concerning the assessment of the eligibility of ISPs for pruden-
tial supervisory purposes. It aims to ensure coherence, effectiveness and 
transparency regarding the policy that will be applied when assessing 
IPSs […]”. In this approach, the ECB is not questioning the advantages 
in the CRR associated with IPSs, but rather investigates how effectively 
to supervise IPSs.
LSIs are also confronted with an increasing number of data 
requests, though to a lesser extent than the SIs. Cooperative banks and 
savings banks have centralised their IT systems, and created IT cen-
tres throughout Germany to manage data and processes such as the 
calibration of internal ratings models. The data requests from the ECB 
usually contain new information and are ad hoc and have to be met 
within a short period of time, sometimes within days. LSIs have to react 
to these requests at individual bank level, which increases administra-
tive and IT costs for individual LSIs. If data requests were standardised, 
the IT centres could better implement these requests and centrally 
collect the data from the individual institutions. LSIs are concerned 
that standardised data requests (including for Financial Reporting 
(FINREP) and AnaCredit) will not replace the ECB’s ad-hoc requests.
LSIs complain about a lack of transparency in this process. They do 
not receive feedback on how the ECB uses the data. The LSIs are wor-
ried that the data is not only used in the supervisory process, but that 
the standardised data requests (FINREP and AnaCredit) will be used by 
the ECB to unduly modify and fine-tune their business models.
As with SIs, the data requests raise issues of accounting regimes. 
Germany, like several other European countries, requires banks to 
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use national accounting standards, not IFRS, for entity-level finan-
cial statements, and also allows national accounting standards for 
the consolidated financial statements of banking groups that are not 
publicly listed. Because of potential problems in translating financial 
statements drawn up according to national (ie German) accounting 
standards so that they meet the IFRS requirements, data quality and 
the extent to which the data can be used in the supervisory process 
might be concerns.
There is increasing consolidation among smaller institutions 
in Germany. In 2014 (the last official statistic available from the 
Bundesbank before the start of the SSM), the number of banks was 1.9 
percent less than in 2013. Since 1990, the number of banks in Germany 
has decreased from more than 4,500 to 1,990 in 2014 (Bundesbank, 
2014). But this is unrelated to European banking supervision or the 
costs associated with new regulations. This trend started before the 
start of the banking union, and reflects, amongst other things, that 
some savings banks or cooperative banks do not have a viable business 
model and thus merge with other banks, usually in the same region. 
How much progress has European banking supervision brought?
The SSM is the first pillar of the banking union, and its completion 
is of great importance for further integration in the euro area. Some 
of the problems and concerns highlighted in this chapter (such as 
those related to supervisory complexity and accounting issues) are 
predictable frictions at the beginning of European banking supervi-
sion. While it will be a huge task to implement a single supervisor for 
a diverse set of countries, there is an expectation that many issues will 
be solved as time passes and supervisory processes improve83. Such 
issues are not critical for the success of European banking supervision. 
83  Saunders (2014) argues that even though the US implemented its first national 
banking regulation in 1863, it might still fall short of what might be viewed as a 
banking union. Implementation of a banking union in Europe might be even 
more challenging. 
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Communication and transparency in the supervisory process, on the 
other hand, are important because shortcomings in these areas might 
increase uncertainty on the part of market participants and erode 
market discipline.
More generally, the banking union was supposed to help address 
the shortcomings of the regulatory framework, which became obvious 
during the financial crisis of 2008-09 and the euro-area crisis since 
2010 in the context of an incomplete monetary union. Government 
bonds are not risk-free and affect banks whose balance sheets are 
bloated with these bonds; regulation has not been harmonised across 
the 19 euro-area member states; and the fact that bank solvency was 
a national problem led to the emergence of ‘zombie banks’ in several 
parts of the euro area.
European banking supervision is an integral part of the banking 
union, and is supposed to harmonise supervision throughout the 
euro-area countries and to reduce the linkages between sovereigns 
and the financial sector. Acharya and Steffen (2015) argue that there 
are substantial risks to the stability of the banking union ahead, 
despite significant reform progress, such as through the SSM. They 
argue that the asset quality review conducted by the EBA and the ECB 
before the start of the banking union in October 2014 did not achieve a 
genuine cleaning up of the balance sheets of an over-leveraged bank-
ing sector in Europe, posing substantial challenges to the credibility 
of the ECB as a central bank and single supervisor and to sustainable 
growth in Europe. The ECB’s non-standard policy measures and the 
associated asset price inflation incentivise banks to shift portfolios into 
these securities, crowding out lending to the real economy and making 
these securities systemically important. Whether the banking union is 
eventually able to address these shortcomings remains to be seen.
7 Greece
Miranda Xafa
The Greek banking landscape
Banking sector consolidation has been particularly intense in Greece 
since the onset of the crisis in 2010. As noted by the ECB84, Greece has 
recorded the largest relative decrease in the number of banks among 
euro-area countries, followed by Cyprus and Spain. From 2009 to 2014, 
the workforce in the banking sector shrunk by more than 30 percent; 
a third of branches were closed and foreign ownership of assets nearly 
disappeared. 
Piraeus Bank absorbed Geniki Bank (a subsidiary of Société 
Générale), Millenium Bank (a subsidiary of Portugal’s Millenium 
Group), the Greek branches of three Cypriot banks and the ‘healthy’ 
part of the Agricultural Bank of Greece. Alpha Bank absorbed Emporiki 
(a subsidiary of Crédit Agricole). National Bank of Greece (NBG) 
and Eurobank acquired smaller Greek banks and cooperative banks. 
BNP Paribas closed its branches in Greece in early 2012. Following 
this wave of consolidation, the four systemic banks that emerged have 
a combined market share of 98 percent of total assets: 32 percent at 
NBG, 25 percent at Piraeus Bank, 21 percent at Eurobank Ergasias and 
19 percent at Alpha Bank85. The remaining 2 percent is split between a 
small bank (Bank of Attica) and cooperative banks.
84   ECB (2015a) Report on Financial Structures, October.
85   As of 31 December 2015. Source: banks’ annual reports.
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During the same period, bank deposits have halved, from €238 bil-
lion to €120 billion, and banks have lost access to wholesale funding, 
while NPLs remain a drag on credit growth and a key risk factor for 
capital adequacy. Greek bank exposure to the sovereign was reduced 
substantially to just 7.2 percent of total assets by end-March 2016, 
following the 2012 Greek debt exchange (known as PSI, for private-sec-
tor involvement) and buyback, and subsequent recapitalisations. 
However, about one-half of bank capital consists of deferred tax assets 
(DTAs) and deferred tax credits (DTCs).
The Greek supervisory authority is the Bank of Greece, which is 
also the country’s national central bank and bank resolution authority. 
Developments after the start of European banking supervision
The 2014 comprehensive assessment found Greek banks well cap-
italised, after they had raised a total €8.3 billion in capital from pri-
vate investors in April 2014. This came on top of €28 billion (of which 
€25.5 billion was from the official assistance programme) raised in 
the aftermath of the March 2012 PSI, which generated large losses for 
Greek banks. 
Soon after the comprehensive assessment report was issued, how-
ever, a deadlocked Greek presidential selection process and the associ-
ated likelihood of new elections that would be won by the Syriza party, 
triggered large-scale deposit withdrawals, funding pressures and an 
increase in NPLs as a result of further deterioration in payment behav-
iour. Syriza won the January 2015 election on a defiant platform reject-
ing austerity and vowing to ‘tear up’ Greece’s existing agreement with 
official creditors (ESM, IMF and ECB). After a five-month standoff, the 
Greek government abruptly called a referendum on Friday 26 June, 
four days before the programme was due to expire, urging the Greek 
people to vote against a proposed new assistance agreement. Although 
61 percent of Greeks followed this stance by voting no on the day of 
the referendum (5 July 2015), the Syriza-led government agreed to a 
third assistance programme at an EU Summit on 12 July 2015, under 
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the threat of imminent economic and financial collapse. Agreement 
on an ambitious three-year programme backed by €86 billion of ESM 
financing was finalised and a memorandum of understanding (MoU) 
was signed on 19 August, after the Greek parliament passed several 
prerequisite laws, including the national transposition of the EU Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD). 
The agreement sought to restore fiscal sustainability, promote 
growth, improve public sector efficiency and safeguard financial 
stability. To improve bank viability, the agreement set aside €25 bil-
lion for potential bank recapitalisation needs by end-2015, and called 
for immediate steps to tackle NPLs and to improve bank governance. 
The Bank of Greece was tasked with assessing the capital needs of 
non-systemic banks. The financial sector strategy also included an 
assessment of the bank restructuring plans approved by the European 
Commission in 2013-14 in light of the changed circumstances of the 
financial system, and a plan to return the banks to private ownership 
in the medium term. Liquidity would be monitored through quarterly 
funding plans submitted to the Bank of Greece.
Liquidity vs solvency
As the ECB Supervisory Board’s chair Danièle Nouy has stated, the 
need for recapitalisation had little to do with the Greek banks them-
selves, which were found to have sufficient capital in the 2014 com-
prehensive assessment. In her testimony to the European Parliament 
on 31 March 2015, she argued that political uncertainty was overshad-
owing the progress made by Greek banks. She also opined that Greek 
banks were better equipped for this political episode than in the past, 
thanks to the recapitalisation and restructuring efforts that had taken 
place. She added that the SSM was monitoring deposit outflows on a 
daily basis and had asked the banks to invest in assets that could be 
used as collateral in order to safeguard their liquidity. 
In early February 2015, almost a full month before the programme 
was due to expire, the ECB Governing Council withdrew the waiver 
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that allowed Greek government debt to be used as collateral despite 
its speculative-grade credit rating, because there was no credible 
programme implementation86. Although the programme was sub-
sequently extended to the end of June, Greek banks henceforth had 
to rely on more expensive emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) 
from the Greek central bank instead of the ECB’s lending window. 
Appropriately, the SSM set limits on lending to the government and to 
public enterprises, in order to prevent deficit financing through ELA. 
The ECB continued to approve liquidity provision through ELA until 
the Greek referendum was announced on 26 June, after which a three-
week bank holiday was declared and capital controls were imposed. 
ELA provision was frozen between the bank closure and the agreement 
reached on 12 July, but resumed as soon as the Greek government 
implemented the first round of prior actions. ELA peaked at €88 billion 
in mid-July 2015 and gradually declined to €69 billion by early March 
2016. Between September 2014 and June 2015, when capital controls 
were imposed, bank deposits declined by 41 percent to €120 billion, 
and stabilised thereafter (Figure 9). 
The ECB acted throughout on the assumption that Greece would 
remain in the euro area, and thus continued to approve liquidity pro-
vision through the ELA even as the banks’ solvency ratios deteriorated 
together with the Greek economy. According to President Draghi, 
the ECB had to walk a tightrope between ensuring sufficient liquidity 
for Greek banks and putting euro-area financial stability at risk: “I 
don’t want to underplay the difficulty that the ECB and the Governing 
Council of the ECB had in the last few weeks about having to take 
decisions between making sure the payment system continued to work, 
liquidity provision, monetary policy and not to amass excessive risk for 
the euro system all at the same time”87. Whether Greek banks were
86   ECB press release (2015) ‘Eligibility of Greek bonds used as collateral in Eurosys-
tem monetary policy operations’, 4 February, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/
pr/date/2015/html/pr150204.en.html.
87   ECB press release (2015) ‘Introductory statement to the press conference (with 
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Figure 9: Greek household and corporate deposits (€ billions)
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still solvent by mid-2015 is debatable. President Draghi confirmed the 
SSM assessment that they were solvent on a static basis, since they 
fulfilled the minimum requirements of common equity Tier 1 (CET1) 
capital of 4.5 percent and a total capital ratio of 8 percent. However, he 
implied that on a forward-looking basis Greek banks were “failing or 
likely to fail”:
“However, [...given] the enormous influence that the quality of 
the government paper has on the solvency of the banks88, well, you 
Q&A)’, 16 July, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2015/html/is150716.
en.html.
88   Draghi was referring not only to government paper in bank portfolios but also to 
DTAs and DTCs, which constituted over 50 percent of Greek banks’ Tier 1 capital. 
In March 2015, SSM chair Nouy said she might need the European Parliament’s 
support to close loopholes in EU bank capital rules that provide countries leeway 
in the definition of capital, but so far the Commission has not ruled that legisla-
tive changes that permit DTAs to be transformed into DTCs in banks in Greece, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain constitute state aid. The EU Capital Requirements 
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question their solvency in prospective terms because you look at how 
things go, how the policy dialogue develops, and therefore how the 
quality of the government paper changes according to these develop-
ments [...] It’s on the basis of this prospective assessment that looks 
at the quality of the government paper, but also at the quality of the 
overall banks’ balance sheets after such a protracted recession, and 
therefore with a foreseeable increase in non-performing loans [...] an 
overall envelope of €25 billion, out of a programme of €86 billion, 
was earmarked for the Greek banking system”89. 
Bank recapitalisation
All parties (Greek government, ESM, IMF in its programme moni-
toring role, and the ECB) agreed that bank recapitalisation should 
be concluded before the BRRD’s bail-in rules became mandatory on 
1 January 2016, to avoid haircutting uninsured deposits belonging to 
healthy Greek corporates, which would further set back the economic 
recovery. This aggressive timeline required the rapid conclusion of an 
asset quality review (AQR) and stress tests to assess capital require-
ments – a task the SSM addressed efficiently, by all accounts. However, 
requiring all four systemic banks to raise funds simultaneously, in a 
risk-off market environment ahead of the US Federal Reserve’s tight-
ening cycle, and before the Greek government had implemented 
bank-related reforms including a strategy to deal with NPLs, could 
only be achieved at fire-sale prices: the recapitalisation was concluded 
at a price-to-book ratio in the range of 0.30-0.35 for all four banks. 
Regulation (CRR) does not count DTAs as capital because they are contingent on 
future profits, but counts DTCs as capital because they constitute a claim on the 
sovereign regardless of whether the bank makes a profit or a loss. Insofar as they 
constitute a liability for the state, large DTCs go obviously against the objective of 
breaking the link between banks and sovereigns. 
89   ECB press release (2015), ‘Introductory statement to the press conference (with 
Q&A)’, 16 July, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2015/html/is150716.
en.html.
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European banking supervision found that the four systemic 
banks needed a total €14.4 billion of additional capital, comprising 
€4.4 billion under the baseline stress test scenario and an additional 
€10 billion under the adverse scenario. The shortfalls included AQR 
adjustments of €9.2 billion, partly covered by existing capital buffers 
and baseline scenario profitability. “Covering the shortfalls by raising 
capital would then result in the creation of prudential buffers in the 
four Greek banks, which will facilitate their capacity to address poten-
tial adverse macroeconomic shocks,” the ECB said in a statement90, 
adding that a minimum of €4.4 billion, corresponding to the baseline 
shortfall, was expected to be covered by private investors. By implica-
tion, any bank that failed to attract private capital to cover the shortfall 
of the baseline scenario would be considered ‘failing or likely to fail’ 
and would thus be resolved.
As it turned out, Greek banks were able to raise as much as €9 bil-
lion from private investors. Senior and junior bond instruments 
contributed €2.8 billion either through a voluntary liability manage-
ment exercise or through bail-in; €5.2 billion was raised from new 
equity investors; and €1 billion mainly from asset sales. The chosen 
book-building process, with no effective minimum price set, helped 
attract private capital as share prices fell to new lows ahead of the 
November 2015 offering, with the consequence that existing share-
holders were effectively wiped out. The €25.5 billion initial stake 
acquired by the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF, a national 
entity set up under the first Greek assistance programme) in May 
2013, worth just €2.1 billion in September 2015, was further diluted to 
€750 million at the prices of the November 2015 offering (Figure 10). 
Once this process was completed, residual capital requirements of 
€5.4 billion – largely resulting from adverse-scenario stress test results 
for two out of the four banks – were filled by the Greek state (via the 
90   ECB banking supervision press release (2015) ‘ECB finds total capital shortfall of 
€14.4 billion for four significant Greek banks’, 31 October, https://www.banking-
supervision.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2015/html/sr151031.en.html.
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HFSF) using ESM funding. Three-quarters of the capital contributed by 
the HFSF, or €4.1 billion, was in the form of contingent capital instru-
ments (CoCos), and the remaining €1.3 billion as common equity. The 
use of CoCos helped minimise the state shareholding in the banks. 
Figure 10: Market value of HFSF shares in the four systemic banks
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Source: Hellenic Financial Stability Fund.
The Greek state’s share was diluted to minority stakes in all four 
banks, as shown by Figure 11. The HFSF’s stake in Alpha and Eurobank 
fell to just 11.0 percent and 2.4 percent, respectively (from 66.3 percent 
and 35.4 percent), as these two banks managed to fully cover their 
capital requirements from private investors. The MoU specifically 
stated that “the recapitalisation framework will be developed with a 
view to preserving private management of recapitalised banks and to 
facilitating private strategic investments”. Maximising the capital raised 
from private investors was therefore a key objective, even if it implied 
massive dilution of existing shareholders.
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Figure 11: Greek state ownership of banks, before and after the 2015 
recapitalisation
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As had been noted by President Draghi, uncertainty about the 
impact of capital controls and recession on NPLs, but also political 
uncertainty (snap elections on 20 September 2015 were called as 
soon as the MoU was signed), pointed to the need to err on the side 
of caution in deciding how much official funding to set aside for the 
recapitalisation. Although the recession in 2015 turned out to be more 
shallow than feared, with GDP growth estimated at -0.3 percent versus 
-2.3 percent underlying the programme, the outlook remained highly 
uncertain. The announcement of a €25 billion buffer took markets by 
surprise, coming so soon after the 2014 comprehensive assessment, 
but ultimately provided comfort that an adequate backstop would 
be available if needed. Uncertainty about the economic outlook and 
MoU implementation probably also explain why the SSM required 
higher capital ratios in Greece in 2015 than those underlying the 2014 
pan-European comprehensive assessment: 9.5 percent for the base-
line scenario (vs. 8.0 percent in 2014) and 8.0 percent for the adverse 
scenario (vs. 5.5 percent). Presumably European banking supervision 
targeted higher capital ratios for Greek banks than for their European 
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peers because their Pillar-2 SREP ratios are higher, reflecting their 
exposure to Greek sovereign risk and high levels of NPLs. Despite the 
higher standard, the big gap between the initial estimated need for 
public funds of €25 billion and the final outcome of €5.4 billion sug-
gests that the SSM had underestimated the loan asset quality of Greek 
banks, as well as their ability to attract private capital.
Non-performing loans
When the MoU was agreed, provisions covered 40 to 45 percent of 
non-performing exposures (NPEs = NPLs + performing restructured 
loans), which themselves represented half of total gross loans – an 
unusually high level resulting from six years of recession, fears of exit 
from the euro area, and the general erosion of the payment culture 
in Greece, including strategic defaulters who took advantage of a 
2010 law intended to shield primary residences from foreclosure. 
Comprehensively resolving the NPL issue before the bank recapital-
isation in late 2015 would have required a ‘bad bank’ scheme, which 
would be hard to set up in a country with weak institutions like Greece. 
Moreover, NPLs in Greece were recession-driven and broad-based, 
rather than focused on real estate as they had been in Ireland or Spain. 
By sector, NPEs in agriculture, manufacturing, construction, food 
services, telecoms IT and media, and commercial real estate exceeded 
one-half of loans at end-2015. By type of loan, NPEs to very small 
companies and SMEs, and consumer loans, all exceeded one-half of 
all loans, while large corporate loans and mortgage loans fared better. 
Asset quality deteriorated during 2015, with NPEs rising by 9 percent 
to €117 billion. MoU conditionality helped clean up bank balance 
sheets by suspending the state’s super-seniority in asset sales and 
liquidation, and by permitting home foreclosures of the primary resi-
dence of borrowers who meet certain income and wealth thresholds. 
However, further steps are needed to improve loan recoveries, acceler-
ate bankruptcy procedures and clarify which loans banks are allowed 
to sell to distressed debt funds or service companies. Further delay in 
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resolving the NPLs would undermine the ability of banks to lend. 
Governance
MoU conditionality required a modification in October 2015 of the 
HFSF’s founding law91 to spell out strict criteria for the qualifications 
of bank executives. The criteria exclude former politicians and require 
extensive banking sector experience for board members, includ-
ing inter alia fifteen year’s international experience in banking for 
members chairing committees. These extremely prescriptive guide-
lines, which are additional to the usual ‘fit and proper’ requirements 
imposed by the SSM (Gortsos, 2015, p.175) were imposed by the troika 
to avoid government interference in a country where clientelism is 
extreme. It appears that the SSM is currently applying tough criteria in 
their assessment of board members in order to signal the end of state 
involvement in the banking sector. That said, finding candidates who 
meet the criteria will be difficult. Remuneration is modest by interna-
tional standards and legal risks are high, so Greek banks are unlikely to 
attract applications from many high-calibre professionals.
Business plans
A Restructuring Framework Agreement between the European 
Commission and Greek banks was signed in 2014, in the aftermath of 
the 2013 recapitalisation. The agreement was based on EU state aid 
rules, which require banks to sell assets held abroad and non-core 
businesses if state aid exceeds 2 percent of risk-weighted assets. The 
business plans were revised in 2015 in view of the banks’ changed 
circumstances, with plans to divest foreign subsidiaries in the Balkans 
and non-core assets brought forward and broadened for the two banks 
that relied again on state aid. These banks considered that they were 
given tight deadlines to divest assets, and that ongoing sales were not 
taken into account in assessing capital requirements. However, they 
91   Law 3864/2010.
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recognised that the implementation of the BRRD’s bail-in provisions 
as of 1 January 2016 did not provide banks with sufficient time to meet 
capital requirements through asset sales, and therefore viewed the 
restructuring plans as broadly appropriate. The baseline scenarios of 
the SSM stress tests of both 2014 and 2015 were based on the assump-
tion that the asset sales assumed in the bank business plans would be 
implemented. 
The case of Attica Bank
Attica Bank, a bank majority-owned by the Greek engineers’ union 
pension fund, failed to raise the full amount of additional capital 
required (€0.8 billion under the adverse scenario), even after a large 
capital injection by its main shareholder. It also appears that state-con-
trolled enterprises were strong-armed into participating in the Attica 
offering, including Athens Airport and the Athens Water Company 
– a move that went against the effort to break the link between banks 
and the Greek state. Partly as a result of this alleged state aid, Attica 
Bank managed to raise 91 percent of the needed capital, reaching a 
CET1 capital ratio of nearly 20 percent. However, the recapitalisa-
tion was concluded at a price-to-book of 0.82, far above the 0.30-0.35 
range for the systemic banks, presumably to avoid near-full dilution 
of the equity holdings of the Greek Engineers’ Fund in Attica Bank. 
In early March 2016, European banking supervision started an audit 
of Attica Bank over possible irregularities in its capital-raising efforts. 
Discussions between European supervisors and the bank’s manage-
ment have been ongoing regarding corporate governance  and the 
bank’s business model, which relies heavily on the construction sector 
that has been hard-hit by the crisis. All of the above suggest that Attica 
Bank may end up in resolution. If so, the ECB should have taken it 
under its direct supervision sooner, before public sector entities sunk 
in €0.7 billion of new capital and before bail-in rules took effect.
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Conclusion
Overall, European banking supervision is viewed as justifiably strict by 
Greek bankers and supervisors. They consider it to be tough but fair, 
and believe its involvement lends credibility to bank balance sheets 
and helps banks to raise private funding. The SSM handled well the 
challenges arising out of the Greek crisis: it very closely monitored the 
situation on a daily basis, and acted quickly to assess capital require-
ments as soon as a new bailout agreement was reached. Even though 
the size and modalities of the recapitalisation may be questioned ex 
post, ex ante they seemed eminently sensible in view of the uncer-
tainties involved, as well as the need to minimise the cost to taxpayers 
(including through CoCos) and the state’s equity participation. Thus, 
European banking supervision can be assessed as having done a good 
job so far in supervising the systemic banks. The ECB may, however, 
have been too slow to take over the supervision of Attica Bank from the 
Bank of Greece.
8 Italy
Marcello Messori 
The Italian banking landscape
Italy’s banking system is less concentrated than those of most other 
euro-area countries, especially when the absence of large institutional 
protection schemes such as those in Germany or Austria is taken into 
account. Following a series of mergers in the 1990s and 2000s, two 
groups, UniCredit and Intesa Sanpaolo, are positioned ahead of their 
peers, with combined assets representing 47 percent of the Italian 
total. All other Italian SIs combined add up to only 25 percent of this 
same total, and about 500 LSIs account for the remaining 28 percent. 
In other words, the Italian banking system can be described as two 
large pan-Italian banks (even though, with less than €1 trillion each 
in assets, they are not among the very largest in the euro area), and a 
‘long tail’ of small banks, most of which only have a regional or local 
footprint92. 
Italy had historically relied on strong local and regional public 
savings banks (Casse di Risparmio or Monti di Pietà), and a number 
of national state-owned banks from nationalisations during the first 
half of the twentieth century. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the sav-
ings banks were transformed into commercial entities and the state-
owned banks were privatised, triggering a wave of mergers that led to 
92   The figures in this paragraph are based on data from different sources. The con-
sistency of these sources has been checked with the Bank of Italy.
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the formation of Intesa BCI, UniCredit, SanPaolo IMI and Capitalia. 
As a result of the savings banks reform and bank mergers, the local 
public interests in the biggest banks were managed through founda-
tions, which retained controlling stakes in the consolidated groups. 
In 2007 Intesa and SanPaolo merged, and Capitalia was absorbed by 
UniCredit. Meanwhile foundations typically became minority share-
holders, and Italy’s central government almost entirely exited the 
banking sector93. 
Among the medium or small-sized banks a number are cooper-
atives (Banche Popolari and Banche Cooperative) with governance 
historically based on a one-shareholder-one-vote principle, as opposed 
to the usual one-share-one-vote – ie all shareholders, large or small, 
have identical voting power, even for those Banche Popolari (SI or LSI) 
that are publicly listed. The Banche Cooperative are local banks, often 
very small.
The national central bank, Bank of Italy (Banca d’Italia, often 
referred to as Bankitalia), is the Italian national supervisory authority 
and also the national resolution authority.
The 2014 comprehensive assessment and its interpretation
From mid-2012 to the end of 2013, Italian banks started a process of 
recapitalisation and continued the deleveraging process started in the 
second half of 2011, when Italian sovereign spreads rose significantly. 
However, this was insufficient to align Italian banking indicators with 
European ones in terms of risk-weighted capitalisation and profitabil-
ity. Crucially, the Italian banks were unable to reduce their stockpile of 
non-performing loans (NPLs), which instead kept growing. These are 
the main reasons for the Italian banking sector’s poor performance in 
the 2014 comprehensive assessment, which involved an asset quality 
review (AQR) and stress tests.
93   Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP), a large government-controlled entity, is not a 
bank but a special financial institution supervised by the Bank of Italy. 
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The final report published on 26 October 2014, identified 25 banks 
as failing the assessment as of the end of 2013, with an aggregate cap-
ital shortfall of €24.6 billion and an additional asset value adjustment 
(from the AQR) of €37 billion, adding up to a total impact of €61.6 
billion. Of these 25 banks, nine were Italian, or three-fifths of the 15 
Italian banks reviewed94. Italy thus contributed 36 percent of all banks 
failing the assessment, with a total capital shortfall of €9.7 billion 
(around 39 percent of the total), far higher than any other euro-area 
country.
By the beginning of 2014, the majority of these banks realised they 
would not meet the capital adequacy conditions. They therefore inten-
sified their recapitalisation efforts during the first three quarters of 
that year. By the end of September 2014, 12 of the 25, including five of 
the nine Italian banks, were able to overcome their capital shortfall by 
implementing recapitalisations during 2014 for an aggregate amount 
of €15 billion (€8.2 billion for the five Italian banks). Conversely, the 
other 13 banks, including four Italian banks, still had inadequate 
capital by the time of publication of the comprehensive assessment’s 
results. The four Italian banks accounted for an aggregate capital short-
fall of €3.3 billion or a third of the €10 billion total for the 13 remain-
ing ‘outliers’. The four Italian banks were: Banca Popolare di Milano 
(BPM), Banca Popolare di Vicenza (BP Vicenza), Cassa di Risparmio di 
Genova (Carige) and Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS).
These four, together with the other nine negative outliers from 
other countries, were given two weeks to establish capital plans that 
would rectify their capital gaps within nine months. BPM and BP 
Vicenza had approved but not yet implemented capital adjustments 
94   See ECB (2014a) and Bank of Italy (2014a). The list of 130 banks participating in 
the comprehensive assessment in 2014 does not completely match the list of 
SIs euro-area-wide. This also applies to Italy. Banca di Credito Valtellinese and 
Credito Emiliano were assessed in 2014 but are now designated as LSIs. The 15 
Italian banks assessed accounted for 11.5 percent of the total number in the com-
prehensive assessment, making up 10.4 percent of total assets.
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sufficient to meet these conditions as of September 2014. Thus, by 
the end of October 2014, only MPS and Carige failed to meet the new 
requirements, with a shortfall of €2.92 billion still representing slightly 
more than 30 percent of the total residual capital shortfall in the euro 
area.
The ECB and Bank of Italy presented different public interpreta-
tions of the results. The ECB (2014a, 2014c) focused on the final results 
based on bank balances at the end of December 2013. Conversely, 
the Bank of Italy (2014b, 2014a) focused on the updated AQR results, 
taking into account the recapitalisation efforts during 2014. It also 
emphasised that the capital shortfall of Italian banks according to the 
AQR at the end of 2013 was only €3.25 billion out of their total short-
fall of €9.68 billion, or in other words, the major part of the shortfall 
arose from the stress test results, the adverse scenario in particular. 
Moreover, the updated bank balances at the end of September 2014 
showed that none of the 15 Italian banks (even MPS and Carige) had 
any capital shortfalls resulting from the AQR and that all the late-2014 
shortfalls came from the stress tests, especially the adverse scenario95.
This different emphasis framed a three-pronged narrative pro-
moted by the Bank of Italy. First, the AQR was also a measure of the 
effectiveness of previous supervision; hence, the overall compliance 
of Italian banks with respect to AQR requirements meant an absence 
of past supervisory failures in Italy. Second, Italian banks did not 
represent a problem for the European banking sector – their limited 
capital shortfall involved only two banking groups and was mainly a 
consequence of the severity of the Italian adverse scenario. Third, as 
opposed to most other European countries, these results were attained 
with minimum public financial support since the start of the crisis. 
95   Of course, stress tests are not a forecast of a country’s economic evolution. More-
over, according to the Bank of Italy, the Italian adverse scenario was particularly 
severe because it under-assessed the effects of the double recession character-
ising the Italian economy (pro-cyclicality bias: see also the Bank of England’s 
position).  
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Thus the ECB and Bank of Italy had starkly different interpretations of 
the same events.
The Bank of Italy’s view is supported by the fact that the Italian 
economy was one of the euro area’s worst performers in terms of 
growth and sovereign spreads. Italian banks consequently faced deep 
increases in borrower insolvency and bankruptcy, and an increase in 
the cost of their liabilities, which were often independent of their spe-
cific riskiness. In light of this negative legacy, the average performance 
of the Italian banking sector was not that poor. Apart from cases such 
as that of MPS, the Bank of Italy had been able to guarantee stability 
during a tumultuous period characterised by more than six years of 
national recession. That said, if one ignores the legacy problems and 
takes a snapshot of the Italian banking sector at the end of December 
2013 or even at the end of September 2014, the comprehensive assess-
ment’s results unambiguously demonstrated that Italian banks repre-
sented one of the biggest problems for the European banking sector as 
a whole.
Four additional points deserve mentioning with respect to the 
comprehensive assessment:
• First, as the ECB (2014c, 2014b) partially acknowledged, the capital 
definitions were generally sounder in Italy than in other member 
states. The comprehensive assessment, being based on the national 
transposition of the European CRR/CRDIV, suffered distortions be-
cause of different national definitions and measures of capital often 
deriving from heterogeneous accounting rules of banking sectors. 
All Italian banks applied IFRS, unlike a number of German banks. 
On the other hand, since 2015, Italian banks have been allowed to 
count deferred tax credits (DTCs) as capital. Full implementation of 
the single rulebook could complete transitional arrangements and 
overcome these problems and other harmonisation deficiencies.
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• Second, traditional credit risk was treated more harshly than risk 
from capital market activities. The Italian banking sector is charac-
terised by a dominant weight of loans as a share of total assets. It 
can be argued that European regulation is biased against bank loan 
risks in favour of financial asset risks. As a consequence, Italian 
banks could have been penalised by the emphasis on credit risks 
relative to market and operational risks. However, even though the 
ECB did increase capital requirements in one go by 100 basis points 
during the comprehensive assessment, it only applied CRR/CRDIV 
regulation in assessing different types of risk. The ECB cannot be 
blamed of any bias inherent in the EU legislation.
• Third, and in relation to the previous point, Italy was penalised 
by the European emphasis on risk-weighted assets. Italian banks 
had an average CET1 ratio below the European mean, but also 
had among the soundest leverage ratios on average. A number of 
scholars (Haldane, 2012; Acharya and Steffen, 2014a; Dermine, 
2015) have highlighted weaknesses in the risk-weighted regulatory 
approach underpinning CET1 ratio calculations, eg pro-cyclicality 
and excessive complexity. Moreover, econometric exercises such 
as Barucci et al (2015) suggest that the leverage ratio tends to be 
more effective than risk-weighted measures in controlling for the 
riskiness of banks in the stress tests. From this point of view, the 
methodology used for the comprehensive assessment may have 
been too focused on risk-weighted measures. It would be a stretch, 
however, to argue that the leverage ratio could entirely replace the 
risk-weighted capital framework.
• Fourth, Italian banks suffered from their lack of use of internal rat-
ings-based (IRB) risk models. IRB models are costly to build, com-
plex to manage, and thus only affordable for large and sophisticat-
ed banking groups. On the other hand, IRB models often allowed 
the introduction of devices to disguise the riskiness of assets (Behn 
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et al, 2014; Barucci et al, 2015). Thus, their comparative under-uti-
lisation may have penalised Italian banks in the comprehensive 
assessment. However, it should be noted that, starting in 2010, 
international banking regulation has tended to strengthen risk 
management and internal controls instead of cutting down IRB.
In sum, one can identify many shortcomings in the comprehensive 
assessment, but these do not conclusively add up to the identification 
of a negative bias against the Italian banking sector, only that a level 
playing field has yet to be built for banks across the euro area. With a 
lack of trust between member states, and weak cooperation between 
European institutions and national governments, this can explain why 
the first moves of the new European supervision were characterised 
by a certain rigidity. In this sense, the ECB and SSM behaved more 
as rule-setters than supervisors (see also European Parliament, 2016, 
point 16).
The evolution of supervision
Once in place, European banking supervision shifted its attention to 
the SREP process, using a methodology based on a common set of 
rules (ECB 2015b, 2015e). In principle, the SREP methodology follows 
EBA guidelines, with an overall risk control framework that frames the 
SSM’s constrained judgement of each examined bank. Every judge-
ment implies the inclusion of the bank under assessment in one of the 
four score categories. However, the evaluation is too complex to be 
reduced to a simple score, so European banking supervision retains 
discretion for modulating the requirements for each bank’s risk-
weighted capital. This discretionary margin also applies to governance 
requirements.
The first full-fledged SREP exercise under the new European super-
visory framework started in February 2015 and ended in November of 
the same year. It is difficult to summarise its overall result, since each 
bank case was different. European banking supervision urged various 
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banks to strengthen their organisation and improve their governance. 
Above all, it imposed increases in capital requirements that ranged 
from 60 to 120 basis points for all banks that met the comprehensive 
assessment’s minimum requirements; these increases were mainly 
due to a further tightening of Pillar-2 requirements96. The Bank of Italy 
was reported to disagree with the ECB on this approach, by means of a 
letter sent to the ECB’s Supervisory Board97. The Bank of Italy’s argu-
ment was that the new increases in capital requirements arbitrarily 
overlapped with those of the comprehensive assessment, and thus 
risked harming the banks’ operations and stability.
A recent unofficial note of the European Commission (2016; see 
also Draghi 2016) aimed to limit the SSM’s discretionary power to 
tighten Pillar-2 capital requirements98. An analogous approach is 
suggested by the European Parliament (2016, points 21-25). Hence, 
the next SREP exercise, which started at the end of February 2016 and 
will be concluded later in 2016, might have to introduce substantial 
changes in methodology.
Despite the rigidity of the adopted criteria, the major Italian 
banks performed better in the late-2015 SREP than in the 2014 
96   In contrast to Pillar-1 requirements which are standardised (under CRR in the 
EU), Pillar-2 capital requirements address risks that are specific to each bank and 
involve supervisory discretion. The supervisor may also impose Pillar-2 capital 
guidance, if the capital requirements can be unmet under specific circumstances 
(European Commission, 2016).
97   Patrick Henry, (2015) ‘Bank of Italy slams ‘arbitrary’ ECB over capital demands’, 
Bloomberg, 21 September.
98   At the end of the 10 March 2016 press conference, Draghi said: “…I want to point 
your attention to a communication by the Commission […] that does clarify the 
nature of Pillar-2 requirements”. This Communication acknowledges that “com-
petent authorities may impose additional Pillar-2 capital requirements to address 
the more specific risk profile of each institution”. However, it adds that these same 
authorities have to “provide clear and detailed justification to the institution of why 
Pillar-2 capital guidance is transformed in a Pillar-2 capital requirement” and “the 
institution concerned should have the right to appeal the decision” (see European 
Commission, 2016). 
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comprehensive assessment. The latter’s unflattering picture of the 
Italian banking sector triggered various initiatives by the Italian 
banking sector or imposed by the government, which included more 
recapitalisations, attempts to restructure or liquidate part of the NPL 
stockpile, and changes in corporate governance. On this last point, in 
March 2015, the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance signed an 
agreement with the Italian banking foundations to reduce the foun-
dations’ stakes in each bank, and separately conducted a normative 
reform of the largest Banche Popolari (over €8 billion in total assets), 
requiring them to move towards a one-share-one-vote framework 
by July 2016. More recently (April 2016) the ministry implemented a 
normative reform of the Banche Cooperative to consolidate them into 
a few banking groups or to transform them into joint-stock companies. 
Meanwhile, despite their persistent weaknesses in terms of organisa-
tion and governance, MPS, Carige, BP Vicenza and Veneto Banca were 
able either to meet the specific capital requirements set by European 
banking supervision, or to commit to a sufficient recapitalisation 
within an agreed timeframe (see below).
As mentioned above, LSIs are important in Italy. They currently 
represent more than a quarter of total assets, with no large institutional 
protection schemes. Some of these smaller banks either came under 
special administration (an Italian form of corrective action) or were 
otherwise in need of significant restructuring. The SREP process shed 
light on their most pressing problems. However, EU competition policy 
rules that entered into force in August 2013 (European Commission, 
2013) limited the Bank of Italy’s ability to address LSIs’ weaknesses in 
its role of direct supervisor. These rules mandate losses on sharehold-
ers and junior bondholders as a precondition for state aid, and thus 
severely restricted state guarantees on the securitisation of NPLs, as 
detailed below. On this basis, the European Commission Competition 
Directorate-General placed constraints on the utilisation of an Italian 
inter-bank fund to resolve bank crises. Moreover the BRRD, approved 
in 2014, extended the principle of bail-in to all types of bank bonds and 
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deposits above €100,000 from the beginning of 2016 but, at the same 
time, set the normative framework for banks’ crisis management99. The 
Italian Parliament was late in transposing BRRD into national legisla-
tion, which was only done in mid-November 2015100.
Recent developments and prospects
In November 2015, these constraints crystallised in the Italian 
approach to addressing the weaknesses of four small banks (three 
regional savings banks and one cooperative bank) which, combined, 
held around 1 percent of total Italian banking deposits. The impos-
sibility of finding solutions through the national inter-bank fund 
brought the structural fragilities of the Italian banking sector to the 
fore. The Italian government spun off the NPLs of these failing banks 
into a single ‘bad bank’ at around 18 percent of their nominal value, as 
required by the European Commission, and formed four new viable 
banks. In the process, the value of shares and subordinated bonds 
previously issued by the failing banks was wiped out. Since the Italian 
banking sector had sold an abnormal amount of different types of 
bank bonds to retail investors between 2001 and 2012, the obliteration 
of the value of subordinated bank bonds created alarm. It also affected 
the market values of all listed Italian banking groups101. 
99   See Visco (2015, 2016). In these works, the Governor of the Bank of Italy com-
pares the application of these new European rules with the introduction of total 
loss absorbing capacity (TLAC) requirements for the systemically important 
banks. TLAC was decided by the Financial Stability Board in 2015 and must be 
implemented before 2022; conversely, the new European rules have very short 
transition periods and retroactive effects on outstanding debt. Visco argues that 
this hasty European implementation has a distortionary impact.
100 This late transposition implied that the Italian authorities were left with little time 
to implement the new rules on crisis management before the full implementa-
tion of the bail-in.
101  The negative market reactions at the beginning of 2016 were worsened by the 
spreading of false news. For instance, an ECB Supervisory Board inquiry at a 
number of European banks on their NPL stock was interpreted as a sign of a fur-
ther and generalised strengthening of capital requirements for the Italian banks. 
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At the beginning of 2016, the Italian government reached a con-
troversial agreement with the European Commission to offer a partial 
and costly guarantee to Italian banks securitising their NPLs (Italian 
Ministry of Economy and Finance, 2016). It soon became apparent 
that this guarantee, limited to the senior tranche, would be inef-
fective to reduce significantly the gap between the average value of 
NPLs accounted for by the Italian banks (around 41 percent) and the 
benchmark value set in the case of the four failing banks (around 18 
percent). The size of this gap meant that Italian banks would have 
been unable to liquidate a significant portion of their NPLs without 
resorting to further recapitalisation. In the European context of a still 
unfinished banking union, these events highlighted the fragility of the 
Italian banking sector. They further jeopardised the scheduled recap-
italisations of BP Vicenza and Veneto Banca which had still to meet 
their SREP capital requirements and were charged with administrative 
misbehaviour in previous liquidity raisings; and put the other bank-
ing groups with the highest weight of NPLs – MPS and Carige – under 
strain. Separately, at the beginning of April 2016, the ECB approved 
the first significant bank merger under its supervision, between Banco 
Popolare and BPM102. This piece of good news, however, failed to coun-
terbalance the bad news on other fronts.
In April 2016, the Atlas fund (Atlante in Italian) was launched as 
Italy’s response to this situation. The fund, endowed with an initial 
capital of €4.25 billion by a large majority of the Italian financial insti-
tutions, has two aims: to underwrite new recapitalisations by Italian 
banks (up to 70 percent of its capital), playing the role of ‘shareholder 
of last resort’, and to act as a purchaser for the junior tranches of 
102 ECB banking supervision approved this merger after a lengthy negotiation on 
NPL liquidation, the re-capitalisation of Banco Popolare and changes to the gov-
ernance of BPM. Italian newspapers complained about the Supervisory Board’s 
rigidity because both banks had already met the 2015 SREP requirements. How-
ever, the new banking group will be stronger thanks to these additional requests 
being met.
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securitised Italian NPLs (up to 30 percent of its capital).
The governance and operation of this fund have at least three 
weaknesses. First, Atlas’s endowment is insufficient to pursue its 
double aim, even under optimistic assumptions of its possible lever-
age ratio; the two recapitalisations of BP Vicenza and Veneto Banca 
could consume 85 percent of the capital devoted to this task, almost 
extinguishing Atlas’s capacity. Second, Atlas’s design implies that the 
stronger financial institutions subsidise those in trouble: it is debatable 
whether this solution should be chosen over a new round of consoli-
dation. Third, Atlas’s ownership structure is such that its main share-
holders, the Italian banking groups, are also its contracting parties, 
meaning that the same set of agents will act on the two opposite sides 
of the market, which can hinder competition and generate conflicts 
of interest. Despite these weaknesses, Atlas might effectively temper 
financial instability in the short run. At the beginning of May 2016, it 
acquired full ownership of BP Vicenza, whose capital call had attracted 
demand from market investors for less than 10 percent of the amount 
requested. Without this intervention, either Unicredit as a formal guar-
antor of the capital increase would have had to buy the new shares, 
with a negative impact on its CET1, or BP Vicenza would have had 
to enter into a resolution procedure. At the time of writing, the same 
could happen in the case of Veneto Banca and its guarantor, Intesa-
San Paolo. Moreover, Atlas still wants to increase the market prices 
of Italian NPLs, and thus to allow banks such as Carige and MPS to 
reduce the expected losses from the gradual liquidation of their NPLs.
The threat of financial instability does not imply that the Italian 
banking sector is on the brink of bankruptcy. Moreover, given the 
ECB’s policy of quantitative easing and other non-conventional 
initiatives, the Italian banking system has never faced serious risks of 
illiquidity. Even so, Italian banks will be unable to play a significant 
and efficient role in intermediating financial wealth and lending to 
the Italian economy without restructuring and consolidation. The 
implementation of these processes is not made easier by the lack of 
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trust among euro-area countries, and between them and the European 
institutions. This mistrust risks making European banking regulation 
and supervision excessively rigid; an excess of rigidity could hinder the 
actual construction of a single financial market.
9 The Netherlands 
Casper de Vries and Dirk Schoenmaker
The Dutch banking landscape
The Dutch banking system is highly concentrated. There are three 
very large banks: ABN AMRO, ING Group and Rabobank. ABN AMRO 
was formerly part of Fortis and is still 77 percent government-owned 
following nationalisation in October 2008 and relisting in November 
2015. ING Group is now predominantly a banking group after spin-
ning off most of its insurance activities (under the name Nationale 
Nederlanden) in 2014, as requested by the European Commission 
following state aid received in 2008. Rabobank is a non-listed coopera-
tive group. 
There are three medium-sized banks: SNS, BNG and NWB. 
SNS Bank, originally a savings bank, is wholly government-owned fol-
lowing the nationalisation of failing group SNS Reaal in February 2013. 
When SNS was nationalised, the Dutch government separated the 
insurance subsidiary, which was renamed Vivat and subsequently sold 
to the Chinese insurer Anbang in 2015, and the property subsidiary, 
which had large non-performing commercial property investments. 
Now that the remaining SNS Bank is healthy again, the Dutch govern-
ment is considering privatisation and will send its proposals to the 
Dutch parliament before the summer of 2016.
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Table 8: The Dutch banking system (end 2014)
Category Total assets 
(billion)
Status Percentage
Significant institutions € 2,230 88.1%
ING Bank € 828 Domestic 32.7%
Rabobank € 681 Domestic 26.9%
ABN AMRO € 387 Domestic 15.3%
Bank Nederlandse 
Gemeenten
€ 154 Domestic 6.1%
Nederlandse 
Waterschapsbank
€ 88 Domestic 3.5%
SNS € 68 Domestic 2.7%
RBS Netherlands / RFS 
Holdings 
€ 24 Foreign 0.9%
Less significant 
institutions
€ 302 11.9%
NIBC € 23 Domestic 0.9%
LeasePlan Corporation € 20 Domestic 0.8%
Van Lanschot € 17 Domestic 0.7%
Other domestic LSIs € 96 Domestic 3.8%
Foreign LSIs € 146 Foreign 5.8%
Total SIs and LSIs € 2,531 100.0%
Source: DNB and annual reports.
BNG Bank (Bank Nederlandse Gemeenten, Dutch Municipal Bank) 
and NWB (Nederlandse Waterschapsbank, Dutch Water Bank) are 
also publicly-owned (50 percent by the central government and 50 
percent by local governments for BNG; and 81 percent by the local 
water authorities, 17 percent by the central government and 2 percent 
by local governments in the case of NWB). BNG and NWB mostly lend 
to municipalities, provinces and polders administered by the local 
water authorities. The government intends to divest all shares it holds 
in ABN AMRO and SNS Bank. Meanwhile, the Dutch government has 
benefitted from dividends from ABN AMRO. Lately, there has been 
some public advocacy in favour of keeping SNS as a state-owned bank 
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(Financieele Dagblad, 2016).
There are several smaller banks (LSIs), which amount to 12 percent 
of the Dutch banking system’s total assets. The largest players among 
the LSIs are NIBC, LeasePlan Corporation and Van Lanschot, with 
total assets ranging from €15 to 30 billion. Table 8 provides an overview 
of the Dutch banking system, indicating that only 7 percent is foreign 
owned. The Dutch national supervisory authority is the National 
Central Bank, De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB), which also has resolu-
tion authority. 
Comprehensive assessment
In 2012 DNB started to raise public awareness of potential valuation 
problems in the commercial real estate sector and asked for better risk 
management. DNB stepped up its supervision by starting an in-depth 
investigation of banks’ real estate portfolios. In 2013 DNB conducted 
an asset quality review of all major banks, which resulted in higher 
provisions and adjustments in internal risk models. The supervisor 
also requested additional capital for commercial real estate exposures.
This sectoral asset quality review helped the Dutch banks to 
prepare for the ECB’s comprehensive assessment of 2014. The com-
prehensive assessment did not lead to substantial adjustments for the 
Dutch banks.
More recently, DNB has again been warning commercial banks to 
take heed of the new Basel Committee proposals regarding residential 
mortgages. As discussed below, these proposals will have a material 
impact on Dutch banks that have relatively large mortgage portfolios 
with high loan-to-value (LTV) ratios. DNB is asking banks to anticipate 
these new measures and take action now. 
Significant institutions
The government aims to sell its remaining shares in ABN AMRO in 
later tranches. While there is political agreement on full privatisation, 
there is no indicative timetable. Following the IPO in November 2015, 
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there was a lockup period until May 2016.
ING is an international bank, with operations across Europe and 
beyond. These include significant activities in the euro area, particu-
larly in Belgium, Germany (ING DiBa), Netherlands, Luxembourg and 
Spain. While the supervisors in the Joint Supervisory Teams (JST) are 
still learning, early experiences suggest that (1) the joint supervisory 
process is working; (2) the SSM approach is more intense than the 
former DNB-led regime; (3) there is useful specialisation on topics 
such as capital and liquidity within the JST; and (4) the JST approach 
enables the SSM to have an overall, consolidated, view of the banks 
that was not achievable under the pre-SSM system. Nevertheless, the 
metrics that the SSM is using and the benchmarking against other 
banks are not (yet) transparent. A case in point is the SREP process, in 
which the SREP score is announced to the banks, but the underlying 
factors that contribute to this score are not.
Rabobank underwent a major change of governance in 2015, 
which could have implications for the governance of other coop-
eratives in the euro area. Until 2015, the local member banks were 
owned by  their customers (only those that chose to be a member). The 
local member banks were in turn members and owners of Rabobank 
Nederland, the central institution. The central institution of the 
Rabobank Group and all 106 local member banks merged into one 
entity, Cooperatieve Rabobank U.A., with one banking licence and 
one consolidated balance sheet as of 1 January 2016. There are several 
reasons for this merger:
• Internal: the Rabobank group wanted to improve its governance 
structure. The goal of the new structure is to more effectively serve 
customers, markets and society, while strengthening the coopera-
tive identity.
• Supervision: the central institution and the local member banks 
held individual banking licences. In the previous arrangement, the 
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DNB (and later the ECB) used to supervise the central Rabobank 
institution in Utrecht, which in turn supervised the local member 
banks under a special clause in Dutch financial services law. The 
DNB, and more recently the ECB, wanted direct access to the local 
banks, particularly because the ECB acts as the licensing authority 
for all banks under the SSM Regulation.
• Resolution: for regulatory purposes, the group’s capital was divid-
ed between the central institution (€7 billion) and the local banks 
(€20 billion) as of end-2015. The Rabobank entities had explicit 
cross-guarantees. But the question remained open whether capital, 
for example, would be up-streamed from the local banks to the 
central institution in the case of a big loss in the central institution, 
and vice versa. Such questions are particularly relevant for the trig-
gering of contingent convertibles (CoCos), which Rabobank issued 
for the first time in 2010, and the implementation of resolution 
plans, which now require debt holders to take the first hit.
Since 1 January 2016, the ECB and DNB have had full supervisory 
access to the whole Rabobank group, and regulatory capital is con-
solidated in the newly-merged Rabobank entity. The Rabobank has 
kept a cooperative structure, however. The local business is organised 
through about 100 local banks. These local banks are no longer sep-
arate legal entities, since they are part of the unified Rabobank legal 
entity, but their governance arrangements maintain strong relation-
ships with their customers and local communities. The cooperative 
customers (leden, or ‘members’) of Rabobank are organised into 
about 100 departments (afdelingen), based on geographical and other 
criteria. The chairman of each department’s supervisory body (lokale 
raad van commissarissen), who is also the chairman of the local mem-
bers’ council (lokale ledenraad), represents the members from that 
department in the general members’ council (algemene ledenraad), 
Rabobank’s highest governing body. Both Rabobank’s executive board 
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(raad van bestuur) and its supervisory board (raad van commissaris-
sen) are accountable to the general members’ council.
Less significant institutions
The experience of Dutch LSIs is that the scope for DNB to follow its 
own policies has been reduced. The heavy shadow of the ECB is felt in 
the supervision of LSIs. DNB follows the formats and templates of the 
ECB, because it has to report to the ECB. DNB also receives instruc-
tions from the ECB.
As LSIs generally have higher funding costs than larger institu-
tions, the business model is more challenging for them. Supervision, 
as a result, has become more intrusive. One noteworthy matter in the 
Netherlands is wholesale funding. A large part of Dutch household 
savings goes to pension funds, since participation is mandatory. As a 
result, there are fewer retail deposits available for banks than in other 
euro-area countries. The loan-to-deposit ratio in the Netherlands rose 
rapidly in the past two decades and is currently at 180 percent, way 
above the euro-area average (around 130 percent) and much higher 
than in the US or Japan (Jansen et al, 2013). Some LSIs rely for up to 
half of their funding on wholesale funding, and the larger banks rely 
heavily on this channel as well. The loss of the asset-based-securities 
market due to the credit crisis still hurts the Dutch banking sector, 
and Dutch banks have a considerable funding gap. Secured funding is 
cheaper than unsecured, but results in asset encumbrance, which is 
monitored closely by DNB.
Dutch experiences with European banking supervision
The new supervisory framework is generally well respected by the 
Dutch banking community, because the ECB has managed to attract 
qualified supervisors. However, the banks have had to get used to 
on-site visits, which are a new feature in the Netherlands, and the 
multiple data-requests. In fact, it is felt that the ECB acts in a formal 
and legalistic way. It is also not always clear whether the ECB or DNB 
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is in charge of certain issues. While the functioning of JSTs is improv-
ing, occasionally decisions are not taken in due time. There are delays 
between the enquiries conducted by supervisors and the feedback on 
the results. Also, the follow-up on data requests can be rather long. 
More widely, bankers perceive a lack of transparency in the decisions 
taken by the ECB. Nevertheless, the Dutch banking community is 
engaging with the ECB to improve processes. Dutch banks fully sup-
port further harmonisation of the single rulebook.
Our own assessment is that the ECB is indeed more intrusive 
than the DNB was previously. This was to be expected, and strength-
ens the supervisory process. Regarding the multiple data requests, 
delayed feedback and lack of transparency, the ECB could streamline 
its own procedures in cooperation with the banks. Notwithstanding 
the teething problems of the JSTs, the working of the JSTs is a major 
improvement for the quality and efficiency of cross-border supervision 
of Dutch banking groups.
Risk weights on residential mortgages
Dutch households have a higher exposure to the financial sector 
than the euro-area average. This is for two reasons. First, the Dutch 
pension system is capital-based, and pension savings are currently 
running at 178 percent of gross national product; this excludes life 
insurance policies which, if added, would amount to 200 percent of 
GNP (CBS Statline, own calculations). Second is the high proportion 
of interest-only mortgages with a high LTV. Early in one’s career, these 
high LTVs are needed since mandatory pension premiums run high 
at around 20 percent of one’s income. Over one’s lifetime, the two 
exposures may net out, but they expose Dutch households to consider-
able uncertainty regarding their future flow of funds during the period 
of the mortgage. This is one of the reasons why Dutch consumption is 
more pro-cyclical than in other euro-area countries where pensions 
are based on a pay-as-you-go system (SER, 2013). However, with the 
baby boomers now retiring, pro-cyclicality may become a problem in 
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those countries with a pay-as-you-go system because of pressures on 
government budgets.
Before the 1990s, Dutch mortgages were primarily funded by life 
insurers and pension funds. Given the long duration of the liability 
structure of these institutions, it is only natural that this should be 
matched on the asset side with mortgages of similarly long duration. 
More recently, Dutch pension funds have massively shifted their 
investments outside the Netherlands for purposes of diversification. 
Banks have stepped in and built up large mortgage portfolios over the 
past two decades. The demand for mortgages also grew because of 
considerable pension premium hikes and the favourable income tax 
treatment of debt financing, which explains the high proportion of 
interest-only mortgages. Demand was further spurred by the growth 
in two-income households, which can typically apply for larger 
mortgages. As a result, Dutch banks have come to hold large portfo-
lios of mortgages with high LTV ratios, which are often interest-only 
mortgages.
Until recently, Dutch banks under the internal ratings-based (IRB) 
approach were operating with a capital weight of around 18 per-
cent for mortgages. This is considerably lower than the standardised 
approach under current Basel regulations, which requires a 35 percent 
risk weight up to 80 percent of the market value and a 75 percent risk 
weight for the part of the exposure above 80 percent. Under the cur-
rent standardised approach, KPMG (2015) estimates that the capital 
requirements of all Dutch mortgages would have a risk weight of about 
30 percent.
The combination of high LTVs and low risk weights caught the 
attention of the ECB, which started to ask questions about the mort-
gage portfolios of Dutch banks. This did not lead to adjustments in the 
comprehensive assessment in October 2014, but the ECB is closely 
monitoring Dutch mortgages. To gain further evidence about the risks 
and performance of Dutch mortgages, European banking supervision 
(spurred by DNB) has started an on-site review of mortgage portfolios. 
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Prompted by the US supervisors, who prefer simplicity over internal 
models, the Basel Committee is currently reviewing risk weights for 
mortgages and has proposed a floor in the IRB approach based on 
a revised standardised approach. For the Dutch banks, this would 
increase the risk weighing to 40 percent (KPMG, 2015), a considerable 
hike from the current 30 percent given the large mortgage portfolio.
For this reason, Dutch banks are currently selling parts of their 
mortgage portfolios, partly to pension funds and insurers, and have 
reduced the supply of mortgages. In anticipation of this, and of other 
housing-related regulation, which requires new homeowners to repay 
the loan through an annuity, the Dutch housing market has stalled 
for a number of years. It is only now recovering thanks to the very low 
interest rates.
Two years ago, about 30 percent of mortgages were in nega-
tive equity according to CBS (2015), but that number is declining. 
Furthermore, mortgages with negative equity are concentrated in the 
more recent mortgages of younger families. Nevertheless, the loss 
rates are less than 0.1 percent, and foreclosures are even lower. The 
number of households in arrears is also very low. Expected default 
rates are among the lowest in the EU. One reason for the low loss 
rates on mortgages is the strong legal position of lenders in relation to 
borrowers under the Dutch civil code. For this reason, Dutch banks 
complain that the new rules do not take into account the high-quality 
payment history on Dutch mortgages and the legal environment. Here 
the one-size-fits-all approach, which mainly comes from Basel and 
EU legislation in the aftermath of the credit crisis, is biting. The DNB, 
however, has not (yet) been able to convince the Basel Committee to 
take the specific situation of Dutch mortgages into account. It appears 
that banks will have to live with this new reality, and should continue 
slimming down their exposure to residential housing or increase their 
capital. Given this, a revision of the Dutch bankruptcy law might also 
be considered to make defaults on mortgages easier, which would 
arguably contribute to the EU objective of capital markets union. In 
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this sense the one-size-fits-all supervision in the banking union is not 
promoting the best standards, and supervisors appear to promote a 
race to the bottom with their unconditional approach that neglects 
local institutional factors. Recently, DNB has threatened to block 
stronger capital requirements (in the form of capital floors for mort-
gages) in the Basel Committee.
Macro-prudential aspects
The euro area now has a single monetary policy and a (still incom-
plete) banking union. The outlines of a capital market union are still 
being drawn, but the difficulty of harmonising insolvency laws holds 
back progress in this direction. In such an unbalanced environment, 
monetary policy can wreak havoc. The ECB, given its responsibilities 
for monetary policy and banking supervision, has an in-built incen-
tive to support the banking sector without taking due account of the 
whole financial sector. In a country with high pension savings like the 
Netherlands, the current low rates pose a problem for pension funds 
and life insurers. Future liabilities in these entities are discounted at 
market interest rates. Since these rates are near zero, their solvency is 
under pressure.
During the gold standard era between 1871 and 1905, countries 
such as Germany, the UK, the United States and the Netherlands 
experienced prolonged periods of deflation, but interest rates always 
remained positive. The current negative interest rate environment 
is unprecedented, and at least partly policy-induced. It effectively 
allocates subsidies to dithering governments and weak banks, while 
creating heavy distortions in parts of the financial markets.
In the Dutch system, tinkering with interest rates has an immediate 
effect on aggregate demand. A balanced approach should take such 
ramifications into account. This is why a macro-prudential framework 
has been developed. Unfortunately, this is left to each country sepa-
rately. For example, the Netherlands, Sweden and the Czech Republic 
are the only countries that apply a systemic risk buffer of 3 percent to 
137 | EUROPEAN BANKING SUPERVISION: THE FIRST EIGHTEEN MONTHS
the largest institutions (see Figure 6 in the European Overview). This 
uneven playing field suggests a race to the bottom. As a result, fric-
tions arise between monetary policy and bank supervision, which are 
conducted at the euro-area level, while the insurance and pensions 
sectors remain supervised at the country level. A more balanced eval-
uation would examine the challenges faced by these financial sub-sec-
tors and monetary policy. This requires establishing European banking 
supervision within a proper framework of macro-prudential policy for 
the financial system as a whole. The current preoccupation with the 
inflation goal overlooks the explosion of credit in other areas of the 
financial sector. Negative nominal interest rates are hurting insur-
ers and pension funds and are historically unprecedented. A similar 
process was at work in the run-up to the credit crisis. A reform of the 
European macro-prudential policy framework is needed to rectify such 
imbalances.
10 Portugal
António Nogueira Leite
The Portuguese banking landscape
As of September 2015, Portugal had 159 credit institutions, of which 
67 were banks, 88 were mutual agricultural credit banks and four were 
savings banks. On 30 September 2015, they had total assets of €452.7 
billion, €261.5 billion in loans and advances to customers, €250.9 bil-
lion in deposits, and an average loan-to-deposit ratio of 104.2 percent. 
Borrowing from the European Central Bank (ECB) was €25.1 billion. In 
September 2015, the aggregate Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio for 
the system was 11.6 percent103. 
In contrast to the euro area as a whole, growth of the assets of 
Portuguese banks continued well beyond the start of financial crisis: 
the average growth rate between 2009 and April 2011 was 8.7 percent, 
against a mere 1.8 percent for the euro area. Between the start of the 
Portuguese assistance programme in May 2011 and September 2015, 
however, total assets in Portugal’s banking sector decreased by 20.8 
percent104.
There are currently four institutions designated as significant, 
representing roughly 60 percent of the market by any of the usual indi-
cators. The largest is Caixa Geral de Depósitos (CGD), a state-owned 
103 CET1 ratio calculated in accordance with the new CRD IV/CRR transitional 
arrangement. Most numbers in this paragraph are from the Portuguese Banking 
Association (November 2015 Report) and ECB. 
104 Source: ECB.
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bank with a significant footprint outside Portugal – it owns banks in 
Brazil, South Africa, Macao, East Timor and all former Portuguese col-
onies in Africa with the exception of Guinea-Bissau. Millennium BCP 
is the largest private-sector group, with significant operations in 
Poland and also in Mozambique and Angola. By end-2015, Angola’s 
Grupo Sonangol was its main shareholder with 18 percent, followed 
by Spain’s Banco Sabadell with 5.1 percent. Novo Banco is the ‘good 
bank’ that emerged from the resolution of Banco Espírito Santo (BES) 
in August 2014. Banco Português de Investimento (BPI) is the small-
est of the four. As of April 2016, BPI’s main shareholders were Spain’s 
CaixaBank (44 percent) and Angola’s Isabel dos Santos (close to 20 
percent)105, and it in turn owned a controlling position (51 percent) 
in Angola’s largest and most profitable bank (Banco de Fomento de 
Angola). In addition, Spain’s Santander Group has a significant pres-
ence in Portugal through its wholly owned subsidiary Santander Totta, 
which also in late December 2015 bought the performing operation of 
Banco Internacional de Funchal (Banif), a smaller bank that had gone 
through a resolution process106. 
The Portuguese supervisory authority is the national central bank, 
the Bank of Portugal, which now also has resolution authority. 
The 2011-14 assistance programme
In April 2011, the Republic of Portugal sought assistance and obtained 
a three-year assistance programme from the European Union, the 
ECB and the IMF. The package was agreed in May 2011 and included 
a €78 billion loan, split equally between the European Financial 
Stabilisation Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility and 
the IMF. Of these funds, €12 billion was to be reserved for the country’s 
105 On 18 April 2016, Caixa Bank announced a preliminary offer to take full control of 
the bank. It was the second announcement in less than a year.
106 In addition to this sale, a vehicle (Oitante) for non-performing assets (mostly 
NPLs, secured and unsecured) and a residual bad bank, which retained the 
name Banif, were created.
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banks, which had to raise their CET1 ratios to 9 percent in 2011 and to 
10 percent by the end of 2012107. The programme also included a ful-
ly-funded capital backstop facility of €35 billion, as well as “safeguards 
to support adequate banking system liquidity and for strengthening the 
supervisory and regulatory framework”108. The backstop facility was 
independent from the aforementioned €12 billion capital facility and 
was meant to facilitate the wholesale financing of Portuguese banks 
in the presence of the downgrading of their respective ratings below 
investment grade. These measures were intended to create the condi-
tions for an orderly deleveraging of private-sector balance sheets while 
preserving financial sector stability.
The banks’ dependence on ECB funding had increased sharply 
in the months before the programme. As a result, the programme 
required all major banks to produce quarterly updates of their funding 
and capital plans.
The Portuguese economy had accumulated imbalances in the 
decade prior to 2011. During this period, the economy became ever 
more dependent on bank credit, posting substantial accumulated 
deficits on the part of both the government and non-financial cor-
porations. The adjustment initiated in 2011 noticeably changed this 
trend, with the total financing needs of the economy decreasing by 13 
percent of GDP in the six years ending in December 2015109.
As a result of the accumulated borrowing prior to 2011, which 
was mostly bank lending, private corporations started a significant 
deleveraging process which led to a decline in their accumulated debt 
in excess of 20 percent of GDP between the start of the programme 
and December 2015110. However, at the end of 2015, the debt of 
107  Only half the amount, ie €6 billion, was used to recapitalise Portuguese banks 
during the three-year bailout programme.
108 Portugal’s Letter of Intent to the IMF, May 2011.
109  Source: Statistics Portugal and IGCP (Portugal’s Debt Management Agency).
110  Source: Bank of Portugal.
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non-financial corporations still represented more than 145 percent 
of GDP, the same level as in December 2008111. Because most of the 
financing of corporate debt had been done through bank lending, this 
trend was followed by the very substantial deleveraging of the balance 
sheets of banks operating in Portugal.
The adjustment of Portugal’s economy after 2011 had a significant 
impact on banks. This, together with increased capital requirements 
and a new institutional framework for regulation and supervision, led 
to a major overhaul of the competitive landscape in Portugal’s banking 
sector, leading to its greatest transformation in decades112. The delev-
eraging process after the beginning of the adjustment programme led 
to a 19 percent reduction in total banking assets between May 2011 
and June 2015. The equivalent figure for the euro area was a mere 2.8 
percent decrease113.
Credit-to-deposit ratios for the system had been rising steadily 
since 2000, when the ratio was 115 percent, reaching a maximum of 
161.5 percent at the end of 2009114. With the implementation of the 
adjustment programme and following the troika’s instructions, the 
Bank of Portugal recommended that the (then) eight largest banking 
groups reduce their loan-to-deposit ratios to 120 percent by the end of 
2014. The credit-to-deposit ratio decreased steadily, from 158 percent 
at end-2010 to 140 percent at end-2011, and 104.2 percent at the end 
of September 2015. Even so, the downgrading of Portugal by the three 
main credit rating agencies, which occurred during 2010 and 2011, 
111  Deleveraging of non-financial corporations continued throughout 2015 at a   
slightly slower pace than in the previous years.
112  In March 1975, all Portuguese-owned banks were nationalised, while foreign 
banks then operating in Portugal were left untouched. Everything else was kept 
unchanged. This time, there was a smaller change in the ownership structure of 
banks but the change in the sector’s structure was much more pronounced, and 
likewise the regulatory framework faced by banking institutions.
113 Source: ECB.
114 Credit net of impairments, including securitised and non-derecognised loans. 
Source: Bank of Portugal.
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adversely affected the ratings of Portuguese banks115 and led to a sub-
stantial increase in the amount they borrowed from the ECB, from €10 
billion in December 2008 to €60.5 billion in June 2012116. This amount 
started to decrease in mid-2012, and was €25.1 billion in September 
2015. Correspondingly, the share of Portuguese banks in total funding 
granted by the ECB fell from 8.1 percent in April 2011 to 3 percent in 
June 2015117.
The rise in credit risk led to a substantial increase in the impair-
ments recorded by banks, which rose from €3.56 billion in 2010 to 
€6.6 billion in 2011, €7.2 billion in 2012, €6 billion in 2013, €8.2 bil-
lion in 2014 and €8.5 billion in 2015118. The simultaneous decrease 
in net interest income, from €7.9 billion in 2011 to €5.6 billion in 
2014, affected the profitability of banks119. As a result, in recent years 
the return on Portugal’s banking assets fell sharply. In aggregate, 
Portuguese banks only returned to profit in the first half of 2015. In 
December 2015, NPLs represented 12 percent of total loans. In spite of 
this significant deleveraging, however, households and non-financial 
corporations have remained more dependent on bank loans than the 
euro-area average: in December 2014, loans to private customers were 
72 percent of GDP in Portugal versus 51.7 percent for the euro area, 
while loans to non-financial firms were 50.4 percent in Portugal and 
42.4 percent in the euro area120.
Portuguese deposits have remained more stable than in some other 
countries facing economic and financial adjustment. Deposits from 
115  Among major banking groups, only Santander Totta retained investment-grade 
status. 
116 Source: Bank of Portugal.
117 Source: Bank of Portugal, ECB.
118 Source: Bank of Portugal.
119 At the time of writing there is no equivalent figure for 2015.
120 Source: AMECO, ECB. It includes only loans and not debt-issued securities. 
Although there are no more-recent figures for Portugal it is clear that the relative 
assessment did not change meaningfully in 2015.
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the non-monetary sector were €208 billion in May 2010, reached a 
peak of close to €240 billion in early 2012, and stood at €219 billion in 
June 2015121.
Efforts to ensure the capitalisation of most banks led to an improve-
ment in the quality of banks’ own funds. Core Tier 1 (CET1) ratios were 
8.7 percent in December 2011, 11.5 percent in December 2012, 12.3 
percent in December 2013, 11.3 percent in December 2014 and 11.6 
percent in September 2015122, 123.
In accordance with the programme, from 2011 the Bank of Portugal 
conducted several inspections of the largest Portuguese banking 
groups to assess whether the accounted impairments were adequate. 
The first exercise occurred in the second half of 2011 and was intended 
to perform an assessment of credit portfolios, the validation of credit 
risk capital requirements and the assessment of parameters and meth-
ods used in stress testing. It concluded that there was a need to rein-
force impairments by €596 million124. The second exercise took place 
in the second half of 2012 and assessed credit exposure to real estate, 
leading to the need to reinforce impairments by €474 million. The third 
inspection, in June and July 2013, assessed €93 billion of credits and 
led to a need to reinforce impairments by €1.1 billion. The fourth and 
final inspection occurred between October 2013 and March 2014 and 
centred on 12 large clients across the system, producing a further need 
to reinforce impairments by €1 billion.
From the beginning of the programme until mid-2015, six banks 
used €16.53 billion of the €35 billion state guarantee facility, totalling 
121  Source: ECB.
122  Source: ECB, using data from bank groups and domestic banks on a consolidat 
ed basis, excluding the insurance business, when applicable.
123  Since the beginning of 2014, Portuguese banks have had to follow the new CR-
DIV/CRR transitional arrangements for the adequacy of own funds (CET1 ratio of 
7 percent). The Bank of Portugal obliged Portuguese banks to meet a minimum 
CET1 ratio of 10 percent by December 2013.
124  Source: Bank of Portugal.
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16 new operations125. This line was created to mitigate banks’ financing 
pressures and to support collateral buffers. That is, the government 
extended guarantees on bank bonds to be used as temporary collateral 
for Eurosystem financing126. In addition, to strengthen the capital posi-
tion of specific banks, between 2012 and 2014 public injections of new 
capital through issuance of new shares were made into CGD (€750m) 
and Banif (€700m). State-sponsored convertible bonds (CoCos) were 
allocated to Banif (€400m), Millennium BCP (€3 billion), BPI (€1.5 bil-
lion) and CGD (€900m). Of these, only €3.75 billion has been repaid127. 
In 2014, the newly-established Portuguese Resolution Fund injected 
€3.9 billion into Novo Banco in the process of resolving BES.
Supervision during the programme and beyond: the Bank of 
Portugal and European banking supervision
Problems in the Portuguese banking sector started to emerge before 
the 2011 programme. In 2008, a small bank (BPP, Banco Privado 
Português) was liquidated, but the government nationalised ailing 
BPN (Banco Português de Negócios) for fear of destabilising the sector. 
This near-bankruptcy and subsequent nationalisation prompted a par-
liamentary inquiry and several criminal cases, which uncovered sev-
eral episodes of apparent excessive leniency (maybe naiveté) towards 
BPN by the supervising authorities in the years prior to nationalisa-
tion. These events and subsequent losses at BPN post-nationalisation 
generated unprecedented pressure on the Bank of Portugal, which 
was seen as lacking initiative and demonstrating excessive caution 
prior to action: for close to ten years BPN had been seen by the market 
as a non-compliant institution although it benefited from apparent 
complacency on the part of the supervisor, who followed the old-time 
125 Source: Portuguese Ministry of Finance, Directorate General of Treasury and 
Finance.
126 Similar schemes have been implemented in several other euro-area countries. 
127 In any event, a substantial part of the recapitalisation facility was left unused.
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common practice of ‘trusting a banker’s word’. In spite of this, and 
before the case was made public, the supervisor was already taking 
steps to increase its ability to effectively regulate the Portuguese bank-
ing sector. After years of preparation and study, the Bank of Portugal 
had promoted internal changes, separating solvency and capital 
adequacy supervision from behavioural supervision, reinforced the 
supervision area with new specialists and, after 2008, started supervis-
ing in situ all major banks, with permanently embedded teams moni-
toring their day-to-day activity. In other words, the Bank of Portugal’s 
supervisory approach was to a great extent proactive, even though 
the effectiveness of the changes in terms of the daily supervisory and 
regulatory practice fell below everybody’s expectations.
In spite of this reinforcement and of the collaboration with the troi-
ka’s experts during the programme, the Portuguese authorities were 
unable to avoid the failure of BES, then the third-largest bank operat-
ing in Portugal, in July 2014. This event, occurring after years of alleg-
edly tight scrutiny and examination involving the Bank of Portugal, the 
ECB (as part of the troika even before the start of European banking 
supervision in 2014), the European Commission and the IMF, was 
clearly detrimental to the public perception of the effectiveness of 
bank supervision and regulation128. The negative public perception in 
Portugal of the effectiveness of banking regulation concerns all rele-
vant players, although local politicians (especially members of parlia-
ment) have singled out the Bank of Portugal as the source of the lack of 
effectiveness and inadequate pre-emptive measures that these cases 
arguably illustrate.
The ECB’s comprehensive assessment of euro-area banks hap-
pened at the same time as the BES debacle. The assessment initially 
included CGD, BPI, Millennium BCP and Espírito Santo Financial 
Group, but the BES resolution led to the latter being removed from 
128  In spite of this lack of confidence expressed in the media and via opinion polls, 
total deposits in Portugal were not affected, with most of the deposits departing 
BES/Novo Banco going to other Portuguese banks, notably state-owned CGD.
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the list. CGD and BPI passed the test, while Millenium BCP failed 
the stress test under the adverse scenario129. The asset quality review 
of 2014 strengthened confidence in the Portuguese banks’ bal-
ance sheets. Nevertheless, some evidence indicates that, though it 
was demanding and fairly rigorous, the examination failed to take 
into account the fact that some of the banks’ assets are parked at 
above-market prices in so-called ‘restructuring funds’. From 2011 
onwards, some of the major banks, notably BES and Millenium BCP 
(and to a lesser extent Montepio, a smaller bank, and only residu-
ally CGD), transferred NPLs and other soon-to-be-troubled loans to 
nominally independent funds at close to book value, in exchange for 
participating units in these funds, becoming the sole participants of 
each of these funds. It seems that, as of the time of writing, these units 
are still valued above market prices, in spite of recent adjustments. 
Although the Bank of Portugal has placed a capital surcharge on such 
holdings, there is an obvious potential for further capital consumption 
in case they are brought to market prices, or if the funds fail to generate 
the additional value necessary to bring the assets’ intrinsic value close 
to the current balance sheet valuation130. Total amounts parked exceed 
€3 billion. A mark-to-market valuation of the banks’ holdings in some 
of these independent vehicles could enhance the size of their capital 
needs, especially for those that had most recourse to such schemes. 
True sales of NPL portfolios have been small in number, thus making 
it more difficult to provide a market test of the value of problematic 
assets.
129 The Bank of Portugal added that BCP had already identified a set of measures 
to fully cover the shortfall detected, and that, in the particular case of BCP, the 
stress test did not fully reflect the globally positive developments resulting from 
the implementation of the restructuring plan negotiated with the European 
Commission.
130 The market sentiment is that, in most cases, these values are currently above 
market levels, thus implying a hidden loss.
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Another controversy arose with the resolution in December 2015 
of Banif (designated an LSI by European banking supervision). As 
mentioned above, the bank benefited from state support in 2012, but 
the operation’s approval by the European Commission’s Competition 
Directorate-General never took place because DG COMP maintained 
that Banif had failed to demonstrate sustainable economic viability. 
In the week prior to the resolution, leaks appeared in the Portuguese 
press that the bank had to be resolved. The subsequent bank run led to 
its application for emergency support, which was denied, and resolu-
tion mechanisms were then activated. The operation resulted in the 
separation of the original bank into a bad bank, a platform managing 
NPLs (named Oitante), and the sale of branches, deposits and per-
forming loans to Santander Totta for €150 million. Public support from 
the Portuguese authorities amounted to €2.255 billion, to cover future 
contingencies, of which €1.77 billion came directly from the Treasury 
and the remaining €489 million was provided through Portugal’s reso-
lution fund, benefitting from a government guarantee131. 
The Bank of Portugal’s supervision of Banif has been called into 
question by many politicians and commentators. As noted previously, 
the Bank of Portugal has established permanent teams in the most 
relevant institutions and has been showing a more proactive stance 
than in the past. Nevertheless, the Banif case – notably the lengthy and 
inconclusive period of discussions involving the bank’s management, 
the Bank of Portugal, the Government of Portugal and DG COMP – was 
seen by many as further evidence of the supervisor’s lack of effective-
ness, and thus reignited criticism of the Bank of Portugal’s allegedly 
dovish approach. This has led the public to take a more favourable 
attitude to the direct role of the ECB in supervising Portuguese banks, 
although, as noted before, more sophisticated analysts have raised 
doubts about the ECB’s ability to effectively supervise the system 
131 When the resolution occurred, the Portuguese state was already creditor for 
€825 million, €700 million of which was shares of the bank and €125 million was 
unpaid CoCos.
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at this juncture, since the ECB was involved in the monitoring of 
Portuguese banks during the 2011-14 assistance programme and was 
unable to pre-empt the problems in BES and in Banif. There has been 
great pressure, especially from politicians, for changes in the appoint-
ment of the Bank of Portugal’s top officials, especially the governor, 
and their accountability to elected representatives. On 2 May 2016, 
the government announced the creation of a working group including 
the governor of the Bank of Portugal, the president of the insurance 
regulator and the president of the securities regulator, to propose new 
institutional arrangements for financial markets regulation, including 
bank supervision. In addition, the pressure on the Bank of Portugal 
from politicians and public opinion might have smoothed the ECB’s 
entry into direct regulation of local players, by indirectly fostering a 
collaborative approach between the staff of the two institutions: there 
are absolutely no reports of any problems in the daily relationship 
between the supervisory staff of the ECB and Bank of Portugal. 
There is, however, a growing sentiment that the Bank of Portugal 
is, in practice, being led by the ECB (and, in some cases, also by 
DG COMP) in addressing some of the most delicate situations, such 
as the recent resolution of Banif. In the Banif case, the Portuguese 
press made express reference to an email sent by Danièle Nouy 
to Portuguese Finance Minister Centeno132 allegedly promoting 
Santander as the purchaser of the ‘good bank’ and mentioning her 
knowledge that alternative offers from US funds were found not to be 
compliant with European state aid rules by the European Commission. 
This episode reinforced the perception of a de-facto secondary role 
played by the Bank of Portugal, although the latter publicly assumed 
responsibility for the resolution.
One argument that is often made in Portugal is that the approach 
to bank problems taken by the Bank of Portugal during the 2011-14 
132  See among other reports Bernado Ferrão and João Pereira, ‘Bruxelas ordenou 
venda do Banif ao Santander’, Expresso, 22 January 2016.
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assistance programme was gradual, avoiding the upfront capitalisa-
tion of banks that had been suggested by the troika. In January 2016, 
Governor Costa stated that he opposed the upfront approach “since 
that would imply resources not available in Portugal’s rescue package”. 
He added that “an exercise performed at the time showed that such 
front loading would have a financial impact between 28 percent and 
33 percent of GDP”133. There is a sense in the market that the scrutiny 
became gradually more demanding and rigorous and that the advent 
of European banking supervision in 2014 was an obvious incentive 
for improved procedures at the Bank of Portugal. Greater proactivity, 
first by the Bank of Portugal and now with direct ECB intervention, has 
improved the quality of the banks’ balance sheets. Gradual recognition 
of impairments, as seen above, has had a direct effect on the quality 
of bank statements but has also generated increased stress on grad-
ually worn-out capital ratios. At the time of writing, there are great 
expectations about the handling of the forthcoming recapitalisation 
of state-owned CGD, seen by depositors as a cornerstone of Portugal’s 
banking sector (with more than four million private clients, most of 
them depositors, in a country of 10 million inhabitants), and about the 
positions of DG COMP and the ECB on the issue.
It is also expected that the ECB will be more demanding on the 
suitability of the shareholders of banks large and small. This is an  area 
in which the ECB has clearly increased compliance requirements. In 
the case of BPI, the ECB forced the separation of Portuguese activities 
from its large Angolan exposure. This resulted in negotiations involv-
ing the bank management, the Santoro company of Angola (owner 
of close to 20 percent of BPI and 49 percent of Angola’s BFA, in which 
BPI has a 51 percent controlling stake), CaixaBank (BPI’s main share-
holder with 44 percent of the capital, but voting rights that were until 
recently restricted to just 20 percent), an envoy from Portugal’s prime 
minister, and even the President of the Republic. After an agreement 
133  University of Lisbon, January 2016.
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was announcing to the market, the situation became confused and 
the government of Portugal eventually published a decree eliminating 
restrictions on voting rights in banks, including BPI. CaixaBank then 
launched an offer for 100 percent of BPI’s shares, and negotiations 
between BPI’s shareholders subsequently resumed at the end of April 
2016. 
All in all, the start of SSM regulation in Portugal has been well 
accepted, at least for daily supervisory activities, and the day-to-day 
joint work with the Bank of Portugal seems to be running smoothly. 
But it is perceived differently by Portuguese public opinion and the 
business community when there are large one-off interventions, 
because the sequence of such interventions (BPP, then BPN, then BES 
and most recently Banif) has generated public resentment towards 
banks and the use of public money or public guarantees to rescue 
them. The business community expects that improved regulation 
could reduce the risk of such occurrences, and understands that 
guaranteeing financial stability in an unstable environment comes                      
at a cost.
In political terms, the most talked-about issue at time of writing 
is the ownership of banks and the apparent bias of the ECB in favour 
of a consolidation path that could allow major Spanish banks to take 
over all of the major Portuguese banks except CGD, the privatisation 
of which is not currently being considered. Although there is no direct 
evidence of an actual bias, this theme has been on the political agenda 
since Santander Totta’s involvement in the resolution of Banif. It has 
led to calls from a number of prominent individuals, including Novo 
Banco’s first CEO (for a brief period in the summer of 2014) and sev-
eral past finance ministers, for the cancelation of the current process 
of selling Novo Banco, though a cancelation remains highly unlikely. 
Unlike the previous government, which insisted on non-interference, 
the current government has openly defended direct intervention in 
supposed coordination with supervisors and market players, as the 
BPI case illustrates. The president, who constitutionally has no say 
151 | EUROPEAN BANKING SUPERVISION: THE FIRST EIGHTEEN MONTHS
in these matters, has admitted to being involved at least in the BPI 
shareholder dispute, something that would have been highly unlikely 
under the previous president Cavaco Silva. On 1 May 2016, a mani-
festo signed by several previous ministers, business leaders and top 
executives of the Bank of Portugal, including a former governor, called 
for caution in the process to avoid “dominance by one single country”, 
an obvious reference to the possible scenario in which Spanish banks 
might end up owning most of Portugal’s banking sector. The situation 
remains highly fluid at the time of writing, meaning the lessons for 
European banking supervision are not yet clear.
11 Spain
David Vegara
The Spanish banking system 
The financial crisis has profoundly changed the Spanish banking 
system. The housing boom prior to the crisis, accumulated macro-
economic disequilibria, the disruption in euro-area sovereign debt 
markets and the sharp reversal of private external financing flows 
beginning in the second half of 2011 all combined to put the whole 
system under severe stress.
The most affected subsystem has been the savings banks (Cajas). 
The crisis revealed several weaknesses in many of them. Savings                    
banks previously had no actual shareholders; they were governed by 
a broad range of public and private stakeholders, and they did not 
distribute profits. Consequently, their ability to raise external equity 
was limited, contributing to inadequate capital buffers in the run-up 
to the crisis. Political interference by the savings banks’ public-sector 
stakeholders also adversely affected financial stability, while a division 
of supervisory responsibilities between the Bank of Spain and regional 
governments undermined the effectiveness of oversight of the savings 
banks (IMF, 2014).
An ESM-financed financial sector programme was adopted in 
July 2012 amid a deep recession, severe financial market turmoil, 
sharply rising NPLs, falling bank capital, soaring borrowing costs for 
banks and the sovereign, tighter credit conditions for households 
and firms, shrinking economic activity and rising unemployment. All 
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these left a significant portion of the banking system undercapitalised,    
which in turn further undermined confidence and the already very 
difficult outlook.
The programme provided around €40 billion to support the 
recapitalisation process. An independent asset quality review and 
stress testing exercise identified those banks that were sound, those 
that were weak but viable (and were subsequently recapitalised), and 
those that were unviable (for which restructuring/resolution plans 
were adopted). Additional measures included the bail-in of unvia-
ble banks’ subordinated debt and preference shares, the transfer of 
loans and other assets to a newly incorporated asset management 
company (SAREB, Sociedad de Gestión de Activos procedentes de 
la Reestructuración Bancaria) and private capital-raising efforts.                        
The legal regime for savings banks was improved, and the Bank of 
Spain’s regulatory and supervisory powers and procedures were 
strengthened.
As a result of this process and of previous injections of public capi-
tal, the Spanish government (via its Fund for an Orderly Restructuring 
of the Banking System, or FROB) became the controlling owner of a 
significant part of the banking sector, holding an estimated 18 percent 
of all loans in the system, with plans to gradually divest. Ten institu-
tions have been resolved and the number of savings banks reduced 
to eight, from 45 at the beginning of the crisis. The ESM-supported 
programme was completed in January 2014, and Spanish banks passed 
the SSM’s 2014 comprehensive assessment with only minor capital 
needs identified (only one Spanish bank, Liberbank, was among the 25 
that failed the assessment as of end-2013, and it had no capital short-
fall left as of September 2014).
Even so, the Spanish banking sector has not completed its recovery. 
The sector-wide return on equity was around 5 percent in 2015, well 
below the cost of capital. Credit growth has been negative in Spain 
since the beginning of the crisis and only in early 2016 did it start to 
show timid signs of positive year-on-year growth, while the sector has 
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seen a decrease of over 25 percent in its labour force and number of 
branches since 2010 (Banco de España, 2014). The total consolidated 
assets of Spanish banks, including Spanish and foreign operations, 
reached €3.66 trillion, or 3.6 times GDP (Banco de España, 2015).
In the wake of the consolidation of savings banks, there are now 
14 significant institutions. These include the two large international 
groups, Santander and BBVA; three domestic medium-sized pri-
vate-sector groups, namely Banco Sabadell, Banco Popular and 
Bankinter; seven groups resulting from the consolidation of savings 
banks, namely Caixabank, Bankia (still owned by FROB), Unicaja, 
Ibercaja, Kutxabank, Liberbank and Banco Mare Nostrum (owned by 
FROB); Abanca, a former savings bank acquired in 2014 by Venezuela’s 
Banesco group; and Cajamar, a cooperative group. Less significant 
institutions include small rural savings banks and subsidiaries of inter-
national banking groups.
The Bank of Spain (Banco de España) is the national supervisory 
authority while the FROB acts as the national resolution authority.
Overall assessment 
The establishment of European banking supervision and its initial 
steps are generally seen in a positive light by the Spanish banking 
community. With the advent of the SSM, the European project fol-
lowed the route of increased economic and financial integration in 
difficult times. Together with improved fiscal surveillance (the fiscal 
compact) and the creation of the ESM, the banking union is seen as 
having enabled the euro area to increase its financial and economic 
ties significantly, even though it was done in the middle of a severe 
financial crisis.
European banking supervision, which was difficult to imagine not 
long ago, is now a reality and has achieved significant successes in the 
face of the main challenges that confronted it. On the organisational 
front, it had to establish itself and hire hundreds of highly qualified 
professionals. On the institutional front, it had to develop a brand and 
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a reputation quickly and in difficult times.
In general, private–sector participants in the Spanish banking 
system point out that the SSM has contributed decisively to the finan-
cial stability of the euro area and has established itself as a professional 
and reputable supervisory institution, and is on its way towards estab-
lishing a genuine European supervisory culture. All are impressive 
achievements, especially given the diversity of the previous super-
visory cultures of euro-area member states. Both private and public 
players underline that before European banking supervision was born, 
there seemed to be less consensus among national supervisors on how 
and what to supervise, than among monetary policymakers before the 
creation of the euro.
Furthermore, on top of all these achievements, the SSM begins its 
second year at full speed with a general consensus among private-sec-
tor participants that it has been able to design a framework that is 
broadly perceived as fair by the supervised entities, with no critically 
relevant biases.
As in any process of such complexity and ambition, there are still 
areas where full speed or a steady-state situation has not yet been 
achieved. On this, comments can be grouped in four areas:
Ex-post versus forward-looking supervision
Pre-SSM, supervision by the Bank of Spain had a reputation of being 
quite intrusive (including through on-site supervision), with a focus 
on data, asset valuation, classification for accounting purposes, credit 
risk analysis, collateral valuation and provisioning. The main objective 
was to identify potential provisioning deficits. The central bank was 
also responsible for defining the accounting framework for banks. 
This approach could be labelled ex-post supervision. By contrast, the 
forward-looking focus of the SSM has been a real change.
The SSM has tended to focus on elements with a forward-looking 
component: sustainability of the business model, corporate govern-
ance, risk management and risk appetite, whether procedures and 
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reporting are adequately established and clear, and deadlines fulfil-
ment, among others. It seems to focus more on how the institution is 
organised internally, and on whether it is well prepared for unexpected 
events, being quite hands-on in this regard. It also leads a process of 
convergence towards best practices in these areas. Thus, the SSM-led 
change for Spanish banks, unlike in other countries, has not been so 
much an issue of the intrusiveness of supervision, but rather an issue 
of its focus and scrutiny.
The new approach has arguably improved the quality and broad-
ened the scope of supervision, with internal implications for the banks, 
from the organisation of credit committees all the way up to their top 
management and boards. The new system is more based on rules 
and procedures, but also on significant amounts of information being 
provided by the banks at the ECB’s request without full understanding 
of its purpose and final use, an area in which the ECB could provide 
some further feedback.
While this broader and more systematic approach is welcome, it 
would benefit from incorporation of more elements of ex-post super-
vision, with a focus on asset valuation, classification or provisioning 
policies. Admittedly, such issues are still to a great extent under the 
umbrella of national supervisors, but a framework for a common 
methodology and interpretation could be established. In fact, this is 
what was done in the 2014 asset quality review or, more recently, in the 
review of NPL definitions. The implementation of the IFRS9 standard 
for financial instruments accounting will be another good opportunity 
for this, in a context in which member states will also have to limit the 
use of national exceptions.
From a legal perspective, many of the tools for both ex-post and 
forward-looking supervision will be kept in the hands of national 
authorities and policymakers, at least for a while (for example some 
interpretations of accounting standards). But even so, there should 
be scope for convergence towards best practices and a broadening of 
the scope of supervision. This would also help mitigate the risk of a 
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one-size-fits-all model of supervision (see below).
Communication issues
Communication issues are always a challenge when new institutions 
are set up, and European banking supervision has been no excep-
tion. It has not helped that deadlines have been very tight, and that 
the initial steps took place in the middle of a difficult situation with a 
European banking sector emerging from the financial crisis.
Investors’ appetite for Spanish banks’ securities, and hence their 
cost of capital, have been affected by uncertainties about the final 
treatment of deferred tax assets and, more recently, about the frame-
work to determine banks’ maximum distributable amounts. Lack of 
clarity on whether and how to communicate SREP exercise results 
has not helped either. More generally, there has also been uncertainty 
about whether the current levels of capital were seen as sufficient by 
ECB banking supervision, or whether additional requirements where 
still lying ahead. In this context, the recent ECB clarifications that cap-
ital requirements would not increase further have been very welcome, 
as have been a series of clarifying workshops held by the SSM on a 
variety of issues that have improved communication and feedback to 
and from banks.
There is concern about the results of several ongoing discussions, 
including those on potential changes in risk weights for public debt, 
IFRS9 implementation and internal models. All of these could have 
significant impact, and hence communication will continue to be very 
relevant.
Finally, while the whole institutional setup of the banking union is 
rather complex, with several European-level institutions (such as the 
ECB, SRB and EBA) interacting with national authorities, it is essential 
to maintain adequate coordination among the different institutions 
and to ensure consistency of messages and criteria.
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Subsidiaries, diversification and the risk of a one-size-fits-all 
approach
The Spanish international banks’ expansion into Latin America and 
other regions was undertaken via local subsidiaries with a high level 
of autonomy. Supervision is undertaken at local level, as is capital and 
liquidity management in most cases.
Some elements of this model seem not to have been taken suffi-
ciently into account in the SSM’s supervision of international groups. 
The subsidiary model is less common among intra-EU or intra-eu-
ro-area cross-border banking operations, where branches and a less 
decentralised framework are more widely used. This latter model can 
certainly be seen as more in line with an ideal EU single market for 
banking services, because it is likely to reduce fixed costs, enhance 
financial integration and generate economies of scale. But it is less 
common in the context of non-EU retail banking operations.
In addition, it would seem reasonable to accept that the risk profile 
and correlations (macro, but not only) are not the same intra-EU and 
with Latin America, for example. Together with the different levels of 
risk, these differences should be taken into account in various super-
visory areas. Among others, the design of stress test scenarios should 
consider the lower correlation of economic cycles and other specific 
issues: for example, not assuming a simultaneous deflationary pro-
cess in several big Latin American economies as a likely scenario. If 
correlation is not perfect, then there should be some benefits arising 
from geographical diversification. This can also be true of geographical 
diversification inside the EU or euro area.
This geographical diversification and different legal structures 
could also be considered in the context of potential resolution sce-
narios (single or multiple point of entry). Recognising and analysing 
different banking models on the basis of their own merits might make 
supervision more complex, but would help to avoid risks embedded 
in a one-size-fits-all approach. This risk is not immaterial, especially if 
one adds to the equation the fact that a more structured supervisory 
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framework allows less flexibility and discretion to the supervisors.
Internal challenges
Setting up an institution like the SSM inevitably involves less-public, 
more-internal challenges, the addressing of which also critically affects 
the institution’s credibility. The establishment of Joint Supervisory 
Teams, which is now a reality on the ground, with JST leaders from 
outside each bank’s home country and involving different cultures and 
languages, is certainly a success. JSTs seem to be working efficiently, 
though alignment of working methods and focus among different JSTs 
is not yet fully achieved.
Furthermore, and perhaps at least partly because of the legal 
framework under which European banking supervision was estab-
lished, there is a view among Spanish bankers that procedures are very 
heavy and time consuming. Approvals and decision-making processes 
take a long time, and the perception is that these delays are excessive, 
for example for the vetting of a bank’s board members.
Finally, European banking supervision will have to strike the 
inherently difficult balance when it comes to rotating supervisory staff 
between different banks. If teams spend long periods supervising a 
particular bank, they can become too close to the supervised entity. 
But quick rotations do not allow the supervisors to fully benefit from 
the knowledge that is acquired with experience and time. This is an 
issue that other institutions have had to confront, for example the IMF 
with its country teams. Some rotation within teams is probably part of 
a reasonable solution.
All in all, the SSM has been a success. Broadening the scope of 
supervision, improving communication, avoiding a one-size-fits-all 
supervisory approach and tackling some internal issues and proce-
dures will improve it even further.
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